Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case
Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case
Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case
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Netting <strong>of</strong> obligations in light <strong>of</strong> concurso raises an important policy issue: A balance<br />
should be struck between the benefits <strong>of</strong> netting (commercial predictability, reduction <strong>of</strong><br />
the scope <strong>of</strong> the estate and mitigation <strong>of</strong> systemic risk) and affording a privilege to some<br />
creditors not otherwise available to others. IMF (1999) provides an insightful analysis <strong>of</strong><br />
this policy issue:<br />
An important issue that arises in the design <strong>of</strong> an insolvency law is the treatment <strong>of</strong> a creditor<br />
who, at the time <strong>of</strong> the initiation <strong>of</strong> the liquidation proceedings, also happens to be a debtor to<br />
the estate. If the fundamental principle <strong>of</strong> equality <strong>of</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> similarly situated creditors<br />
were applied, the outcome would be relatively straightforward: The liquidator should be able to<br />
receive the full amount owed by the creditor and the creditor’s claim would be satisfied to the<br />
extent to which all other unsecured creditors get satisfied upon the liquidation <strong>of</strong> the estate.<br />
However, an alternative approach permits the creditor, in these circumstances, to exercise<br />
set-<strong>of</strong>f rights against the estate after liquidation is initiated, with the effect that, depending on<br />
the size <strong>of</strong> the estate’s claim on the creditor, the creditor’s claim may be satisfied in full.<br />
There are several reasons why it may be appropriate to include the right <strong>of</strong> set-<strong>of</strong>f in an<br />
insolvency law. The first is that <strong>of</strong> fairness: notwithstanding the importance <strong>of</strong> equality <strong>of</strong><br />
treatment among creditors, it is considered unfair for a debtor to refuse to make payment<br />
to a creditor but, at the same time, to insist upon payment from that creditor. In addition,<br />
since many counterparties are banks, the right <strong>of</strong> set-<strong>of</strong>f is particularly beneficial to the<br />
banking system and, because <strong>of</strong> the important credit creation role <strong>of</strong> banks, is therefore<br />
considered to be <strong>of</strong> general benefit to the economy. By virtue <strong>of</strong> their core functions<br />
(lending and deposit taking), banks that have lent to an entity that has gone bankrupt will<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten find that they have financial obligations to the debtor in the form <strong>of</strong> deposits. A postcommencement<br />
right <strong>of</strong> set-<strong>of</strong>f would allow the banks to <strong>of</strong>fset their unpaid claims with<br />
the debtor’s deposits even though these reciprocal claims are not yet due and payable.<br />
Even among countries that do not provide for a general right <strong>of</strong> set-<strong>of</strong>f in the context <strong>of</strong><br />
insolvency, set-<strong>of</strong>f will still normally be permitted in two circumstances: if both claims are mature<br />
at the time insolvency takes place, or if the mutual claims arise from the same transactions.<br />
The <strong>Insolvency</strong> Law has taken the approach <strong>of</strong> allowing netting in specific cases<br />
provided therein. However, the cases in which netting is allowed are relatively broad.<br />
<strong>White</strong> & <strong>Case</strong><br />
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