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the Croatian reserve troops was demobilized, and military activities abated throughout
the Croatian theatre of war. 42 Th e eff orts of the Republic of Croatia focused on resolving
the problem of the Serbian rebellion were transferred to the diplomatic fi eld. On 31 March
and 30 September 1994 the UN Security Council extended the UNPROFOR mandate
by six months. 43 Croatia was not satisfi ed with UNPROFOR’s effi ciency, and between 1
July and 16 August 1994 displaced persons organized road blocks in order to pressure
UNPROFOR and draw the attention of the international public to the ineffi ciency of
the “blue helmets”. 44 Th e position of the RSK deteriorated owing to the confl ict between
Belgrade and Pale because the Bosnian&Herzegovinian Serbs refused to sign the Contact
Group peace plan for Bosnia&Herzegovina, aft er which Belgrade imposed on 4 August
1994 political and economic sanctions which also aff ected the Krajina Serbs. 45
In mid-September 1994 the US Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia Peter Galbraith
proposed to the President of the Republic of Croatia a plan, later on called Plan Z4,
according to which the autonomous districts of Glina and Knin would have certain
elements of statehood, but would be reintegrated together with other occupied areas
into Croatia. Th e acceptance of the plan would be equal to political suicide, as F. Tuđman
was clearly aware, according to the testimony of one of his close associates. 46 However,
regardless of whether he was equal to his function, Galbraith was the representative of
a global power and his view had to be appreciated. 47 All the same, on 30 January 1995 F.
Tuđman received the draft plan from the representatives of the international community
and declared that the Croatian side would consider it. He also noted that he had serious
objections to the plan, in particular because “the issue was defi ned as a controversy
between two equal sides, while it actually involved an issue regarding a minority in a
national state, and even not the entire minority but only a smaller part of it”. 48 However,
the RSK leadership turned the plan down; actually, because it insistently pursued the
policy of annexation of the RSK to the “Greater Serbia”, it even refused to consider it
although the plan off ered the rebel Serbs in Croatia an extraordinarily great autonomy,
almost a “state within a state”. Th e possibility of sustaining negotiations about the plan
existed until the moment when conditions again brought the military option to the fore.
Th e commitment of the Army of B&H and the Croatian Defence Council at Bihać and
Kupres opened up the need for the engagement of Croatian forces, and aft er a six-month
42 Command of the Zagreb Corps District, cl. str. conf. 8p/94-02/87, reg. no. 1075-11/01-94-3 of 16 March
1994. Order for the demobilization of units and parts of HV units of the Zagreb Corps District.
43 «Ujedinjeni narodi: Rezolucije o Republici Hrvatskoj, UNPROFOR» (Th e United Nations: Resolutions on
the Republic of Croatia, UNPROFOR), 57-63.
44 “Hronologija rata” (Chronology of the War),. 387, 400.
45 “Hronologija događaja na prostoru prethodne Jugoslavije 1990-1995” (Chronology of Developments in
the Previous Yugoslavia 1990-1995); Glas srpski - Centar za geostrateška istraživanja Univerziteta u Banja
Luci, Banja Luka, 2002, 176.
46 H. Šarinić, «Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem, 1993-95/98» (All My Secret Negotiations
with Slobodan Milošević, 1993-95/98), 153-161.
47 Ibid., 268.
48 Ibid., 209-210. Date of meeting in “Kronologija rata” (Chronology of the War), 448.
49