storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ... storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

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Croatian Navy units received orders for an active naval defence of the Republic of Croatia focused on “anti-naval, anti-submarine, anti-mine operations, and anti-sabotage and air defence”. Naval defence in the South Adriatic area was incorporated into the overall defence operations in the Southern Th eatre. 160 Military police units were issued orders related to their domain of activity with the additional obligation to cooperate with civil police. 161 Reporters were “forbidden all access to areas of responsibility of Croatian army units without a special permission issued by the MORH Political Directorate”. HV members were forbidden to give “any statements to (national and foreign) media without the express approval of the MORH Political Directorate”. 162 On 3 August at 2115 hours the Chief of the HV General Staff issued battle readiness orders to units of the Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split Corps Districts, and to the special units of the Ministry of Internal Aff airs of the Republic of Croatia; units of ZP Osijek, the Southern Th eatre and of the Croatian Navy received defence readiness orders at 0300 hours on 4 August. Battle readiness for the Croatian Air Force was set at 0500 hours on 4 August. 163 Th e fi rst air strike was scheduled for 0600 hours, the second one to follow “depending on weather conditions”. 164 At 0700 the Croatian Army was to “repossess Croatian materiel from the UNCRO depots”, where it was stored under the provisions of the Zagreb Agreement concluded in the spring of 1994. 165 74 Th e political and military leaders of the Republic of Croatia watch the progress of Operation Storm. 160 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08. reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-350 of 3 August 1995; Order. 161 MORH, GSHV: MORH, Military Police Directorate, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-158, reg. no. 512-19/01-95-474 of 3 August 1995. 162 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 818-04/95-01/02-03, reg. no. 1075-04/95-17 of 3 August 1995; Order. 163 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-364 of 3 August 1995; Order. 164 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl.08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-0605/01-95-365 of 3 August 1995; Order. 165 MORH, GSHV: GSH, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-368 of 3 August 1995; Order. Because of the impression that the preparation of Storm (unit mobilization, their assembly and deployment, order reception, knowledge of the terrain and briefi ng, assessment of the situation and battle order of the enemy) unfolded in a disorganized way or in the nick of time, General Petar Stipetić believes that the overall conduct and command of the GSHV needs to be analyzed in particular, including the selection of people for key positions. HMD- CDR: comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about ZP Zagreb in the military-police operation Storm.

Croatian Navy units received orders for an active naval defence of the Republic of Croatia<br />

focused on “anti-naval, anti-submarine, anti-mine operations, and anti-sabotage and air<br />

defence”. Naval defence in the South Adriatic area was incorporated into the overall defence<br />

operations in the Southern Th eatre. 160<br />

Military police units were issued orders related to their domain of activity with the<br />

additional obligation to cooperate with civil police. 161 Reporters were “forbidden all access<br />

to areas of responsibility of Croatian army units without a special permission issued by the<br />

MORH Political Directorate”. HV members were forbidden to give “any statements to (national<br />

and foreign) media without the express approval of the MORH Political Directorate”. 162<br />

On 3 August at 2115 hours the Chief of the HV General Staff issued battle readiness orders<br />

to units of the Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split Corps Districts, and to the special<br />

units of the Ministry of Internal Aff airs of the Republic of Croatia; units of ZP Osijek, the<br />

Southern Th eatre and of the Croatian Navy received defence readiness orders at 0300 hours<br />

on 4 August. Battle readiness for the Croatian Air Force was set at 0500 hours on 4 August. 163<br />

Th e fi rst air strike was scheduled for 0600 hours, the second one to follow “depending on<br />

weather conditions”. 164 At 0700 the Croatian Army was to “repossess Croatian materiel from<br />

the UNCRO depots”, where it was stored under the provisions of the Zagreb Agreement<br />

concluded in the spring of 1994. 165<br />

74<br />

Th e political and<br />

military leaders<br />

of the Republic<br />

of Croatia watch<br />

the progress of<br />

Operation Storm.<br />

160 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08. reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-350 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />

161 MORH, GSHV: MORH, Military Police Directorate, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-158, reg. no. 512-19/01-95-474<br />

of 3 August 1995.<br />

162 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 818-04/95-01/02-03, reg. no. 1075-04/95-17 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />

163 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-364 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />

164 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl.08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-0605/01-95-365 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />

165 MORH, GSHV: GSH, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-368 of 3 August 1995; Order. Because of<br />

the impression that the preparation of Storm (unit mobilization, their assembly and deployment, order reception,<br />

knowledge of the terrain and briefi ng, assessment of the situation and battle order of the enemy) unfolded<br />

in a disorganized way or in the nick of time, General Petar Stipetić believes that the overall conduct and command<br />

of the GSHV needs to be analyzed in particular, including the selection of people for key positions. HMD-<br />

CDR: comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about ZP Zagreb in the military-police operation Storm.

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