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1 November 1994. By 8 November Serbian forces cleared the valley of the river Una from
Spasovo to the village of Lohovo, and blocked Ripač. 59 Bosniak forces found themselves
in a tight spot, and on 12 November the President of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina A. Izetbegović sent to the President of the Republic of Croatia F. Tuđman
the request to prevent attacks on Bihać from Croatian territory. 60
By 17 November Serbian forces recovered almost the entire territory formerly
liberated by the Bosniaks. F. Abdić’s forces entered V. Kladuša, and units of the 2 nd Krajina
Corps advanced to two kilometres from Bihać. 61 Th e forces of the Krajina Serbs were
restructured, and the Command of Operational Group Pauk (Spider) became functional
on 16 November. 62 Since the concentration of Croatian forces towards occupied areas had
been observed, on 17 November the SVK General Staff ordered all units to ensure the
appropriate degree of combat readiness “in order to prevent a possible surprise action by
the HV”. 63 Two days later mobilization was ordered of all conscripts on wartime posting
lists of the SVK units. 64
Th e international community reacted to the Serbian attacks. On 9 November
UNPROFOR warned the Krajina Serbs that it would use all available means if they did
not stop shelling the Bihać safe area. Th e Serbs rejected the warning on grounds that it
as untrue, and attributed it to false accusations by Croats and Bosniaks. 65 Th e attacks
did not stop, and on 21 November NATO aircraft attacked the SVK airstrip at Udbina.
Five persons were wounded and one of them died soon thereaft er; the attack caused
considerable damage to the airstrip and mobile equipment. 66 On 22 November the
Yugoslav Army informed the SVK that it had received from its military representatives
in Rome and London the information that the air attacks would continue if the Serbian
off ensive in the Bihać area should continue. 67 Because of the attack and of the threats of
the international community F. Abdić’s units were given the role of main forces, while
the SVK was supposed to organize and supply them, and direct their actions. 68
59 HDA, RSK: Command of the 98th infantry brigade; str. conf., no. 32-103 of 12 November 1994. Information
60 H. Šarinić, «Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem, 1993-95» (All My Secret Negotiations
with Slobodan Milošević, 1993-95/98), 170-171.
61 D. Radišić, Hronologija 1990-1995» (Chronology 1990-1995), 501.
62 HDA, HMDCDR: War diary of GŠ VSK, note for 16 November 1994.
63 HDA, RSK: GŠ SVK, IKM Korenica; str. conf., no. 3-503/174 of 17 November. Battle order.
64 HDA, RSK: GŠ SVK; str. conf., no. 11-301 of 19 November 1994. SVK conscripts, mobilization order.
65 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠ SV; conf., no. 40-66/94 of 10 November 1994. Response to the accusations.
66 POA: RSK, GŠ SV, str. conf., no. 3-503/390 of 23 November 1994. Report of the commission for the examination
of the consequences of the NATO air attack.
67 HDA, RSK: RSK, GŠSV; str. conf., no. 3-555 of 22 November 1994. Danger of air attack.
68 POA: GŠ SVK-IKM; str. conf., no. 3-503/552 of 30 November 1994. Data for the report of the defence
minister in the RSK Assembly.
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