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62 THE SECOND BIHAĆ CRISIS On 11 July 1995 the Army of Republika Srpska captured the safe area of Srebrenica, and that was a sign that the situation had taken a radical course. 104 Th e Bosnian&Herzegovinian Serbs had no intention of stopping their war machine. Soon aft er Srebrenica a new attack was mounted on Bihać. Th e Bihać theatre had not remained quiet since the Serb off ensive in late 1994, but there were no major changes of the front line either. Aft er the Croatian forces had liberated Western Slavonia, Bihać again ranked very high on the priority list of both Serbian armies, especially because the observed grouping of Croatian forces towards Kordun and Banovina forced SVK units to shift their focus from Bihać to the defence of these areas. Th e pressure of Operational Group Pauk (Spider) on Bihać ceased, and the ARBiH 5 th Corps used the opportunity to attack Serbian positions. Developments clearly indicated the possible link-up of Croatian and Bosnian forces along the Bihać - Bosansko Grahovo line, as well as the danger posed by such a situation for Knin. Accordingly, the commander of the 2 nd Krajina Corps, responsible for the area under consideration, requested from the VRS General Staff to take every step in order to prevent the risk. 105 Th e proposal of the commander of the 2 nd Krajina Corps to “deal jointly with Dinara and Plješivica” was accepted in principle at the meeting of the supreme RS and RSK command held on 4 May in Knin. For the new campaign Radovan Karadžić approved special police reinforcements and special units for operations on Mount Plješivica. 106 Serbian indecision and sluggish agreement worked to the advantage of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, which rolled back Serbian forces from Bihać on part of the front line. 107 Preparations for the Serbian off ensive started aft er it was agreed by the general staff s of the VRS and the VSK on 4 July. Th e code name of the operation was Mač-95 (Sword-92) for the SVK and Štit-95 (Shield-95) for the VRS. Th e plan of the operation envisioned the routing of the ARBiH 5 th Corps followed by its encirclement and annihilation. Th e role of the SVK was to protect the operation, by preventive readiness, from possible attacks of the Croatian army. Th e SVK committed two operational and one tactical group to the attack itself. 108 Th e newly-formed Special Unit Corps was committed as the Second Operational Group (OG-2), and OG Pauk was renamed into First Operational group (OG-1). 109 A group of MUP members from the Republic of Serbia was also involved 104 «Hronologija 1990-1995» (Chronology 1990.-1995), 246. 105 Command of the 2nd KK; str. conf. no. 66-64 of 8 May 1995. 106 Command of the 2nd KK; str. conf. no. 66-62 of 5 May 1995. 107 B. Felić, “Peti korpus 1992-1995.” (Th e 5th Corps 1992-1995), 463. 108 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 159. 109 VSA MORH: RSK, GŠ SV; str. conf. no.105-41 of 17 July 1995; Delivery of regular battle reports. Warning: VSA MORH: Command OG-2, 17 July 1995, order of the chief of the artillery.
in the operation as part the SVK 101 st Detachment at the hamlet of Rekić (village of Tržac). 110 Aft er a number of postponements, the operation started on 19 July 1995. 111 On 21 July the Command of the ARBiH 5 th Corps informed the HV General Staff that the Corps had sustained heavy losses “in personnel and a signifi cant loss of territory. [...] Ammunition and materiel supplies are below the critical level and the Corps cannot resist the aggressor for a longer period. [...] Considering the rate of the aggressor’s onslaught, we can sustain organized defence over the next two to three days”. 112 Two days later, on 23 July, the Command of the ARBiH 5 th Corps informed the HV General Staff that conditions had deteriorated beyond control and that by the end of the day the Bihać area could be cut up into two parts, “and the 5 th Corps broken up”. 113 One day later, the Command of the 5 th Corps, the HVO General Staff for Bihać and the Bihać Municipal HDZ Board appealed for help to the political and military authorities in Zagreb. “Please consider this situation with utmost seriousness, and take urgent and radical steps in order to save the population and the territory of the Una-Sana Canton”. 114 Th e Serbian success at Bihać briefl y brought Fikret Abdić back to the front pages. He proclaimed the Republic of Western Bosnia in Velika Kladuša on 26 July 1995. 115 Soldiers of the HVO 101 st Regiment in Bihać 110 RSK, MUP, Special Unit Directorate; no. 08/4-2-6299/95 of 31 July 1995; Report. 111 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 160-161. 112 Command of the 5th Corps, GS GVO Command Bihać, 21 July 1995; Intelligence information. 113 Command of the 5th Corps, GS GVO Command Bihać; 23 July 1995; Information on conditions in the zone of responsibility of the 5th Corps and HVO Bihać. 114 Command of the 5th Corps, GS HVO Command Bihać, Bihać Municipal HDZ Board, 24 July 1995; Breakdown of the military and political situation in the territory of the Una-Sana Canton. 115 “Hronologija 1990-1995.”(Chronology 1990-1995), 251. 63
- Page 11 and 12: material, the reminiscences of Gene
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- Page 15 and 16: ordered the Flight/; Večernje novo
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- Page 19 and 20: - the population was signifi cantly
- Page 21 and 22: General Staff had traditionally cou
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- Page 34 and 35: Croatian soldiers (guardsmen) 34
- Page 36 and 37: 36 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .
- Page 38 and 39: (Croatian soldiers, 6 August 1995 (
- Page 40 and 41: y infl uential Croatian politicians
- Page 42 and 43: 42 THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE BELLIGER
- Page 44 and 45: Th e Croatian Air Force and Air Def
- Page 46 and 47: 46 THE SERBIAN REBELLION IN CROATIA
- Page 48 and 49: helmets”. 35 Th ey brought relati
- Page 50 and 51: standstill the Croatian Army was se
- Page 52 and 53: attacks against the RSK. Th e Lika
- Page 54 and 55: 54 CROATIAN FORCE OPERATIONS IN LIV
- Page 56 and 57: Th is was quite true, because the m
- Page 58 and 59: Croatian guardsmen between Mali Ša
- Page 60 and 61: of UNPROFOR. In his letter to Boutr
- Page 64 and 65: 64 THE CROATIAN RESPONSE TO THE SEC
- Page 66 and 67: to 8 days; guarantee of civil safet
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- Page 70 and 71: 70 WAR PLANS (DEFENCE PLANS AND PLA
- Page 72 and 73: Under the pressure of Croatian atta
- Page 74: Croatian Navy units received orders
- Page 78 and 79: Knin (the fortress), 5 August 1995
- Page 80 and 81: HVO 3 rd Guards Brigade with the Se
- Page 82 and 83: 1 st and 4 th Light Brigades, the 2
- Page 84 and 85: of access to Benkovac. 177 Along th
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- Page 88 and 89: 88 Conclusion Th e Split Corps Dist
- Page 90 and 91: 90 SPECIAL MUP RH UNITS IN OPERATIO
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- Page 96 and 97: 96 THE GOSPIĆ CORPS DISTRICT The m
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- Page 100 and 101: day they reached the planned line:
- Page 102 and 103: Th e 138 th Home Guard Regiment pus
- Page 104 and 105: Croatian soldiers (Guardsmen) 104 C
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- Page 108 and 109: and prevent deeper penetration on t
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in the operation as part the SVK 101 st Detachment at the hamlet of Rekić (village of<br />
Tržac). 110<br />
Aft er a number of postponements, the operation started on 19 July 1995. 111 On 21<br />
July the Command of the ARBiH 5 th Corps informed the HV General Staff that the<br />
Corps had sustained heavy losses “in personnel and a signifi cant loss of territory. [...]<br />
Ammunition and materiel supplies are below the critical level and the Corps cannot<br />
resist the aggressor for a longer period. [...] Considering the rate of the aggressor’s<br />
onslaught, we can sustain organized defence over the next two to three days”. 112 Two days<br />
later, on 23 July, the Command of the ARBiH 5 th Corps informed the HV General Staff<br />
that conditions had deteriorated beyond control and that by the end of the day the Bihać<br />
area could be cut up into two parts, “and the 5 th Corps broken up”. 113 One day later, the<br />
Command of the 5 th Corps, the HVO General Staff for Bihać and the Bihać Municipal<br />
HDZ Board appealed for help to the political and military authorities in Zagreb. “Please<br />
consider this situation with utmost seriousness, and take urgent and radical steps in<br />
order to save the population and the territory of the Una-Sana Canton”. 114 Th e Serbian<br />
success at Bihać briefl y brought Fikret Abdić back to the front pages. He proclaimed the<br />
Republic of Western Bosnia in Velika Kladuša on 26 July 1995. 115<br />
Soldiers of the HVO 101 st Regiment in Bihać<br />
110 RSK, MUP, Special Unit Directorate; no. 08/4-2-6299/95 of 31 July 1995; Report.<br />
111 M. Sekulić, “Knin je pao u Beogradu” (Knin Fell in Belgrade), 160-161.<br />
112 Command of the 5th Corps, GS GVO Command Bihać, 21 July 1995; Intelligence information.<br />
113 Command of the 5th Corps, GS GVO Command Bihać; 23 July 1995; Information on conditions in the<br />
zone of responsibility of the 5th Corps and HVO Bihać.<br />
114 Command of the 5th Corps, GS HVO Command Bihać, Bihać Municipal HDZ Board, 24 July 1995;<br />
Breakdown of the military and political situation in the territory of the Una-Sana Canton.<br />
115 “Hronologija 1990-1995.”(Chronology 1990-1995), 251.<br />
63
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