Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and ...
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The public assembly is not practical in a modern democratic<br />
state, except at <strong>the</strong> local level. But that is not a problem. The<br />
public assembly as a type <strong>of</strong> democracy can happily be surrendered.<br />
What is essential is that <strong>the</strong> fundamental elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
archetype <strong>of</strong> democracy are retained. The public assembly is only<br />
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possible manifestations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> underlying archetype.<br />
The public assembly model has its limitations. Beyond a certain<br />
size <strong>of</strong> population, <strong>the</strong> town square simply becomes too<br />
small. As a result, <strong>the</strong> public debate must take place somewhere<br />
else: via <strong>the</strong> media, via district meetings, etc. The debate<br />
will last longer <strong>and</strong> be <strong>of</strong> a less direct nature. This is<br />
more <strong>of</strong> an advantage than a drawback. There is more time<br />
for consultation, more opportunity to see through false arguments.<br />
Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, we will no longer vote by a show <strong>of</strong><br />
h<strong>and</strong>s, but in ‘<strong>the</strong> privacy’ <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> voting booth. This type <strong>of</strong> secret<br />
ballot is undeniably a great benefit: everyone can express<br />
his or her opinion free from social pressure.<br />
Through <strong>the</strong>se two changes, <strong>the</strong> public assembly is transformed<br />
into a referendum. A referendum is essentially a public<br />
assembly in which <strong>the</strong> participants no longer come toge<strong>the</strong>r physically.<br />
But, at <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> citizens’ initiative referendum<br />
still retains all <strong>the</strong> essential characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public<br />
assembly: <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> equality, <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> initiative, majority<br />
rule <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ate principle.<br />
It is interesting that in historical terms – particularly in<br />
Switzerl<strong>and</strong> – this transition from public assembly to referendum<br />
has also occurred by public initiative: “In many cantons,<br />
<strong>the</strong> referendum <strong>and</strong> initiative devices were viewed as<br />
an acceptable replacement for direct communal assemblies<br />
<strong>and</strong> cantonal ‘L<strong>and</strong>sgemeinden’. Population growth was<br />
making this type <strong>of</strong> public assembly impractical. In some<br />
cantons, such as Schwyz <strong>and</strong> Zug in 1848, <strong>the</strong> substitution<br />
was immediate <strong>and</strong> direct, with <strong>the</strong> referendum introduced<br />
as <strong>the</strong> L<strong>and</strong>sgemeinde was withdrawn.” (Kobach, 1994, p.<br />
100-101)<br />
Representative democracy<br />
But <strong>the</strong> referendum also has its limits. We cannot hold referendums<br />
on every issue: <strong>the</strong> costs to society <strong>of</strong> direct decisionmaking<br />
are just too great. Not only does each referendum<br />
cost money. More importantly, each referendum dem<strong>and</strong>s<br />
time <strong>and</strong> effort from <strong>the</strong> citizens: <strong>the</strong>y must use <strong>the</strong>ir best<br />
capacities to form an opinion <strong>about</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue that is under<br />
discussion, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n cast <strong>the</strong>ir votes.<br />
Of course, overtaxed citizens can refrain from voting in <strong>the</strong><br />
referendum <strong>and</strong>, by doing so, provide a m<strong>and</strong>ate to those<br />
who do vote. If <strong>the</strong>re are too few people interested, however,<br />
this procedure is also unusable. It is absurd to organise a<br />
national referendum on a matter for which only a h<strong>and</strong>ful<br />
<strong>of</strong> voters eventually show up. Not only is <strong>the</strong> public assembly<br />
unworkable, but even <strong>the</strong> systematic use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referendum<br />
becomes impracticable.<br />
Thus ano<strong>the</strong>r solution has to be found. The essential question<br />
in this context is: when <strong>the</strong> referendum is an unsuitable method<br />
for making decisions, who will <strong>the</strong>n actually make those decisions?<br />
The m<strong>and</strong>ate problem with <strong>the</strong> referendum normally<br />
solves itself: those entitled to vote <strong>and</strong> who actually do vote receive<br />
<strong>the</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ate <strong>of</strong> society. Because everyone is free to accept<br />
this m<strong>and</strong>ate or not, <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> equality is not violated. But<br />
who is given <strong>the</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ate if <strong>the</strong> referendum doesn’t take place?<br />
1<br />
Representative democracy is essentially a technique for solving<br />
this m<strong>and</strong>ate problem. Representative democracy must be<br />
implemented as soon as <strong>the</strong> citizens have too little time or interest<br />
to cooperate in a decision that still has to be made. The<br />
costs to society for a referendum on each separate subject are,<br />
at a certain time, according to <strong>the</strong> citizens <strong>the</strong>mselves, too high in<br />
proportion to <strong>the</strong> democratic benefit (direct access to decisionmaking<br />
for every citizen). That is why <strong>the</strong> citizens appoint a<br />
fixed parliament for several years; it receives <strong>the</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ate to<br />
make decisions on all <strong>the</strong> matters that <strong>the</strong> citizens do not want<br />
to decide directly. The election <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parliament is <strong>the</strong>refore a<br />
special type <strong>of</strong> direct-democratic decision: <strong>the</strong> citizens decide<br />
who will decide, <strong>and</strong> under what conditions, on <strong>the</strong> issues for<br />
which <strong>the</strong> people want to delegate <strong>the</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ate.<br />
The m<strong>and</strong>ate received by <strong>the</strong> parliament is, <strong>the</strong>refore, a special<br />
manifestation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ate given to <strong>the</strong> effective voters in direct-democratic<br />
decision-making by <strong>the</strong> entire community. In direct-democratic<br />
decision-making (referendum), <strong>the</strong> effective<br />
voters form as it were an enormous ad hoc parliament that is<br />
m<strong>and</strong>ated to decide on <strong>the</strong> subject. The only difference with<br />
representative decision-making (voting in <strong>the</strong> parliament) is<br />
that <strong>the</strong> parliament received its m<strong>and</strong>ate some time before<br />
<strong>the</strong> vote, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ate is given for a specific period <strong>of</strong><br />
time. It is clear that this separation <strong>of</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ating <strong>and</strong> deciding<br />
is not fundamental. But it is, however, essential to underst<strong>and</strong><br />
that <strong>the</strong> parliament <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> community <strong>of</strong> voters in a<br />
referendum have <strong>the</strong> same basis both logically <strong>and</strong> formally.<br />
The relationship between referendum<br />
<strong>and</strong> parliamentary decision-making<br />
The introduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> representative parliament raises a<br />
new problem. How does one determine which issues <strong>the</strong><br />
citizens still wish to decide directly?<br />
The supporters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> purely representative system have <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
answer ready. They argue that <strong>the</strong> parliament is all-powerful<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y reject <strong>the</strong> referendum. This severely damages <strong>the</strong><br />
principle <strong>of</strong> popular sovereignty included in <strong>the</strong> archetype<br />
<strong>of</strong> democracy. In <strong>the</strong> purely representative system it is once<br />
again possible to pass laws that are wanted by an elite, but<br />
which are rejected by <strong>the</strong> majority. As soon as <strong>the</strong> parliament<br />
is installed, it can act freely against <strong>the</strong> will <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority.<br />
The right <strong>of</strong> initiative, which follows directly from <strong>the</strong> principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> equality, is rescinded.<br />
The defenders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘purely representative system’ justify<br />
this system with two main arguments.<br />
An imposed m<strong>and</strong>ate is no m<strong>and</strong>ate at all<br />
First <strong>of</strong> all, <strong>the</strong> defenders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘purely representative system’<br />
state that <strong>the</strong> citizens give a m<strong>and</strong>ate to those elected <strong>and</strong><br />
that, as a result, <strong>the</strong> latter now possess <strong>the</strong> right to decide.<br />
In doing so, <strong>the</strong>y ignore <strong>the</strong> fact that this type <strong>of</strong> imposed m<strong>and</strong>ate<br />
creates an internal contradiction. A legitimate m<strong>and</strong>ate,<br />
just like a legitimate gift, can only be given voluntarily. This<br />
voluntariness also means that <strong>the</strong> citizen must be free not to<br />
provide a m<strong>and</strong>ate, but to opt for direct decision-making via a<br />
referendum. An imposed m<strong>and</strong>ate is a sham m<strong>and</strong>ate.<br />
An analogy can clarify this. Imagine that you are held up at<br />
night by five muggers who dem<strong>and</strong> your wallet. They do,<br />
however, leave you <strong>the</strong> choice <strong>of</strong> which mugger you surren-