Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
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<strong>the</strong> appearance <strong>of</strong> logical correctness is false <strong>and</strong> is merely<br />
being generated by <strong>the</strong> succession <strong>of</strong> chemical <strong>and</strong> physical<br />
processes in our brains. If we believe that our thinking is<br />
entirely determined by <strong>the</strong>se kinds <strong>of</strong> physico-chemical processes,<br />
we must also assume that every impression <strong>of</strong> logical<br />
correctness could in reality be an illusion conjured up by <strong>the</strong><br />
chemical processes in our brains. This uncertainty applies to<br />
all our opinions – including our assumption that thinking is<br />
fully reducible to physico-chemical phenomena. As Popper<br />
(1982) rightly remarks, this mechanistic view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> origin <strong>of</strong><br />
thinking is thus self-destructive.<br />
Observation teaches us that sound brain function is without<br />
doubt an essential precondition for <strong>the</strong> emergence <strong>of</strong> human<br />
thoughts <strong>and</strong> judgements, as also for human actions. But this<br />
does not mean that <strong>the</strong> content <strong>of</strong> thinking can be fully reduced<br />
to chemical processes in <strong>the</strong> brain. In order for me to listen to a<br />
radio programme, it is essential that my radio is working properly.<br />
But that does not mean that <strong>the</strong> content <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> programme<br />
is explained by <strong>the</strong> inner workings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> radio.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> contrary: in following a scientific pro<strong>of</strong> step by step,<br />
for instance, it is only intrinsic, purely ma<strong>the</strong>matical or logical,<br />
considerations that take us from one step to <strong>the</strong> next<br />
in <strong>the</strong> reasoning. And intrinsic considerations as such can<br />
never be deduced from a purely physico-chemical configuration.<br />
The meaning <strong>of</strong> a road sign, for example, can never be<br />
deduced from its material components. The meaning <strong>of</strong> a<br />
word chalked up on a blackboard can never be deduced from<br />
<strong>the</strong> shape <strong>and</strong> composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> chalk marks. The road sign<br />
or <strong>the</strong> chalk marks can in principle have very many different<br />
meanings; <strong>the</strong>y do not in <strong>the</strong>mselves lead to a single specific<br />
meaning or line <strong>of</strong> thought. A man from Mars could never<br />
deduce <strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> a road sign from <strong>the</strong> physical <strong>and</strong><br />
chemical analysis <strong>of</strong> that sign (e.g. a metal disc or triangle,<br />
painted white with a red border). In exactly <strong>the</strong> same way,<br />
<strong>the</strong> content element <strong>of</strong> a consideration or thought can never<br />
be deduced from a specific chemical configuration in <strong>the</strong><br />
brain. The above-mentioned Martian would never be able to<br />
reconstruct <strong>the</strong> thought content <strong>of</strong> a brain from a physical<br />
<strong>and</strong> chemical analysis <strong>of</strong> it, because that content exists purely<br />
in <strong>the</strong> consciousness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> owner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> brain at that specific<br />
moment. In this respect <strong>the</strong>re is no basic difference between<br />
<strong>the</strong> road sign <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> brain.<br />
Thus, we cannot consider thought contents as anything o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than autonomous realities that are not reducible to material<br />
processes. If one wishes to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> correctness <strong>of</strong> a<br />
ma<strong>the</strong>matical pro<strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re is no point in using a microscope<br />
to examine <strong>the</strong> brain processes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matician in question.<br />
One must examine <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matical logic using ones<br />
own faculty <strong>of</strong> discernment as <strong>the</strong> instrument <strong>of</strong> perception.<br />
Equally, if we want to develop rational concepts <strong>of</strong> political or<br />
social action, we must likewise approach <strong>the</strong> distinction between<br />
good <strong>and</strong> evil from a non-deducible basic assumption:<br />
political <strong>and</strong> social issues are always ethical issues at heart,<br />
<strong>and</strong> political solutions are always ethical solutions. However<br />
much one might try to twist <strong>and</strong> turn <strong>the</strong> argument, ethics<br />
always ultimately concerns <strong>the</strong> distinction between good <strong>and</strong><br />
evil. The concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘morally good’ is always central to<br />
political debate. Because moral judgements, just like all <strong>the</strong><br />
contents <strong>of</strong> consciousness, cannot be reduced to physicochemical<br />
processes, <strong>and</strong> because <strong>the</strong>y are at <strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> all<br />
political activity, <strong>the</strong> latter cannot – as a matter <strong>of</strong> principle<br />
– be reduced to physico-chemical processes, as little as political<br />
science can be reduced to physics <strong>and</strong> chemistry.<br />
3<br />
Benjamin Barber (1984) attached great importance to this<br />
non-reducible character <strong>of</strong> political science <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> political activity.<br />
Politics is more than <strong>the</strong> pragmatic search for <strong>the</strong> best<br />
possible solution to a given set <strong>of</strong> circumstances. There is a<br />
creative dynamic in politics, a dynamic <strong>of</strong> free moral choice.<br />
What constitutes a good solution does not follow automatically<br />
from <strong>the</strong> facts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> given situation. The right solution<br />
emerges because people add something entirely new to <strong>the</strong><br />
given situation. The political sciences are independent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
natural sciences because <strong>the</strong>y deal with ethical issues (which<br />
are not required to be considered in <strong>the</strong> natural sciences),<br />
<strong>and</strong> because an ethical solution always contains a creative element<br />
as well. Political actions are different from, for example,<br />
<strong>the</strong> actions <strong>of</strong> an engineer who is searching for <strong>the</strong> best<br />
possible solution to a technical problem. The engineer only<br />
applies natural laws to a given situation. What constitutes<br />
<strong>the</strong> best solution from a technical perspective follows unambiguously<br />
from <strong>the</strong> material facts. Politically active people<br />
add <strong>the</strong>ir own moral universe to <strong>the</strong> basic situation. This is a<br />
fundamental difference.<br />
Three visions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human being –<br />
three visions <strong>of</strong> democracy<br />
The most fundamental question – <strong>the</strong> key question <strong>of</strong> politics<br />
– is <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> ‘moral good’ actually means. And<br />
this question leads to an extraordinarily interesting paradox.<br />
The concept <strong>of</strong> ‘moral good’ only makes sense if we accept<br />
that ‘<strong>the</strong> good’ transcends individual discretion. We cannot<br />
arbitrarily choose what we call ‘good’ <strong>and</strong> what not. The concept<br />
<strong>of</strong> ‘morality’ or <strong>the</strong> ‘moral good’ includes an element<br />
that transcends individual choice.<br />
But individual freedom is an essential aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept<br />
<strong>of</strong> ‘moral good’. Freedom implies <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> choice. A<br />
deed or decision can only be ‘morally good’ to <strong>the</strong> extent that<br />
<strong>the</strong> deed is ultimately rooted in <strong>the</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> choice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
individual. If a deed is ultimately <strong>the</strong> product <strong>of</strong> an external<br />
force, however subtle that may be, <strong>the</strong> categories <strong>of</strong> ‘good’<br />
<strong>and</strong> ‘evil’ no longer apply.<br />
There are two sides to morality. Morality transcends individual<br />
discretion: that is <strong>the</strong> suprapersonal aspect <strong>of</strong> morals. Yet<br />
morality can only come from <strong>the</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual<br />
who acts, <strong>and</strong> from nothing else: that is <strong>the</strong> individual aspect<br />
<strong>of</strong> morals. These two aspects have a paradoxical relationship<br />
with each o<strong>the</strong>r. How can morality be simultaneously individual<br />
<strong>and</strong> suprapersonal?<br />
On this point, it is crucial to make a distinction between freedom<br />
<strong>and</strong> licence. Freedom distinguishes itself from licence<br />
through what can variously be termed involvement, attachment,<br />
connectedness or commitment [cf. below for more on <strong>the</strong><br />
difficulty <strong>of</strong> precisely defining this concept].<br />
We express our own individuality through <strong>the</strong> word ‘I’. Without<br />
an ‘I’, <strong>the</strong>re is no moral freedom, no distinction between<br />
good <strong>and</strong> evil, <strong>and</strong> thus no politics ei<strong>the</strong>r. But what exactly is<br />
this individuality, which we normally refer to as ‘I’? The ‘I’<br />
must clearly be distinguished from its ‘possessions’. I ‘have’<br />
a body, a gender, <strong>and</strong> a native language. I experience pleasure<br />
<strong>and</strong> pain. I have memories <strong>and</strong> ambitions. However, <strong>the</strong><br />
word ‘I’ makes it clear that I am not all <strong>of</strong> this – but can place<br />
myself as subject in distinction to it. To begin with, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong><br />
word ‘I’ indicates a kind <strong>of</strong> void, an empty space. This void