08.05.2013 Views

Jury Think ™ The Social Psychology Of Group Deliberation

Jury Think ™ The Social Psychology Of Group Deliberation

Jury Think ™ The Social Psychology Of Group Deliberation

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Lynbrook, NY New York City Washington, DC<br />

1-800-875-8705 Fax 516-823-4400<br />

www.DOAR.com<br />

<strong>Jury</strong> <strong>Think</strong> <br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong> <strong>Of</strong><br />

<strong>Group</strong> <strong>Deliberation</strong><br />

Written by<br />

Steven Lybrand, Ph.D.,<br />

Jim Dobson & Samuel H. Solomon


“<strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong>”: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong> of <strong>Group</strong> <strong>Deliberation</strong><br />

Steven Lybrand Ph.D.*<br />

James Dobson<br />

Samuel H. Solomon<br />

DOAR Litigation Support & Trial Services<br />

ABSTRACT<br />

In the past two decades, the field of jury research has demonstrated that<br />

individuals serving on juries are especially susceptible to the powerful<br />

currents of group influence. In this paper, we will examine the tendency of<br />

jurors to subordinate their own -- presumably unique -- opinions as they<br />

work toward a unanimous verdict. In short, individuals serving on juries<br />

become susceptible to a form of group influence we have coined<br />

<strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong>. Without an understanding of <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong>, litigating attorneys<br />

are rolling the dice against powerful forces they may be unprepared to<br />

control. <strong>The</strong> good news is that jury research, if done with methodological<br />

rigor, can uncover how <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong> operates in particular cases.<br />

Introduction: Understanding Individualism<br />

As Americans, we have long felt that one of the defining characteristics of our<br />

culture is our rugged individualism. With roots going back to the early colonists<br />

in New England, American self-reliance expresses itself both in our publicly<br />

stated policies to remain free of what George Washington called “entangling”<br />

alliances and in our collective fantasies in which film stars such as John Wayne<br />

and Gary Cooper are celebrated for their willingness to “go it alone” outside the<br />

influence of the community.<br />

In a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2002, 65 percent of<br />

Americans reported that they believe success in life depends on forces within<br />

their individual control. In Germany only 32 percent of respondents felt this way,<br />

while in India, less than 20 percent of those polled felt that they controlled their<br />

own destiny. While it is true that many Americans have significant opportunities<br />

for individual advancement, we might ask if this picture of ourselves as free and<br />

autonomous individuals is an accurate description of how we actually think and<br />

behave. This issue becomes significant when we consider the impact of how<br />

individuals engage in decision making within a group setting.<br />

1


As jury consultants, we are intimately aware of how even those people most<br />

committed to their individual points of view are affected by the power of the<br />

group. When sitting in a room with up to a dozen other people, it is very difficult<br />

not to be affected by the opinion of your peers, even if you remain unaware of the<br />

subtle influence of the group (some have argued that social influence achieves<br />

its most potent form when it operates below the radar of conscious awareness).<br />

For years, we have watched how the opinions of even those individuals doggedly<br />

committed to their opinions have their ideas ground down as they are subjected<br />

to the powerful forces of group deliberation. <strong>The</strong> much-vaunted American<br />

individualism turns out to be a rather weak force in the face of the collective<br />

power of the jury. How does this group influence operate and what situational<br />

forces could be powerful enough to bring to heel individuals whose opinions<br />

seem so settled when the deliberation began? To understand the powerful<br />

forces that operate in jury deliberations, we must turn to the research tradition<br />

that takes seriously the extraordinary power of interpersonal influence.<br />

From <strong>Group</strong>think to <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong><br />

In <strong>Group</strong>think, Irving Janis’s classic work on group dynamics first published in<br />

1972, the author argues that individuals brought together to make decisions tend<br />

to act in ways that cannot be predicted from their prior beliefs and attitudes.<br />

Janis notes that individuals in groups tend to suppress their more idiosyncratic<br />

beliefs in the interest of achieving group consensus. Those whose opinions start<br />

out in conflict with that of the majority are put under various forms of social<br />

pressure – from subtle to blatant – to bring their opinions into line with the<br />

dominant thinking of the group. In some interesting cases, individuals with ideas<br />

in conflict with the majority can sometimes persuade the majority to “flip,” thereby<br />

creating a new center of gravity to which the others feel compelled to conform.<br />

While not the norm, this shift does occur in cases in which the evidence is less<br />

than fully convincing and the jurors’ commitment to their positions is shallow.<br />

For Janis, the idea of the individual as a distinct and autonomous being (and<br />

therefore free of the pressures of the social group), begins to dissolve under the<br />

sway of forces that in the 19 th century used to be called the “group mind.” In<br />

many areas of social life (when we are with friends, with family, at work, etc.),<br />

individuals seem to sacrifice (often unknowingly) their independent judgment in<br />

the interest of the maintaining “good relations” (or what social psychologists call<br />

group cohesiveness or solidarity). That is, when we are with others, there are<br />

strong norms that encourage us to moderate our idiosyncratic beliefs in the<br />

interest of group harmony.<br />

2


While the old conception of a supra-individual “group mind” has not survived the<br />

test of scientific scrutiny, the powerful psychological forces that Janis identified<br />

under the label of “groupthink” are real and operate in some of the most<br />

important arenas of social life, including the one institution established by society<br />

where we are empowered to judge our fellow citizens: the jury trial.<br />

Individualistic Approaches to the Study of <strong>Jury</strong> Decision Making<br />

Largely oblivious to Janis’s findings, the research on decision making within<br />

juries has long suffered from an overemphasis on the individual level of analysis<br />

at the expense of group processes. <strong>The</strong> oldest model of jury decision making is<br />

J.H. Davis’s <strong>Social</strong> Decision Scheme (SDS) in which it is proposed that the final<br />

group verdict can be explained by means of a mathematical formula that simply<br />

sums up the decisions of individual jurors prior to deliberation. In order to make<br />

his model work mathematically, Davis had to assume that jurors would not<br />

change their opinion during the course of the deliberations, an assumption that<br />

many critics rightly found too limiting for understanding actual jury behavior.<br />

Later models, such as N.H. Anderson’s Information Integration <strong>The</strong>ory or that of<br />

Jo-Ellan Dimitrius’s intuitional model of juror assessment discussed in her 1998<br />

book, Reading People, while less dependent on limiting mathematical<br />

assumptions, still suffer from an exclusive focus on individual level phenomena.<br />

Dimitrius claims to be able to “read” individuals through the use of intuitional<br />

skills, but sidesteps altogether actual group deliberations. It seems that few<br />

researchers are willing to take on juries in their full complexity as actively<br />

functioning groups, yet in their failure to do so, these researchers miss how jury<br />

deliberations involve an almost roller-coaster ride of haphazard recollection,<br />

emotional turmoil, rational deliberation and eventual compromise as the group<br />

lurches toward a legally mandated unanimous decision (or, in those cases in<br />

which the center does not hold, a hung jury).<br />

In the place of the above individualistic models of jury decision making we would<br />

like to propose a more nuanced conception of jury deliberations that attempts to<br />

do for jury behavior what Janis did for policy making behavior. <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong> refers<br />

to the social psychological group dynamics that draw the individual juror out of<br />

him or her self into the broader currents of group decision-making. We will spend<br />

the rest of the article outlining how this new conception of deliberation operates<br />

within juries and how an understanding of this behavior can lead to more<br />

efficacious attorney-juror communication.<br />

3


<strong>The</strong> Dynamics of <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong><br />

What happens when jurors, after days, weeks or even months of trial testimony<br />

and argument, finally come to the deliberation phase of the legal process?<br />

Although the experience varies with the type of case, in our own specialty area,<br />

complex commercial litigation, the overwhelming experience of jurors is a sense<br />

of relief that the swirl of conflicting facts and testimony (and lawyerly posturing) is<br />

finally at an end. As the trial unfolds, each juror tries to make sense of the<br />

arguments presented by constructing a story or narrative (or drawing on a<br />

narrative already constructed for him/her by the attorneys) that makes sense of<br />

the facts as he/she understands them.<br />

In a recent case we studied, the plaintiff’s story, while hardly compelling in strictly<br />

legal terms, was simple, easy to understand and much less cognitively<br />

demanding than the defendant’s more complex and fact-laden story. When the<br />

jurors retired to deliberate, they collectively attempted to work out which of the<br />

two stories presented to them was the more convincing. One juror recalled a<br />

piece of the evidence that had confused him during argument. Other jurors<br />

weighed in on the issue, clarifying how that fact piece fit into the story as they<br />

understood it. <strong>The</strong>n another juror, whose memory had been jogged by the<br />

exchange, brought up a point of fact she could not make sense of within the<br />

framework of the story that had just been discussed. <strong>The</strong> back and forth<br />

discussion continued in this fashion for some time. As it unfolded, it became very<br />

clear that the plaintiff’s more simple narrative was the one that resonated with the<br />

jurors, and thus was the story that finally carried the day. It seemed that the<br />

defendant’s more technical case, while legally and factually sound, was unable to<br />

achieve a critical mass with the jurors. Why?<br />

In the above case, as in many others like it, individual jurors are often confused<br />

by the testimony and are desperate for some sense of coherence or meaning.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y turn to others in the jury for information and reassurance of the working<br />

story they had internalized during the trial. <strong>The</strong> group then becomes a reservoir<br />

for ideas and interpretations to which the entire group can contribute and draw<br />

from. Before long, a collective narrative or story emerges that starts to gather<br />

together all the facts of the case in a way that makes sense to the collective. At<br />

that point, the deliberations become larger than any one individual, no matter<br />

how persuasive that one individual may be, as he or she must ultimately deal<br />

with the narrative reservoir as it has been constituted by the group. And with this<br />

new collective reality, we are out of the realm of individual thought and into the<br />

realm of <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong>.<br />

4


In the thick of <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong>, individuals, while still individuals in some physical<br />

sense, are no longer free to say anything they want, as “deviant” contributions<br />

are quickly countered and either rejected or assimilated into the dominant<br />

narrative. Individuals who insist on clinging onto narrative-discrepant facts or<br />

counter-narratives are subject to increasing forms of pressure to abandon their<br />

position. While some lone wolves try to hold out, most mortals eventually relent<br />

as the criticism, ostracism and the potential for exclusion is far too painful an<br />

experience for most mere mortals (the Amish practice of shunning is a clear case<br />

of using the power of the group to bring the wayward into line).<br />

Lessons for Litigation<br />

Developments in jury research suggest that there are some important lessons<br />

that can be used to craft legal strategy.<br />

1. Litigators should be aware that jury selection, while important, is not the<br />

only arrow they have in their quiver. <strong>The</strong> simple fact is that in many<br />

venues, voir dire is severely limited, which leaves attorneys with little<br />

knowledge about the pre-existing attitudes of the jurors actually hearing<br />

the case. In addition, to focus on individual juror characteristics (as is the<br />

practice of many jury consultants), in our view, is shortsighted. Indeed, in<br />

many instances individual juror attitudes are not always predictive of<br />

actual behavior during deliberation. Decades of research attempting to<br />

use personality characteristics to predict situation-specific behaviors (such<br />

as jury deliberation behavior) have largely failed due to the power of what<br />

we have called <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong>. <strong>Jury</strong> deliberations are powerful collective<br />

situations where no man or woman is an island and where one is forced to<br />

respond to the arguments of others. Knowledge of the attitudes and<br />

predispositions brought by individual jurors to the trial, while useful for deselecting<br />

obviously problematic jurors, may be less useful in<br />

understanding how jurors will vote collectively at the end of the day.<br />

2. Having said the above, insofar as the venue allows for voir dire, questions<br />

should be asked that identify leadership or dominance characteristics of<br />

people in order to determine who will likely attempt to asset “control” over<br />

their peers. While it is the rare among us who can convince a half-dozen<br />

or more peers to flip their thinking completely, there are people who<br />

possess an almost animal sense of the mood of the group and who use<br />

this to sway the group toward their preferred position.<br />

5


3. In the legal realm, the equivalent to location, location, location would be:<br />

story, story, story. Jurors need to understand how all the pieces of the<br />

puzzle fit together, in short, how they all fit together as a coherent story.<br />

<strong>The</strong> jurors who have been able to make sense of the case as a story are<br />

able to help the other jurors who are uncertain or confused as to the<br />

contours of the case. If well-constructed by the attorney, their story not<br />

only provides a framework within which to place the evidence, it also<br />

provides answers to any questions the jurors will generate.<br />

4. Using focus groups and mock trials, we have studied how jurors<br />

collectively make sense of the case as it has been presented by the<br />

attorneys. If there is one “law” of jury consulting, it would have to be that<br />

until you’ve actually tried your case in front of a jury (or a simulated jury),<br />

you really have no idea how it will actually be heard and accepted by<br />

members of the group. Even seasoned attorneys express astonishment<br />

when they attend focus groups and, standing behind a one-way mirror,<br />

watch <strong>Jury</strong><strong>Think</strong> at work. Even the most exquisite legal arguments can<br />

be construed by mock juries in ways no one had anticipated. This type of<br />

jury research is actual empirical research: we cannot be 100% certain of<br />

how an argument will fly until we actually test it in front of a panel of jurors.<br />

5. If it is necessary to monitor how the actual case is unfolding at trial, it may<br />

be advisable to run shadow juries in order to make sure the pre-tested<br />

arguments are coming through as planned. <strong>The</strong>y’ve proven to be an<br />

invaluable source of real time data. For more information on shadow<br />

juries please contact me at jdobson@doar.com.<br />

Author Biographies<br />

Steven Lybrand Ph.D.<br />

Steven Lybrand is a member of DOAR’s <strong>Jury</strong> Research and Analytical Graphics division<br />

and is a specialist in jury research and litigation strategy. Dr. Lybrand specializes in the<br />

social psychology of jury decision making and in the interpretation of complex legal<br />

information. Dr. Lybrand, formerly the Director of Criminal Justice and a tenured<br />

professor of sociology at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, has coauthored<br />

several publications including "Symbolic Racism in Candidate Evaluation: An<br />

Experiment." Political Behavior, Volume 12, No. 4: pp 385-402 and “Synthesis of<br />

phosphatidylethanol-a potential marker for adult males at risk for alcoholism." Proceedings<br />

of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 85, pp. 9778-9782. Dr. Lybrand is also an<br />

award-winning documentary filmmaker and producer whose films have aired on PBS.<br />

Steven holds a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He can be reached at<br />

slybrand@doar.com.<br />

6


James Dobson<br />

As Director of Research & Analytical Graphics, Mr. Dobson oversees both the jury<br />

research and trial graphics teams involved in the design and implementation of courtroom<br />

presentations. In support of DOAR clients, he has personally developed extensive<br />

research designs and reports in a wide range of both civil and criminal cases dealing with<br />

highly complex issues. Mr. Dobson’s skilled methods in focus group facilitation uncover<br />

the underlying perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that are critically important in<br />

understanding how the modern juror assesses arguments. In addition, Jim oversees a<br />

group of highly specialized litigation artist who craft persuasive trial graphics based on<br />

jury research findings. Jim is a much sought after speaker and consultant in the area of<br />

graphic design as it relates to juror perceptions. Jim is a co-author of “What Juries Want<br />

to Hear II: Reverse Engineering the Verdict,” published in the Temple University Law<br />

Review.<br />

Jim has a BA in Human Relations, a MA in Sociology and is currently writing his Ph.D.<br />

dissertation entitled “Exorcism and Criminally Deviant Behavior in Contemporary<br />

America: media reaction and criminal justice decisions in five high-profile cases” at<br />

Fordham University. He can be reached at jdobson@doar.com.<br />

Samuel H. Solomon<br />

Samuel H. Solomon, with over 30 years experience in the legal, financial and information<br />

technology industries is a CEO, legal strategist, and prominent speaker. His command of<br />

the intricacies of trial strategy, visual persuasion and courtroom presentation technology<br />

have led to the formation of DOAR. During the past 5 years, his scope has broadened to<br />

include issues facing firms in document and electronic discovery. Founded in 1989,<br />

DOAR offers litigation and trial support services to law firms and systems integration<br />

technology to courts and corporations representing more than 3,000 clients nationwide.<br />

Sam’s unique perspective, eclectic education and varied background make him a much<br />

sought-after speaker and consultant. His most recent presentations have covered Trial<br />

Presentation Strategy, Courtroom Communication, <strong>Jury</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong>, Electronic Evidence<br />

and Discovery and <strong>The</strong> Impact of Information Technology on the American Justice<br />

System. He recently co-authored “What Juries Want to Hear II: Reverse Engineering the<br />

Verdict” in <strong>The</strong> Temple Law Review and PowerPoint for Litigators, the seminal work on<br />

the presentation of evidence using technology, published by NITA Press. In 2002, he<br />

contributed to two critically acclaimed works: Handbook on Courtroom Technology – A<br />

Lawyers Guide and A Judges Guide by NITA Press. He is an instructor in the LLM<br />

Advocacy program at Temple University Law School, the Hanley Advanced Advocacy<br />

Program for NITA and and spoken for the New York State Bar Association. Sam can be<br />

reached at sam@doar.com.<br />

7

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!