storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

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Conclusion
Th e Split Corps District (ZP Split, ZPS) had more combat experience than any other
operational HV unit. It began to enjoy relative peace only in the second half of 1993. In
late 1994 it was engaged again in the fi ghting on Mount Dinara and in Livanjsko Polje, and
Storm was only one in the series of operations in which it was committed, although the
most demanding one. Its main strength lay in the 4 th and 7 th Guards Brigades, then among
the best professional units of the Croatian armed forces. Th ese brigades were entrusted with
the main part of the mission, which was facilitated by the order of battle of the SVK North
Dalmatian Corps. Along the line of attack of the two Croatian brigades the SVK had two
groups, scraped together from diff erent units, which were no match in any respect for the
Croatian forces. Th at was only one of the problems of the North Dalmatian Corps. Literally
on the eve of Storm it got a new commander, General Slobodan Kovačević, formerly head
of the armoured-mechanized units in the General Staff of the Yugoslav army. M. Sekulić
claims that he did not even have the time to meet with the commanders of the subordinate
units, but that this fact does not clear him of responsibility. According to the same source,
Kovačević did not organize his command, and sent the chief of his staff to command a
combat group instead of keeping him in the Corps command. 201 Th e decision of the SVK
Supreme Defence Council to “cut down” the front by pulling back from Knin was the last
straw in the poor performance of the command of the North Dalmatian Corps. 202 Because
of this the Split Corps District accomplished the fi rst stage of the operation very quickly
and with unexpectedly little eff ort. However, in the report on the subsequent engagement
of the ZP Split, addressed to the President of the Republic of Croatia, the Chief of the
HV General Staff wrote: “In the second phase, intended to exploit the breakthrough, the
Split Corps District - which could have proceeded even to pursuit - having halted the
attack, for reasons unknown, of its main units for 2 days and having falsely reported the
achieved line - did not cut off 203 the communications in due time allowing the enemy
to pull out a considerable share of the materiel of the 7 th Knin and the 15 th Lika Corps”.
According to the same report, the units of the Split Corps District reached the state border
on 8 August 1995, two days later than it had been objectively possible. In the opinion of
General Rajko Rakić, the report was improper, and the conduct of the commander of the
Corps justifi ed and better for everyone concerned; he also supported this belief by the fact
that “the President did not react at all to such a tendentious report”. 204
200 SVA MORH, GSHV: ZP Plit Command, IZM Knin; cl. str. conf. 81/95-01/19, reg. no. 1080-01-95-47 of
8 August 1995; Report.
201 M. Sekulić, «Knin je pao u Beogradu» (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 188-189.
202 Aft er the fall of Knin and Gračac on 5 August, notes the CIA analysis, the SVK commander General
Mile Mrkšić and the commander of the SVK North Dalmatian Corps General Kovačević were faced with
a diffi cult choice: withdraw entirely from the Benkovac - Obrovac - Kistanje pocket or face defeat and the
destruction or surrender of the entire 7th Corps. Of course, they chose to pull out, with the Serbian population.
Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict 1990-1995, 371-372.
203 MORH, GSHV: GS HV, cl. 80-01/95-02-08, reg. no. 412-06-05/01-95-5o5 of 21 August 1995; Report on
Operation Storm.
204 HMDCDR: Comments of General Rajko Rakić on the text about the role of ZP Split in the military-police
Operation Storm.