Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case
Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case
Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case
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the reorganization plan); (3) all signing secured and priority creditors; and (4) all<br />
secured and priority creditors whose claims are stated to be paid in full, subject<br />
to certain legal rules concerning quantification [LCM 165].<br />
The fact that the reorganization plan can be imposed on non-signing parties is<br />
arguably the single most important aspect in favor <strong>of</strong> restructuring a debtor’s debts<br />
through court-assisted reorganization procedures. Should the reorganization plan be<br />
binding only on signing parties, it would have been sufficient to do so out <strong>of</strong> court,<br />
without having to incur the delays and expenses <strong>of</strong> a judicial procedure. Of course,<br />
the benefits <strong>of</strong> a debtor declared en concurso, consisting <strong>of</strong> the stay <strong>of</strong> execution,<br />
suspension <strong>of</strong> payments, rejection <strong>of</strong> cumbersome contracts, etc., would not be<br />
afforded out <strong>of</strong> court during the restructuring negotiations.<br />
s. Expedited Proceedings<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the novelties <strong>of</strong> the 2007 amendments to the <strong>Insolvency</strong> Law was the<br />
introduction <strong>of</strong> expedited proceedings.<br />
Reaching agreement through voluntary restructuring negotiations is <strong>of</strong>ten impeded by the<br />
ability <strong>of</strong> individual creditors to take enforcement action and by the need for unanimous creditor<br />
consent to alter the repayment terms <strong>of</strong> certain existing classes <strong>of</strong> debt. These problems are<br />
magnified in the context <strong>of</strong> complex, multinational businesses, where it is especially difficult<br />
to obtain consent from all relevant parties....Voluntary restructuring negotiations can also be<br />
impeded by a minority <strong>of</strong> affected creditors who may refuse to agree to a solution that is in the<br />
best interests <strong>of</strong> most creditors in order to take advantage <strong>of</strong> their position to extract better<br />
terms for themselves at the expense <strong>of</strong> other parties (<strong>of</strong>ten referred to as “holding out”). Where<br />
these hold-outs occur, the voluntary agreement can only be implemented if the contractual<br />
rights <strong>of</strong> these dissenting creditors can be modified without their consent. Under most<br />
existing legal systems, such a modification <strong>of</strong> contractual rights requires the commencement<br />
<strong>of</strong> full reorganization proceedings under the insolvency law, involving all creditors and<br />
requiring satisfaction <strong>of</strong> the provisions <strong>of</strong> the insolvency law governing the conduct <strong>of</strong> such<br />
proceedings….These difficulties, as well as some <strong>of</strong> the costs, delays and procedural and legal<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong>ten associated with full reorganization proceedings, can be avoided where<br />
<strong>White</strong> & <strong>Case</strong><br />
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