storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

engaged in the Operation and contributed signifi cantly to its success. Apart from that,
such documents usually and largely lack self-criticism. Th us, it is obvious that the analysis
of an attached unit will not include the assessment of one Corps District Command that
it could “not be committed any longer in action because of well-known reasons stated in
previous reports. 9
Today as well as in 2001 I had a negligible number of documents on the actions of the
Special Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia; as a matter of
fact, I hardly had any. Accordingly, the space devoted to the actions of the MUP Special
Police is this book is totally below the level of its action and performance during the
Operation.
Th is study is not meant to deal in detail with the action of each and every unit. It
seeks to describe the atmosphere in which the operation was run and its salient features.
However, it can be noted that a more detailed analysis of Storm, not yet presented publicly,
would not confi rm the claim about an “irreproachably executed operation”. Of course,
this is obvious, considering the great number of quickly mobilized units and personnel
in reserve brigades and Home Guard regiments, not prepared for such a demanding
operation. Of course, for the Croats Storm will always remain “the mother of all battles”,
an operation which deserves the epithet “brilliant” above all because its outcome is of an
extraordinary, maybe even crucial historical signifi cance for the Croats and for Croatia.
Croatian soldier
9 MORH, GSHV: ZP Karlovac, IZpM Karlovac-Ogulin, Cl. 81/95-01/01, Reg. No. 1078-IZM-1/95-29 of 6
August 1995, 17.00 hours. Report. MORH, GSHV: VP 2121, Cl. 81/95-01/01, Reg. No. 2121-02/2-95-28 of 5
September 1995. Analysis of combat action, Operation Storm.
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