07.05.2013 Views

Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case

Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case

Mexican Legal Framework of Business Insolvency - White & Case

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

taking any action to improve the relative position <strong>of</strong> a creditor to the detriment <strong>of</strong> other<br />

participating creditors. They also include similar undertakings from the debtor and other<br />

terms such as a sharing <strong>of</strong> information and lock-up covenants.<br />

The validity and enforceability <strong>of</strong> undertakings by creditors refraining from exercising<br />

procedural rights is questionable [CPM 1, 8, 17; CCF 6], and specific performance may be<br />

unavailable [CFPC 421, 423].<br />

The exchange <strong>of</strong> information raises another legal issue: Mexico does not have a rule<br />

preventing shared information from being used as evidence in a court <strong>of</strong> law, and<br />

confidentiality agreements may not be strong enough to prevent disclosure <strong>of</strong> such shared<br />

information as evidence in a judicial process [CFPC 79].<br />

3. Interim Financing<br />

The case where the debtor requires New Money to continue operating during the standstill<br />

period raises the question <strong>of</strong> how the New Money provider will be recognized in priority over<br />

preexisting creditors. INSOL (2000) takes a very clear position on the issue:<br />

10<br />

Where a debtor requires New Money funding, relevant creditors will be concerned that<br />

such New Money will, so far as practicable, be given priority <strong>of</strong> repayment compared<br />

with other debts in the event <strong>of</strong> the failure and insolvency <strong>of</strong> the debtor.<br />

The simplest method <strong>of</strong> ensuring the priority <strong>of</strong> repayment for New Money is usually by the<br />

obtaining <strong>of</strong> security for its repayment over assets <strong>of</strong> the requisite value. In some cases,<br />

however, negative pledges in favor <strong>of</strong> third parties or other legal complications will either<br />

prevent the granting <strong>of</strong> security for New Money or render the benefit which will result from<br />

such security uncertain. While there are various techniques for ameliorating such problems<br />

(e.g., asset purchase arrangements, placing assets into newly formed and “ring-fenced”<br />

borrowing entities and sale and leaseback arrangements) in some cases relevant creditors will<br />

have no option but to fall back on loss-sharing arrangements between themselves designed<br />

to ensure that the New Money will be accorded priority <strong>of</strong> repayment status (e.g., by agreeing<br />

to “pool” recoveries from any insolvency <strong>of</strong> the debtor and to apply them in repayment <strong>of</strong><br />

the New Money first or, in certain jurisdictions, by the use <strong>of</strong> subordination agreements).

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!