Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
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In this context, one must not forget how dem<strong>and</strong>ing life is<br />
for people today. It is (rightly) assumed that under normal<br />
circumstances <strong>the</strong>y st<strong>and</strong> entirely on <strong>the</strong>ir own two feet in a<br />
fast-moving <strong>and</strong> competitive society. Via school, work <strong>and</strong> in<br />
all o<strong>the</strong>r aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir daily life, <strong>the</strong>y continually encounter<br />
on a smaller scale <strong>the</strong> problems which are also <strong>the</strong> issues <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> day in <strong>the</strong> wider political sphere. This is only logical, because,<br />
ideally, politics is really <strong>about</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems that people<br />
encounter in <strong>the</strong>ir day-to-day lives.<br />
In making <strong>the</strong>ir choices, citizens usually use ‘information<br />
shortcuts’, such as <strong>the</strong> opinions <strong>of</strong> acquaintances <strong>and</strong> ‘natural<br />
authorities’ that <strong>the</strong>y trust: for example, <strong>the</strong> voting recommendations<br />
<strong>of</strong> political parties <strong>and</strong> public organisations,<br />
information that is provided by media <strong>and</strong> experts etc. In<br />
Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> voting recommendations <strong>of</strong> numerous organisations<br />
(political parties, trade unions, churches, pr<strong>of</strong>essional<br />
associations <strong>and</strong> pressure groups etc.) are included in<br />
<strong>the</strong> referendum information packages. Incidentally, members<br />
<strong>of</strong> parliament make just as much use <strong>of</strong> shortcuts: <strong>the</strong>y must<br />
make decisions <strong>about</strong> so many laws <strong>and</strong> regulations that it is<br />
frequently not feasible for <strong>the</strong>m to study all <strong>the</strong> sources <strong>of</strong> information<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves (this became clear from a survey showing<br />
that Dutch MPs read only a quarter <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> memor<strong>and</strong>ums<br />
that <strong>the</strong>y are expected to read (Dutch newspaper NRC<br />
H<strong>and</strong>elsblad, 28 February 1997), so that <strong>the</strong>y regularly make<br />
use <strong>of</strong> `shortcuts’. Lupia (1994) has shown that <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> ‘information<br />
shortcuts’ by citizens in referendums has hardly<br />
any effect on <strong>the</strong> final decision. In his analysis <strong>of</strong> a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> Californian citizens’ initiatives from 1990, it appeared that<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was only a 3% difference in voting behaviour between<br />
<strong>the</strong> group <strong>of</strong> voters who were well-informed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> group <strong>of</strong><br />
voters who based <strong>the</strong>ir vote solely on shortcuts.<br />
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> argument cannot be used selectively against<br />
direct democracy: it is actually an argument against democracy<br />
itself. If <strong>the</strong> citizens are not competent to decide on specific<br />
issues, by definition <strong>the</strong>y are certainly not competent<br />
to elect people who make good decisions. In order to elect<br />
someone who makes good decisions, after all, one must not<br />
only be competent to distinguish between good <strong>and</strong> bad decisions,<br />
but also be competent to judge <strong>the</strong> trustworthiness<br />
<strong>and</strong> moral <strong>and</strong> intellectual integrity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>and</strong>idates, or be<br />
competent to see through <strong>the</strong> hidden agendas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political<br />
parties. “It is (...) not clear why <strong>the</strong> citizens are trusted to be<br />
able to choose between parties <strong>and</strong> politicians in elections,<br />
but not between issues in referendums. If anything, <strong>the</strong><br />
former choice seems to be <strong>the</strong> more difficult one, because<br />
electors must form expectations <strong>about</strong> politicians’ actions in<br />
<strong>the</strong> future.” (Frey <strong>and</strong> Bohnet, 1994, p. 157)<br />
The incompetence argument also includes <strong>the</strong> concealed<br />
twin assumptions that <strong>the</strong> elected representatives are actually<br />
competent, <strong>and</strong> really do have <strong>the</strong> public interest at heart.<br />
“Critics <strong>of</strong> direct legislation frequently have a view <strong>of</strong> state<br />
legislators that borders on <strong>the</strong> mythical: highly intelligent;<br />
extremely well informed; as rational as a virtuous, wise, <strong>and</strong><br />
deliberative statesman; <strong>and</strong> as competent as corporate presidents<br />
<strong>and</strong> university pr<strong>of</strong>essors. These same critics tend to<br />
view <strong>the</strong> people as a ‘mob’, unworthy <strong>of</strong> being trusted. Yet <strong>the</strong><br />
people, or so-called mob, are <strong>the</strong> same persons who elect legislators.<br />
How is it that <strong>the</strong>y can choose between good <strong>and</strong> bad<br />
c<strong>and</strong>idates but cannot choose between good <strong>and</strong> bad laws?”<br />
(Cronin, 1989, p. 87)<br />
Finally, it is a fact that citizens’ ‘social knowledge’ increases<br />
as a result <strong>of</strong> participating in referendums. Benz <strong>and</strong> Stut-<br />
zer (2004) examined this by comparing Switzerl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
European Union, where a number <strong>of</strong> countries held referendums<br />
on European integration, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs did not. During<br />
<strong>the</strong> period examined, seven <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU states held a referendum<br />
on European integration (Denmark, Irel<strong>and</strong>, France,<br />
Austria, Sweden, Finl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Norway). There were no EU<br />
referendums during this period in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r eight countries<br />
(at that time only 15 countries belonged to <strong>the</strong> EU). Inhabitants<br />
<strong>of</strong> countries which held referendums appeared to score<br />
considerably better on 10 general questions <strong>about</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU<br />
than did inhabitants <strong>of</strong> countries where no referendum was<br />
held: <strong>the</strong> effect was just as great as <strong>the</strong> difference between<br />
people with an average income versus people with a low income.<br />
In Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, Benz <strong>and</strong> Stutzer took an index <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
degree <strong>of</strong> direct democracy at cantonal level (which, as stated<br />
previously, differs considerably from one canton to ano<strong>the</strong>r),<br />
<strong>and</strong> compared this with <strong>the</strong> answers from Swiss citizens on<br />
three questions <strong>about</strong> general Swiss politics. Here too, <strong>the</strong><br />
Swiss who lived in cantons with greater direct democracy<br />
had considerably more knowledge than <strong>the</strong> Swiss living in<br />
cantons with more representative systems. The impact was<br />
just as large as <strong>the</strong> difference between members <strong>of</strong> political<br />
parties <strong>and</strong> non-members, or <strong>the</strong> difference between people<br />
with monthly incomes <strong>of</strong> 5,000 versus 9,000 Swiss francs.<br />
b. Lack <strong>of</strong> a sense <strong>of</strong> responsibility<br />
According to this argument, people will mainly approve proposals<br />
that serve only <strong>the</strong>ir own interests, showing a lack <strong>of</strong><br />
responsibility for <strong>the</strong> whole community or society, with destructive<br />
consequences. They will, for example, vote to abolish<br />
taxes <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time increase public spending.<br />
In reality, from a financial perspective, citizens are more responsible<br />
than politicians. The large public debts that now<br />
exist in most Western countries, for example, have been accrued<br />
against <strong>the</strong> wishes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people. Surveys conducted<br />
over several generations in Germany <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> US show that a<br />
stable two-thirds majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population are in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
a government budget that remains balanced also in <strong>the</strong> short<br />
term (‘balanced budget’, von Weizsäcker, 1992). Thus, <strong>the</strong><br />
accumulation <strong>of</strong> a mountain <strong>of</strong> debt is <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a policy<br />
that is contrary to <strong>the</strong> wishes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority. People are also<br />
unwilling to be burdened with measures that would be required<br />
to reduce such mountains <strong>of</strong> debt (Blinder <strong>and</strong> Bagwell,<br />
1988; Tabellini <strong>and</strong> Alesina, 1990).<br />
Research has shown that <strong>the</strong> accumulation <strong>of</strong> a government<br />
deficit is closely connected with <strong>the</strong> party-political line-up in<br />
a country. Here are a few empirical observations:<br />
• <strong>the</strong> greater <strong>the</strong> polarisation within a multi-party coalition,<br />
<strong>the</strong> greater <strong>the</strong> tendency to accrue a debt;<br />
• <strong>the</strong> more probable it is that a government will lose <strong>the</strong><br />
coming election, <strong>the</strong> greater <strong>the</strong> tendency to accrue a debt;<br />
• <strong>the</strong> shorter a government’s average term in <strong>of</strong>fice, <strong>the</strong><br />
greater <strong>the</strong> accrued debt;<br />
• <strong>the</strong> more coalition partners <strong>the</strong>re are in a government, <strong>the</strong><br />
greater <strong>the</strong> tendency to accrue a debt.<br />
(cf. Roubini <strong>and</strong> Sachs, whose research concerned <strong>the</strong> OECD<br />
countries during <strong>the</strong> period from 1960 to 1985; o<strong>the</strong>r references<br />
in von Weizsäcker, 1992).<br />
These observations demonstrate that <strong>the</strong> political elite’s<br />
short-term thinking plays a pivotal role in <strong>the</strong> accrual <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>