storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ... storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
90 SPECIAL MUP RH UNITS IN OPERATION STORM Forces of the MUP [Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia] Special Police were present on the Velebit range from 1992. By the time Storm set off they had enough time to adjust to living in mountain conditions, sometimes to the limit of endurance. While in the area the members of the Special Police gained substantial information on the routes of movement and order of battle of Serbian forces in the Lika valley, kept in top shape and acquired specifi c combat experience. Th ese were the main reasons why the HV General Staff decided to commit the Special Police units to Operation Storm: from their jump-off position on Velebit they were supposed to cut the Medak - Gračac communication, free the northern Velebit foothills (Sveti Rok, Lovinac) and link up with HV forces at Lički Ribnik. Before that, they were to cut the Gračac - Obrovac communication, and seize the dominant points on Velebit above Obrovac, especially the Ćelavac communications centre, the main communications node of the Serbian forces. Further objectives of the MUP special units included seizure of the strategic road hub at Otrić, linkup with HV forces and penetration towards the international recognized border of the Republic of Croatia with Bosnia&Herzegovina in the area of Donji Lapac, Gornji Lapac and Borićevac (Kulen Vakuf). 206 Th e composite MUP Special Police force was assigned a special mission in the area between the Split and Gospić Corps Districts, and was directly subordinated to the Chief of the HV General Staff . Th eir commander was Lieutenant General Mladen Markač. On the fi rst day of the operation, at 0500 hours on 4 August, the composite Special Police force attacked from its positions on the Velebit range - from Ivine Vodice and Sveto Brdo in the western to Bukva and Tulove Grede in the eastern part of the Velebit range. Th eir main and auxiliary objectives were the Serbian forces fortifi ed on Mali Alan pass and deep in the northern Velebit foothills, and the Medak - Sveti Rok - Gračac - Obrovac communication. Th e Special Police units were deployed to their jump-off positions covertly (on foot) with all the required logistic and medical support, which is indicative of the high level of motivation and organization, and of the stamina and discipline of the troops. Particular skill was required in the covert deployment of artillery-rocket units - six 120 mm mortar batteries, a VRL 128 mm battalion and other weapons, together with the required ammunition. Th e Serbian units in all the positions along the Velebit range were at the highest level of combat readiness, and immediately aft er 0500 hours they opened heavy rocket and artillery fi re on the positions of the MUP units which had come close to their forward battle line. 206 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).
Aft er heavy and strenuous fi ghting the special units broke through the defence lines of the 4 th Light Brigade and parts of the 9 th Motorized Brigade of the SVK Lika Corps. Th e Light Brigade was rolled back to the Oščenica - Bolič - Osmatračnica line. At about 1300 hours the MUP units seized from the 9 th Motorized Brigade the fi rst strategic point on the Velebit range - the Mali Alan pass, and at about 1700 hours also took the village of Sveti Rok. 207 Before nighfall, at about 2000 hours, the Special Police also gained control over the Medak - Sv. Rok road up to Ričice. Along the Mali Alan - Ćelavac axis the Special Police units reached the area of Male Žuljine and Velike Žuljine, where it faced extremely tough resistance until 2100 hours. 208 Combat action of the MUP units ceased on 2200 hours, when the units regrouped for defence of the achieved lines, while the majority of the force rested, under heavy guard, in fi eld conditions until 0500 hours. On the fi rst day casualties totalled 5 dead and more than 30 wounded (of varying severity; some of the troops were dehydrated because of an insuffi cient quantity of drinking water). Th e casualty toll was substantially reduced by the presence of surgical and anesthesiological teams in the fi rst line of battle, which promptly provided the necessary medical assistance to the wounded. One company of the Grom (Th under) Special Police unit from the Karlovac Police Department, whose members were from the area of Slunj, was attached to the HV 1 st Guards Brigade advancing towards Plaški - Saborsko - Slunj; two of its members were wounded in the operation. 209 Aft er losing its position on the Velebit range, part of the SVK 9 th Motorized Brigade started to abandon other positions as well in order to secure withdrawal towards Udbina because the Medak - Gračac road was cut. At midnight on 4 August the HV General Staff ordered the MUP special force to take Gračac “by a vigorous attack and manoeuvre”. 210 In the morning of 5 August the SVK General Staff planned to halt the Croatian advance by committing part of the 2 nd Guards Brigade of the Special Unit Corps and, later on, by deploying one battalion from the 92 nd Motorized Brigade and another from the 4 th Light Brigade. 211 However, on 5 August in the morning (at about 1030 hours) the Special Police units freed the village of Lovinac at the foot of Mount Velebit, cut the Gospić - Gračac road and entered Gračac at about 1115 hours. Aft er entering Gračac they continued to advance towards Čolovac - Brezić. Th is brought the police troops into the area of the Gospić Corps District, i.e., the Lika theatre. 212 On its western front the Special Police liberated 207 According to the CIA analysis, the HV’s greatest success on 4 August came in the Velebit range and Northern Dalmatia. Th e pace of the MUP advance, stresses further the analysis, left the SVK 9th Motorized Brigade no time to regroup or consolidate its defences. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1990-1995, Central Intelligence Agency, Offi ce of Russian and European Analysis, Washington DC 20505, May 2002, 371. 208 MUP, Command, 4 August 1995; Report MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01- 95-381 of 4 August 1995; Report. HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm). 209 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm). 210 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95.02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-384 of 5 August 1995; Order. 211 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 223-224. 212 SVA MORH, ZZPS: ZP Split, cl. 032-01/95-01/12, reg. no. 1080-01-03-95-34 of 5 August 1995; Daily report. HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm). 91
- Page 40 and 41: y infl uential Croatian politicians
- Page 42 and 43: 42 THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE BELLIGER
- Page 44 and 45: Th e Croatian Air Force and Air Def
- Page 46 and 47: 46 THE SERBIAN REBELLION IN CROATIA
- Page 48 and 49: helmets”. 35 Th ey brought relati
- Page 50 and 51: standstill the Croatian Army was se
- Page 52 and 53: attacks against the RSK. Th e Lika
- Page 54 and 55: 54 CROATIAN FORCE OPERATIONS IN LIV
- Page 56 and 57: Th is was quite true, because the m
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- Page 62 and 63: 62 THE SECOND BIHAĆ CRISIS On 11 J
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- Page 70 and 71: 70 WAR PLANS (DEFENCE PLANS AND PLA
- Page 72 and 73: Under the pressure of Croatian atta
- Page 74: Croatian Navy units received orders
- Page 78 and 79: Knin (the fortress), 5 August 1995
- Page 80 and 81: HVO 3 rd Guards Brigade with the Se
- Page 82 and 83: 1 st and 4 th Light Brigades, the 2
- Page 84 and 85: of access to Benkovac. 177 Along th
- Page 86 and 87: Bribirske Mostine line on the way t
- Page 88 and 89: 88 Conclusion Th e Split Corps Dist
- Page 92 and 93: Medak at about 2000 hours and then,
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- Page 96 and 97: 96 THE GOSPIĆ CORPS DISTRICT The m
- Page 98 and 99: 98 Execution of the Operation Th e
- Page 100 and 101: day they reached the planned line:
- Page 102 and 103: Th e 138 th Home Guard Regiment pus
- Page 104 and 105: Croatian soldiers (Guardsmen) 104 C
- Page 106 and 107: 106 KARLOVAC CORPS DISTRICT Accordi
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- Page 128 and 129: Petrova Gora, swept by the MUP RH S
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- Page 134 and 135: 134 BJELOVAR CORPS DISTRICT Aft er
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- Page 138 and 139: 138 Conclusion Th e Bjelovar Corps
90<br />
SPECIAL MUP RH UNITS IN OPERATION STORM<br />
Forces of the MUP [Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia] Special<br />
Police were present on the Velebit range from 1992. By the time Storm set off they<br />
had enough time to adjust to living in mountain conditions, sometimes to the limit<br />
of endurance. While in the area the members of the Special Police gained substantial<br />
information on the routes of movement and order of battle of Serbian forces in the Lika<br />
valley, kept in top shape and acquired specifi c combat experience. Th ese were the main<br />
reasons why the HV General Staff decided to commit the Special Police units to Operation<br />
Storm: from their jump-off position on Velebit they were supposed to cut the Medak -<br />
Gračac communication, free the northern Velebit foothills (Sveti Rok, Lovinac) and link<br />
up with HV forces at Lički Ribnik. Before that, they were to cut the Gračac - Obrovac<br />
communication, and seize the dominant points on Velebit above Obrovac, especially the<br />
Ćelavac communications centre, the main communications node of the Serbian forces.<br />
Further objectives of the MUP special units included seizure of the strategic road hub<br />
at Otrić, linkup with HV forces and penetration towards the international recognized<br />
border of the Republic of Croatia with Bosnia&Herzegovina in the area of Donji Lapac,<br />
Gornji Lapac and Borićevac (Kulen Vakuf). 206 Th e composite MUP Special Police force<br />
was assigned a special mission in the area between the Split and Gospić Corps Districts,<br />
and was directly subordinated to the Chief of the HV General Staff . Th eir commander<br />
was Lieutenant General Mladen Markač.<br />
On the fi rst day of the operation, at 0500 hours on 4 August, the composite Special<br />
Police force attacked from its positions on the Velebit range - from Ivine Vodice and Sveto<br />
Brdo in the western to Bukva and Tulove Grede in the eastern part of the Velebit range.<br />
Th eir main and auxiliary objectives were the Serbian forces fortifi ed on Mali Alan pass<br />
and deep in the northern Velebit foothills, and the Medak - Sveti Rok - Gračac - Obrovac<br />
communication. Th e Special Police units were deployed to their jump-off positions<br />
covertly (on foot) with all the required logistic and medical support, which is indicative<br />
of the high level of motivation and organization, and of the stamina and discipline of the<br />
troops. Particular skill was required in the covert deployment of artillery-rocket units<br />
- six 120 mm mortar batteries, a VRL 128 mm battalion and other weapons, together<br />
with the required ammunition. Th e Serbian units in all the positions along the Velebit<br />
range were at the highest level of combat readiness, and immediately aft er 0500 hours<br />
they opened heavy rocket and artillery fi re on the positions of the MUP units which had<br />
come close to their forward battle line.<br />
206 HMDCDR: Ž. Sačić, «Specijalna policija u Oluji» (Special Police in Storm).