storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ... storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
Croatian Navy units received orders for an active naval defence of the Republic of Croatia focused on “anti-naval, anti-submarine, anti-mine operations, and anti-sabotage and air defence”. Naval defence in the South Adriatic area was incorporated into the overall defence operations in the Southern Th eatre. 160 Military police units were issued orders related to their domain of activity with the additional obligation to cooperate with civil police. 161 Reporters were “forbidden all access to areas of responsibility of Croatian army units without a special permission issued by the MORH Political Directorate”. HV members were forbidden to give “any statements to (national and foreign) media without the express approval of the MORH Political Directorate”. 162 On 3 August at 2115 hours the Chief of the HV General Staff issued battle readiness orders to units of the Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split Corps Districts, and to the special units of the Ministry of Internal Aff airs of the Republic of Croatia; units of ZP Osijek, the Southern Th eatre and of the Croatian Navy received defence readiness orders at 0300 hours on 4 August. Battle readiness for the Croatian Air Force was set at 0500 hours on 4 August. 163 Th e fi rst air strike was scheduled for 0600 hours, the second one to follow “depending on weather conditions”. 164 At 0700 the Croatian Army was to “repossess Croatian materiel from the UNCRO depots”, where it was stored under the provisions of the Zagreb Agreement concluded in the spring of 1994. 165 74 Th e political and military leaders of the Republic of Croatia watch the progress of Operation Storm. 160 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08. reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-350 of 3 August 1995; Order. 161 MORH, GSHV: MORH, Military Police Directorate, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-158, reg. no. 512-19/01-95-474 of 3 August 1995. 162 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 818-04/95-01/02-03, reg. no. 1075-04/95-17 of 3 August 1995; Order. 163 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-364 of 3 August 1995; Order. 164 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl.08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-0605/01-95-365 of 3 August 1995; Order. 165 MORH, GSHV: GSH, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-368 of 3 August 1995; Order. Because of the impression that the preparation of Storm (unit mobilization, their assembly and deployment, order reception, knowledge of the terrain and briefi ng, assessment of the situation and battle order of the enemy) unfolded in a disorganized way or in the nick of time, General Petar Stipetić believes that the overall conduct and command of the GSHV needs to be analyzed in particular, including the selection of people for key positions. HMD- CDR: comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about ZP Zagreb in the military-police operation Storm.
- Page 23 and 24: However, aft er the Split Agreement
- Page 25 and 26: military support to the RSK. Specif
- Page 27 and 28: warrant the conclusion that Croatia
- Page 29 and 30: war. But, it is certain that they c
- Page 31 and 32: Of course, this does not disprove t
- Page 34 and 35: Croatian soldiers (guardsmen) 34
- Page 36 and 37: 36 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .
- Page 38 and 39: (Croatian soldiers, 6 August 1995 (
- Page 40 and 41: y infl uential Croatian politicians
- Page 42 and 43: 42 THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE BELLIGER
- Page 44 and 45: Th e Croatian Air Force and Air Def
- Page 46 and 47: 46 THE SERBIAN REBELLION IN CROATIA
- Page 48 and 49: helmets”. 35 Th ey brought relati
- Page 50 and 51: standstill the Croatian Army was se
- Page 52 and 53: attacks against the RSK. Th e Lika
- Page 54 and 55: 54 CROATIAN FORCE OPERATIONS IN LIV
- Page 56 and 57: Th is was quite true, because the m
- Page 58 and 59: Croatian guardsmen between Mali Ša
- Page 60 and 61: of UNPROFOR. In his letter to Boutr
- Page 62 and 63: 62 THE SECOND BIHAĆ CRISIS On 11 J
- Page 64 and 65: 64 THE CROATIAN RESPONSE TO THE SEC
- Page 66 and 67: to 8 days; guarantee of civil safet
- Page 68 and 69: July noted that on the previous eve
- Page 70 and 71: 70 WAR PLANS (DEFENCE PLANS AND PLA
- Page 72 and 73: Under the pressure of Croatian atta
- Page 77 and 78: THE STORM 77
- Page 79 and 80: SPLIT CORPS DISTRICT Unlike other c
- Page 81 and 82: the 142 nd Home Guard Regiment, the
- Page 83 and 84: Th e operation started early in the
- Page 85 and 86: Brigade captured Golubić, Vrpolje
- Page 87 and 88: Croatian Guards Brigade and an ATG
- Page 89 and 90: According to the data in the analys
- Page 91 and 92: Aft er heavy and strenuous fi ghtin
- Page 93 and 94: of Croatian laws. Even on that day
- Page 95 and 96: Specijalne postrojbe MUP-a RH Speci
- Page 97 and 98: Artillery support was to be provide
- Page 99 and 100: Repetitor (repeater) point of resis
- Page 101 and 102: system was destabilized and reduced
- Page 103 and 104: Brigade, which had been advancing f
- Page 105 and 106: Th e front was elongated and of sma
- Page 107 and 108: Artillery support was to be provide
- Page 109 and 110: In the Karlovac theatre the 137 th
- Page 111 and 112: counterattacked, with artillery, ta
- Page 113 and 114: For the purpose of subsequent opera
- Page 115 and 116: were ambushed on 8 August by the Se
- Page 117 and 118: THE ZAGREB CORPS DISTRICT Pursuant
- Page 119 and 120: Stankovac. 338 Th e HV 153 rd Briga
- Page 121 and 122: liberation of Petrinja on the fi rs
- Page 123 and 124: Petrinja was fi nally liberated on
Croatian Navy units received orders for an active naval defence of the Republic of Croatia<br />
focused on “anti-naval, anti-submarine, anti-mine operations, and anti-sabotage and air<br />
defence”. Naval defence in the South Adriatic area was incorporated into the overall defence<br />
operations in the Southern Th eatre. 160<br />
Military police units were issued orders related to their domain of activity with the<br />
additional obligation to cooperate with civil police. 161 Reporters were “forbidden all access<br />
to areas of responsibility of Croatian army units without a special permission issued by the<br />
MORH Political Directorate”. HV members were forbidden to give “any statements to (national<br />
and foreign) media without the express approval of the MORH Political Directorate”. 162<br />
On 3 August at 2115 hours the Chief of the HV General Staff issued battle readiness orders<br />
to units of the Bjelovar, Zagreb, Karlovac, Gospić and Split Corps Districts, and to the special<br />
units of the Ministry of Internal Aff airs of the Republic of Croatia; units of ZP Osijek, the<br />
Southern Th eatre and of the Croatian Navy received defence readiness orders at 0300 hours<br />
on 4 August. Battle readiness for the Croatian Air Force was set at 0500 hours on 4 August. 163<br />
Th e fi rst air strike was scheduled for 0600 hours, the second one to follow “depending on<br />
weather conditions”. 164 At 0700 the Croatian Army was to “repossess Croatian materiel from<br />
the UNCRO depots”, where it was stored under the provisions of the Zagreb Agreement<br />
concluded in the spring of 1994. 165<br />
74<br />
Th e political and<br />
military leaders<br />
of the Republic<br />
of Croatia watch<br />
the progress of<br />
Operation Storm.<br />
160 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08. reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-350 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
161 MORH, GSHV: MORH, Military Police Directorate, cl. str. conf. 80-01/95-158, reg. no. 512-19/01-95-474<br />
of 3 August 1995.<br />
162 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, cl. 818-04/95-01/02-03, reg. no. 1075-04/95-17 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
163 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-364 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
164 MORH, GSHV: GSHV, cl.08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-0605/01-95-365 of 3 August 1995; Order.<br />
165 MORH, GSHV: GSH, cl. 08-01/95-02/08, reg. no. 512-06-05/01-95-368 of 3 August 1995; Order. Because of<br />
the impression that the preparation of Storm (unit mobilization, their assembly and deployment, order reception,<br />
knowledge of the terrain and briefi ng, assessment of the situation and battle order of the enemy) unfolded<br />
in a disorganized way or in the nick of time, General Petar Stipetić believes that the overall conduct and command<br />
of the GSHV needs to be analyzed in particular, including the selection of people for key positions. HMD-<br />
CDR: comments of General Petar Stipetić on the text about ZP Zagreb in the military-police operation Storm.