Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
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4. The democratic person<br />
Democracy <strong>and</strong> motivation<br />
A purely parliamentary decision-making system is not a democracy.<br />
In such a system, <strong>the</strong> people cannot prevent <strong>the</strong> implementation<br />
<strong>of</strong> an unwanted law. In a real democracy, where<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is any doubt, <strong>the</strong> people always have <strong>the</strong> last word.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong> opponents <strong>of</strong> direct democracy do not allow<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves to be persuaded by such a simple principle. Their<br />
resistance to direct democracy does not usually rely on purely<br />
rational grounds. Their opposition to <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> full popular<br />
sovereignty also derives from a gut instinct rooted in a<br />
fundamental distrust <strong>of</strong> people. The universal franchise <strong>and</strong><br />
women’s right to vote also had to cope with similar irrational<br />
resistance before <strong>the</strong>y were finally introduced.<br />
Opponents <strong>of</strong> direct democracy believe that when people<br />
vote, <strong>the</strong>y allow <strong>the</strong>mselves to be swayed primarily by private<br />
<strong>and</strong> egocentric motives. According to this view, majorities<br />
would always mercilessly suppress minorities. Higher, universal-human<br />
objectives would never be aimed for in a direct<br />
democracy. Representative democracy, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>,<br />
enables a moral elite to make <strong>the</strong> decisions. This elite is <strong>the</strong>n<br />
required to recognise <strong>and</strong> serve <strong>the</strong> general public interest.<br />
Opponents <strong>of</strong> direct democracy, <strong>the</strong>refore, have a very specific<br />
view <strong>of</strong> people <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> society. They consider society in<br />
essence as a kind <strong>of</strong> jungle, a snake pit in which countless<br />
private interests are in conflict with each o<strong>the</strong>r. Opponents<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore implicitly adopt a particular motivational <strong>the</strong>ory,<br />
according to which people are primarily motivated by selfinterest.<br />
They reject <strong>the</strong> logical arguments in favour <strong>of</strong> direct<br />
democracy, <strong>and</strong> even <strong>the</strong> evidence from good practice in<br />
countries where direct-democratic systems have existed for<br />
centuries, because deep inside <strong>the</strong>y consider <strong>the</strong> average person<br />
to be morally defective <strong>and</strong> incompetent.<br />
In what follows, <strong>the</strong>refore, we wish to have a closer look at<br />
<strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> human motivation. The impatient reader<br />
can, however, immediately skip to chapter 5.<br />
Good <strong>and</strong> evil as political core concepts<br />
Morality is not to be found anywhere in <strong>the</strong> material world.<br />
The laws <strong>of</strong> physics do not explain <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> consciousness<br />
(Searle, 1992; Penrose, 1994). Consciousness does not<br />
play any role in physics because <strong>the</strong> latter does not describe<br />
a single causal relationship that calls on <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong><br />
consciousness. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, one must say that consciousness is a<br />
prerequisite for being able to describe physical laws <strong>and</strong> relationships.<br />
Physics does not include consciousness, even if it<br />
is a prerequisite for physical research <strong>and</strong> discovery.<br />
Because moral choice always presumes consciousness, physics<br />
can never provide a basis for any distinction between what<br />
is ‘morally good’ <strong>and</strong> what is ‘morally evil’. But politics cannot<br />
operate without constant reference to good <strong>and</strong> evil, because<br />
it is <strong>about</strong> making a choice between several different measures.<br />
If one measure cannot be judged to be ‘morally better’<br />
than ano<strong>the</strong>r in some sort <strong>of</strong> fundamental way, politics<br />
is meaningless. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong> real existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
moral distinctions must be taken as <strong>the</strong> basic principle <strong>of</strong> po-<br />
3<br />
litical activity. Because morals fall outside <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong><br />
science, <strong>and</strong> yet are <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> politics, politics is in principle<br />
independent <strong>of</strong> science. That is not an unscientific or anti-scientific<br />
viewpoint. It is nothing more than a confirmation <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> natural sciences cannot fully describe human<br />
reality, because <strong>the</strong>y are limited to material things.<br />
The origin <strong>of</strong> morality is <strong>of</strong>ten explained by reference to Darwinian<br />
‘natural selection’ (De Waal, 1996; Ridley, 1996). It is<br />
asserted, for example, that human tribes with a more strongly<br />
developed moral ‘instinct’ demonstrated better internal<br />
cohesion <strong>and</strong> were <strong>the</strong>refore superior to tribes with a less<br />
well-developed moral instinct. A tribe whose members are<br />
continually fighting each o<strong>the</strong>r due to a lack <strong>of</strong> moral instinct<br />
will weaken itself <strong>and</strong> be defeated in <strong>the</strong> struggle against a<br />
tribe whose members assist <strong>and</strong> support each o<strong>the</strong>r. This is<br />
how Darwin himself explained <strong>the</strong> origin <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘moral instincts’<br />
<strong>of</strong> humans – an approach that is now widespread.<br />
However, <strong>the</strong>re are fundamental problems with this explanation.<br />
Darwinian selection cannot explain <strong>the</strong> phenomenon<br />
<strong>of</strong> consciousness. That an antelope notices a lion <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n<br />
takes flight can be fully explained in <strong>the</strong> causal-mechanistic<br />
interpretation (on which Darwinism is based) via a series<br />
<strong>of</strong> purely physical mechanisms. Light falls on <strong>the</strong> antelope’s<br />
retina; a signal is transmitted across <strong>the</strong> optic nerves to <strong>the</strong><br />
brain, where <strong>the</strong> stimulus is converted via particular mechanisms<br />
into a motor response, etc. The flight behaviour <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> antelope <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> selective advantage arising from this<br />
depend solely <strong>and</strong> entirely on <strong>the</strong> antelope’s physical organism.<br />
The contents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> animal’s consciousness, its feelings<br />
<strong>of</strong> fear or aggression, do not play <strong>the</strong> slightest role <strong>and</strong> thus<br />
cannot provide any selective advantage.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> antelope, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong> causal-mechanistic<br />
view falls short in two respects. Firstly, <strong>the</strong> laws <strong>of</strong> physics<br />
give no clues at all as to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> consciousness.<br />
Secondly, this interpretation does not leave any room for <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility that consciousness can provide some selective advantage.<br />
The antelope’s feeling <strong>of</strong> fear cannot <strong>the</strong>refore be explained<br />
by reference to physical mechanisms, nor does it give <strong>the</strong><br />
antelope any advantage in <strong>the</strong> struggle for survival.<br />
What is true for <strong>the</strong> antelope’s feeling <strong>of</strong> fear also applies, mutatis<br />
mut<strong>and</strong>is, to <strong>the</strong> moral judgement <strong>of</strong> humans. This moral<br />
judgement is also a content <strong>of</strong> consciousness which cannot<br />
be explained physically, <strong>and</strong> which likewise cannot provide<br />
any selective benefit. If a human being is “a chemical process<br />
like any o<strong>the</strong>r” (<strong>the</strong> Dutch writer W.F. Hermans), <strong>the</strong>n<br />
<strong>the</strong> selective advantage that comes from cooperation arises in<br />
a manner that excludes any role for consciousness or moral<br />
judgement. Because consciousness <strong>and</strong> moral judgement<br />
play no role in <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> selective advantage, <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
cannot be explained by a Darwinian selection process.<br />
The mechanistic view <strong>of</strong> reality, moreover, results in a kind <strong>of</strong><br />
logical short-circuit. If our thinking is entirely determined by<br />
physico-chemical processes in our brain, our search for truth<br />
<strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing is necessarily an illusion. We would never<br />
be able to find out whe<strong>the</strong>r a percept that appears to us as<br />
logical <strong>and</strong> correct is actually true in reality. We cannot rule<br />
out that possibility – but it could equally well be <strong>the</strong> case that