Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
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erendum.’ But first I acted. I acted first, <strong>and</strong> only afterwards<br />
did I <strong>the</strong>n want to show <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world that <strong>the</strong> German<br />
people supported me. That was <strong>the</strong> reason for it. Had I been<br />
convinced that <strong>the</strong> German people would not perhaps have<br />
been able to go along with us on <strong>the</strong> matter, I would still have<br />
acted, but <strong>the</strong>n I would not have held a referendum.” (speech<br />
reprinted in Frei, 1987, p. 190-195). The Nazis briefly flirted<br />
with <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public assembly. In many places in Germany<br />
from 1933 onwards, <strong>the</strong>y built so-called “Thingplätze”<br />
(‘thing squares’, “Thing” or “Ting” being <strong>the</strong> ancient name<br />
for public assembly parliaments in Sc<strong>and</strong>inavia <strong>and</strong> parts <strong>of</strong><br />
Britain), which never<strong>the</strong>less had nothing to do with directdemocratic<br />
decision-making, but were where <strong>the</strong> population<br />
was supposed to passively watch <strong>the</strong> Nazis’ propag<strong>and</strong>a<br />
meetings. But from 1935 onwards, <strong>the</strong> Nazis decided to put<br />
an end to this, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y prohibited <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
‘thing squares’ (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing).<br />
In 1948, a ‘Parliamentary Council’ was appointed in Bonn<br />
(not elected by <strong>the</strong> people), which had to design a new constitution<br />
for West Germany. It is striking that this Council used<br />
‘<strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> Weimar’ as a reason for not introducing<br />
direct democracy in Western Germany. The first President<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Federal Republic <strong>of</strong> Germany after <strong>the</strong> Second World<br />
War, Theodor Heuss, in particular promoted this absurd interpretation<br />
<strong>of</strong> pre-war German history. Heuss had been a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1933 parliament <strong>and</strong>, though not a Nazi sympathiser,<br />
had none<strong>the</strong>less approved <strong>the</strong> ‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’.<br />
In an introduction to <strong>the</strong> post-war West-German Constitution<br />
Heuss wrote: “The plebiscitary form <strong>of</strong> democracy, with<br />
its popular initiative <strong>and</strong> referendum (‘Volksbegehren’ <strong>and</strong><br />
‘Volksentscheid’), which <strong>the</strong> Weimar republic copied from<br />
<strong>the</strong> Swiss tradition, has also been removed from <strong>the</strong> repertoire<br />
<strong>of</strong> German legislative instruments. This led for a time<br />
to <strong>the</strong> cheap reproach that <strong>the</strong> Parliamentary Council had<br />
deprived <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong> a fundamental element <strong>of</strong> democracy.<br />
But, in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> past experiences, it was its fundamental<br />
duty to protect <strong>the</strong> still insecure state from <strong>the</strong> depredations<br />
<strong>of</strong> lurking demagogues <strong>and</strong> to ground binding responsibility<br />
in <strong>the</strong> representative system”. (Weihrauch, 1989, p. 40).<br />
In o<strong>the</strong>r words: <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> parliamentary<br />
democracy were used to remove direct democracy. The consequences<br />
for European history were immense. If, after <strong>the</strong><br />
Second World War, a direct-democratic political practice<br />
could have developed in Germany, more or less following<br />
<strong>the</strong> Swiss example, <strong>the</strong> democratic map <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world at <strong>the</strong><br />
end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 20th century might have looked very different.<br />
What is particularly remarkable is that <strong>the</strong> constitutions<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> former DDR (communist East Germany), <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
Berlin did initially provide for <strong>the</strong> citizens’ initiative referendum.<br />
Shortly after <strong>the</strong> war, <strong>the</strong> SED – <strong>the</strong> united party<br />
that emerged from <strong>the</strong> enforced merger <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> socialist <strong>and</strong><br />
communist parties in <strong>the</strong> Soviet zone – even campaigned<br />
actively for <strong>the</strong> direct-democratic ideal. In fact, this party<br />
was simply seeking to achieve a goal that had previously<br />
been set out in <strong>the</strong> socialist programmes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 19 th century.<br />
Some popular referendums were actually held, for example<br />
on <strong>the</strong> dispossession <strong>of</strong> war criminals. After Germany was<br />
divided, <strong>the</strong> SED came to power in East Germany <strong>and</strong> interest<br />
in direct democracy disappeared without trace. Despite<br />
this, direct democracy remained provided for in <strong>the</strong> DDR<br />
Constitution until 1968, <strong>the</strong> year <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Prague spring,<br />
when <strong>the</strong> provision was removed without public debate.<br />
3<br />
Direct-democratic decision-making was also constitutionally<br />
provided for in West Berlin after <strong>the</strong> Second World War.<br />
All <strong>the</strong> political powers in Berlin kept quiet <strong>about</strong> this constitutional<br />
option, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> provision was finally scrapped in<br />
1974 with no public debate.<br />
Opponents <strong>of</strong> direct democracy clearly lived on both sides<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iron Curtain.<br />
6-2: About compulsory voting<br />
Belgium <strong>and</strong> Greece are <strong>the</strong> last two European countries to<br />
retain compulsory voting. Both <strong>the</strong>se countries also have an<br />
exceptionally high public deficit, with a relatively strongly<br />
developed black economy, <strong>and</strong> lack any form <strong>of</strong> decisive referendum<br />
(situation as <strong>of</strong> summer 2006).<br />
The Christian Democrats <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Socialists defend compulsory<br />
voting. The first argument is that, without compulsory<br />
voting, it is particularly <strong>the</strong> socially weaker people who<br />
would not turn out to vote, which would seriously weaken<br />
<strong>the</strong> representativeness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outcome. With compulsory<br />
voting, all <strong>the</strong> social classes have equal representation in<br />
<strong>the</strong> (indirect) decision-making process.<br />
This argument is questionable for several reasons. Compulsory<br />
voting does not create <strong>the</strong> competence to cast a<br />
responsible vote, but encourages <strong>the</strong> casting <strong>of</strong> protest<br />
votes <strong>and</strong> blank ballots. It can be shown that abolition <strong>of</strong><br />
compulsory voting actually focuses attention on <strong>the</strong> groups<br />
which tend to participate least in voting. Precisely because<br />
<strong>the</strong> passive group can in many cases make <strong>the</strong> difference<br />
between a majority or a minority, <strong>the</strong>y can attract <strong>the</strong> full<br />
attention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political parties, because <strong>the</strong>ir votes can be<br />
won (this argument was used, for example, by <strong>the</strong> Agalev<br />
green group politician Boutmans, Gazet van Antwerp newspaper,<br />
May 1997). In Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, approximately 30% <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> electorate always vote, approximately 45% vote selectively,<br />
<strong>and</strong> approximately 25% are rarely persuaded to vote<br />
(Möckli, 1994, p. 206). There is <strong>the</strong>refore a large group <strong>of</strong><br />
voters who can potentially be mobilised, <strong>and</strong> on whom <strong>the</strong><br />
politicians can focus <strong>the</strong>ir powers <strong>of</strong> persuasion. It is far<br />
from clear whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> effect predicted by Boutmans does<br />
in fact play a role in countries without compulsory voting.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong>re is just as little pro<strong>of</strong> that compulsory voting<br />
leads to better representation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> groups that tend<br />
to participate least in voting. Extreme right-wing parties,<br />
for example, obtain a large proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir votes from<br />
voters in <strong>the</strong> weaker social groups, even though in practice<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are least good at defending <strong>the</strong> economic <strong>and</strong> social<br />
interests <strong>of</strong> those groups.<br />
An argument against compulsory voting is that it removes<br />
<strong>the</strong> intrinsic motivation for taking part in voting. Someone<br />
who is compelled to vote no longer does it <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own free<br />
will <strong>and</strong> insight. Voluntary participation in voting is not<br />
based on selfish calculations. For <strong>the</strong> individual citizen, <strong>the</strong><br />
economic benefit <strong>of</strong> voting is, after all, nothing compared<br />
to <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> taking part in voting – such as <strong>the</strong> time<br />
it costs. So voting is not a rational act for a ‘calculating citizen’.<br />
Never<strong>the</strong>less, people do go out to vote <strong>and</strong> evidently<br />
do so with unselfish motives. Perhaps <strong>the</strong>y miscalculate <strong>the</strong><br />
benefit to <strong>the</strong>mselves, but much more probably <strong>the</strong>y vote<br />
from solidarity with a group, from a sense <strong>of</strong> citizenship,