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1 st and 4 th Light Brigades, the 2 nd and 3 rd Infantry Brigades, the 7 th Composite Artillery
Regiment, the 7 th Composite Anti-Armour Artillery Regiment, the 7 th Light Artillery-
Rocket Regiment and the 7 th Rear Base. Th e Corps commander was Major-General
Slobodan Kovačević. 170 According to the war plan, in the fi rst stage of the operation
the Corps had to prevent HV breakthrough along the axes Zadar - Benkovac - Knin,
Šibenik - Drniš - Knin, Sinj- Velika Vrlika - Knin and on the Velebit range. In the second
part of the operation the Corps had to redeploy its forces, advance to the Adriatic
coast between Šibenik and Biograd, and fortify the achieved line. Th e 105 th Air Force
Brigade, and the Republika Srpska air force and air defence were allocated for support. 171
As compared with the defence plan of February 1995, by early August the situation
changed substantially. Th e Corps did not get the envisioned two brigade reinforcements,
the VRS 2 nd Krajina Corps which was to guard the left fl ank was knocked out, and the
Knin - Bosansko Grahovo route had to be closed by a provisional tactical and combat
unit. In the period under consideration the Corps was reinforced with a 130 mm gun
battalion and an SVLR Oganj battery. Th e Corps included the 2 nd Guards Brigade of
the SVK Special Unit Corps. On the eve of the Croatian attack the brigade pulled back
from Mount Dinara to Knin. A military police battalion was also present in the Knin
greater area. Knin was also the headquarters of the SVK General Staff and of some units
subordinated to it - the 101 th Intelligence Centre and the 75 th Rear Base. 172
As the political and military centre of the RSK, Knin had a great moral signifi cance, and
its liberation would certainly motivate Croatian troops to fi ght on, just as its successful
defence would provide an analogous motivation to the rebel Serbs. Quite logically, the
Split Corps District committed its most successful units, two Guards brigades, to the Knin
operation. Although tired because of the just completed battles for Bosansko Grahovo,
the two brigades were ready to liberate Knin. Th at was certainly a special task in their
battle record, and for the 4 th Brigade an appropriate conclusion of its war path which had
started four years earlier precisely by the defence of parts of Northern Dalmatia from the
threat posed by the JNA and the rebel Serbs from Knin. 173
170 HDAS, RSK: 7th Corps Command; DT no. 37-3of 13 February 1995; Order of the 7th Corps Commander
for defence and off ensive operations, Op.no.1; M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade),
188-202.
171 VSA MORH: Directive for the commitment of the Serb Army of the Krajina, Op. no.1, “GVOZD”, February
1995.
172 VSA MORH MORH: GŠ TO RSK, DT no. 947-2/1 of 27 November 1992; Overview of the mobilization
and deployment of the units of the Serbian Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina; M. Sekulić, “Knin je
pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 223, 239.
173 In discussing the issue of which Guards brigade (the 4th or the 7th) entered Knin fi rst, General Rakić
believes that “this is not a formal matter but rather a point of prestige”. However, as a witness and a person
involved in planning the attack on Knin, he also noted: “Aft er the liberation of Bosansko Grahovo, the 4th
Brigade, which had attacked Grahovo on the right of the 7th Brigade, turned in preparation for the advance
towards Knin via the Derala pass. At the same time, the 7th Brigade, which had advanced towards Grahovo
left of the 4th Brigade, turned with the same goal in mind towards Knin across Crvena Zemlja. At the time
no rotation of the two brigades was possible, and they just remained in position aft er the taking of Grahovo.
At the ZP Split command post in Sajković the two brigade commanders (Ivan Korade and Damir Krstičević)
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