Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
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is identical in all humans – as identical as only two voids can<br />
be. In this fact we discover <strong>the</strong> objective basis for <strong>the</strong> principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> equal rights, for equality before <strong>the</strong> law, regardless<br />
<strong>of</strong> any differences people possess. People have differences, but<br />
people are equal.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> ‘I’ is not a ‘no-thing’. Like <strong>the</strong> ‘superposition’<br />
<strong>of</strong> quantum <strong>the</strong>ory, <strong>the</strong> human ‘I’ is a void full <strong>of</strong> potential,<br />
<strong>of</strong> expectancy <strong>and</strong> creative power; it is <strong>the</strong> emptiness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
moral will, before that moral will has yet brought forth a<br />
moral judgement. What lies dormant in <strong>the</strong> void is <strong>the</strong> as<br />
yet undifferentiated capacity for involvement. The human ‘I’<br />
is nothing o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> involvement in<br />
<strong>the</strong> world. And it is precisely involvement that distinguishes<br />
freedom from licence.<br />
Without involvement, I am as free as an astronaut who alone,<br />
<strong>and</strong> with nothing to hold onto, tumbles slowly around his or<br />
her centre <strong>of</strong> gravity in <strong>the</strong> weightlessness <strong>of</strong> space. The astronaut<br />
can perform voluntary movements, but cannot affect<br />
<strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> his or her centre <strong>of</strong> gravity relative to o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
objects, because all connection to <strong>the</strong> surrounding world has<br />
been severed. If I do not get involved with o<strong>the</strong>r people, even<br />
<strong>the</strong> most exalted deed will not touch me internally; it will<br />
leave me ‘disconnected’. Without commitment <strong>and</strong> involvement,<br />
I am not free to change. Only by virtue <strong>of</strong> my involvement<br />
do I change myself through what I do.<br />
As human beings, we are only free when we are connected<br />
<strong>and</strong> involved. One can say that human involvement, or<br />
<strong>the</strong> moral warmth that <strong>the</strong> individual person can develop,<br />
is <strong>the</strong> way in which morality appears in <strong>the</strong> world. Morality<br />
is nowhere to be found in <strong>the</strong> world outside individual<br />
involved human beings. And it is precisely through involvement<br />
that humans can rediscover <strong>the</strong> real essence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own being. As subject, we can separate ourselves not only<br />
from <strong>the</strong> outside world, but also from our own bodies, our<br />
habits <strong>and</strong> even our character (we can, for instance, try to<br />
lose weight, or change our character, or suppress a rising fit<br />
<strong>of</strong> anger). But, by definition, we cannot separate ourselves<br />
as subject from our involvement (e.g. with ano<strong>the</strong>r’s pain).<br />
If we try to objectify our involvement, we cannot help – as<br />
subject – taking our involvement with us. Basically, we cannot<br />
look with complete detachment at our own feelings <strong>of</strong><br />
affection for someone else. If we none<strong>the</strong>less try to do so, we<br />
must first create a phantasm <strong>of</strong> our affection, by making an<br />
abstraction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential fact that it is our affection we are<br />
dealing with. If we want to make a real image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> affection<br />
or involvement, including <strong>the</strong> fact that it is our affection,<br />
we cannot help but be filled by it. We are <strong>the</strong>n our affection.<br />
The same does not occur, if, for instance, we closely examine<br />
one <strong>of</strong> our habits (including <strong>the</strong> fact that it is our habit).<br />
Our involvement, or attachment, is something from which<br />
we cannot distance ourselves, but with which we are at one<br />
in our deepest being. We have a body, habits, a character; we<br />
are our involvement.<br />
We can underst<strong>and</strong> this more clearly if we consider <strong>the</strong><br />
most basic form <strong>of</strong> involvement – attention. Attention (paying<br />
attention to, showing interest in, empathising with) is<br />
<strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human spirit to make space within ones<br />
own imagination for ano<strong>the</strong>r person or object outside <strong>of</strong><br />
oneself. By its very nature, attention aims at <strong>the</strong> truth. Attention<br />
is <strong>the</strong> precursor to thought. It provides space for both<br />
sensory impressions <strong>and</strong> for individual thoughts <strong>and</strong> trains<br />
<strong>of</strong> thought. We relate to ‘<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’ in <strong>the</strong> first place by focusing<br />
our attention on it. Because <strong>of</strong> its very nature, we<br />
3<br />
cannot separate our attention from our self. It is true that<br />
we can direct our attention to anything imaginable, including<br />
<strong>the</strong> characteristics <strong>and</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attention itself, but<br />
precisely because <strong>of</strong> this activity, we cannot be simultaneously<br />
detached from <strong>the</strong> attention. Our attention does have<br />
<strong>the</strong> capacity for self-reflection (it can be turned upon itself),<br />
but we cannot objectify our attention in <strong>the</strong> same way as we<br />
do with our character traits. We can, for instance, focus our<br />
attention on our laziness without being actually lazy at <strong>the</strong><br />
same time. But we cannot focus our attention on our attention<br />
without being simultaneously attentive. Our laziness is<br />
something that we have; in a deep <strong>and</strong> fundamental sense,<br />
however, our attention is a manifestation <strong>of</strong> our very being.<br />
When we are attentive, <strong>the</strong>n effectively we are this attention.<br />
And attention is involvement.<br />
In involvement/attachment, <strong>the</strong> paradoxical character <strong>of</strong><br />
morals is resolved. On <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, I am my involvement<br />
– involvement is hyperindividual <strong>and</strong> can only come from<br />
an individual human being. But, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, my involvement<br />
is always involvement with ‘<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’. Without<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, my involvement cannot exist. In this sense, I owe<br />
my existence at every moment to that ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’. Involvement<br />
or moral warmth can only exist between people. Real society<br />
is not <strong>the</strong> state, or <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> social structures <strong>and</strong><br />
organisations. Real society is <strong>the</strong> fabric <strong>of</strong> connectedness <strong>and</strong><br />
indifference, <strong>of</strong> moral warmth <strong>and</strong> coldness between people.<br />
It is not easy to capture <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> involvement in a single<br />
term, because <strong>the</strong>re is nothing in <strong>the</strong> material world (from<br />
which we derive most concepts <strong>and</strong> terms) that has at <strong>the</strong><br />
same time <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> both object <strong>and</strong> relationship.<br />
From this consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dual nature <strong>of</strong> morals <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
involvement, <strong>the</strong> following three perspectives on democracy<br />
emerge.<br />
• Anyone who focuses mainly on <strong>the</strong> suprapersonal aspect <strong>of</strong><br />
morals, <strong>and</strong> disregards <strong>the</strong> individual aspect, will tend towards<br />
a limited form <strong>of</strong> democracy in which people’s individual contribution<br />
is minimised. Benjamin Barber (1997) described<br />
<strong>the</strong>se ‘communitarists’ as follows: “Because <strong>the</strong>y assume that<br />
people are embedded in a network <strong>of</strong> communities <strong>and</strong> have<br />
ties with each o<strong>the</strong>r that take precedence over <strong>the</strong>ir individuality<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>se conditions, communitarists do not see ‘civil<br />
society’ as a playground for individuals <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir voluntary<br />
ties <strong>and</strong> contractual organisations, but ra<strong>the</strong>r as a complex<br />
mixture <strong>of</strong> inescapable social relationships that bind people<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r into families, clans, neighbourhoods, communities<br />
<strong>and</strong> hierarchies.” Morals are seen in this communitaristic<br />
perspective as something that is decreed from above. People<br />
choose a subsidiary form <strong>of</strong> state, with, at most, representative<br />
forms <strong>of</strong> democracy <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong> ruling elite having <strong>the</strong> maximum<br />
room for manoeuvre. This elite must <strong>the</strong>n ‘educate’ <strong>the</strong><br />
people. ‘Mid-field organisations’ (clubs, associations etc.) are<br />
mainly considered as instruments by means <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> elite<br />
can subtly control, guide <strong>and</strong> ‘educate’ <strong>the</strong> people.<br />
• Anyone who considers only <strong>the</strong> individual aspect <strong>of</strong> morals<br />
will ignore <strong>the</strong> interaction between people or consider it<br />
as <strong>of</strong> little or no relevance. Barber (1997) characterises <strong>the</strong><br />
‘libertarian’ model as follows: “... <strong>the</strong> social relationships,<br />
both in <strong>the</strong> private sector <strong>and</strong> between <strong>the</strong> private <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
government sector, are contractual relationships entered<br />
into by free individuals, in spite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir interests <strong>and</strong> goods<br />
<strong>and</strong> in defence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir freedoms. (…) By concentrating on<br />
<strong>the</strong> autonomous, solitary, egotist consumers, who have entrenched<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves in a fortress <strong>of</strong> rights, [<strong>and</strong>] only ven-