storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

helmets”. 35 Th ey brought relative peace along the line of disengagement, but not also the
expected reintegration of the areas the administration of which had been turned over to
the rebel Serbs by the JNA aft er its transformation into the Yugoslav Army in 1992 and
withdrawal from Croatia. 36
Until late autumn in 1992 the Croatian Army was busy liberating the occupied
territory in southern Croatia and defending Bosnian Posavina. No major actions were
taken against the other occupied areas, with few exceptions - apparently against the will
of the state leadership. 37 Indeed, aft er the withdrawal of the JNA and the organizational
and structural changes in the Croatian Army, until January 1993 there was no operational
plan regarding the commitment of armed forces in operations focused on Krajina;
however, as of January 1992 the HV General Staff was engaged in drawing up plans for
the liberation of the territory of the Republic of Croatia occupied by the JNA and rebel
Serb forces, code-named aft er Croatian rivers. Th e military directive in the event that the
peaceful reintegration of the occupied territory into the Republic of Croatia should fail
was not drawn up until January 1993. 38 By the end of 1993 the Croatian Army engaged
in two minor operations which earned it, notwithstanding certain military success,
negative political points on the international political scene. Aft er the operation in the
Zadar hinterland in January 1993, Croatia was accused of fomenting war, an accusation
hitherto reserved for Serbia and the Serbs. 39 Th e response was similar aft er the operation
in the Medak pocket in September 1993, and some international circles accused Croatia
of aggression and of breaking the truce. 40 If Croatia’s extremely unfavourable position
due to its involvement in the war between the Bosnian&Herzegovinian Croats and
Bosniaks-Muslims in Bosna&Herzegovina is added to the picture, it is obvious why
Croatia’s political position was far from being rosy.
Th anks to the eff orts of the international community the Cease-Fire Agreement was
signed in Zagreb between the representatives of the Republic of Croatia and of the rebel
Serbs on 29 March 1994. It entered into force on 4 April and provided for the withdrawal
of the belligerent troops at least one kilometre from the line of disengagement and the
withdrawal of heavy weapons 10/20 km from that line. 41 Following the agreement, part of
35 Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks: diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata, 1990-1997” (Th e Croatian Phoenix:
Diplomatic Processes Behind Closed Doors, 1990-1997; Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb, 2000, 247-
260.
36 D. Marijan, «Smrt oklopne brigade» (Death of the Armoured Brigade), 24-25.
37 Specifi cally, Nos Kalik, Baranja and the Miljevac Plateau. See Davor Marijan in Zdenko Radelić, Davor
Marijan, Nikica Barić, Albert Bing and Dražen Živić, “Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat” (Th e
Creation of the Croatian State and the Homeland War), Školska knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb,
2006, 150-151.
38 Central Military Archives, General Staff holdings (hereinaft er SVA MORH, GSHV): GSHV, cl. 8/93-02/04,
reg. no. 512-06-93-7 of 15 January 1993. Directive.
39 «Ujedinjeni narodi: Rezolucije o Republici Hrvatskoj, UNPROFOR» (Th e United Nations: Resolutions on
the Republic of Croatia, UNPROFOR); Pan liber, Osijek, 1995, 85. Cf. F. Tuđman, «Hrvatska riječ svijetu:
razgovori sa stranim predstavnicima» (Croatia’s Word to the World: Talks with Foreign Representatives),
243-248.
40 M. Granić, “Vanjski poslovi: Iza kulisa politike” (Foreign Aff airs: Behind the Scenes of Politics), 83-84.
41 “Kronologija rata 1989-1998” (Chronology of the War 1989-1998); Hrvatski informativni centar, Zagreb,
1998, 360.
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