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States, and that he absolutely had to stop it. I said that in a normal democratic country, the Minister of the Interior would have been sacked or resigned in light of this. Tuđman got quite angry, and so I decided that I needed to follow through on my threat to join the convoy. Prosecutor Nice: And I think you went down in an armoured vehicle but... Galbraith: I went down in an armoured vehicle to Petrinja, where, basically, there were no Croatian civilians, it was a military zone. And the convoy was along the highway, and it was stopped, and I so I walked along the convoy. My plan was to put my armoured car into the convoy and drive along with the American fl ag fl ying, but I ran into a garbage collector who was originally from Karlovac but had moved across the line into the Serbian side. He was quite friendly, recognised me from television, and he invited me to join him on his tractor with his wife and two small children, and so I decided to do that. And I drove with him on the tractor through Sisak. Th ere was a crowd along, jeering, shouting insults, but the Croatian government had policemen every 10 metres and there were no incidents. Prosecutor Nice: One other detail from this period. You were, as you’ve indicated, on television from time to time. You once gave an interview, I think where you made a comment about ethnic cleansing which needs interpretation. Galbraith: Yes. Th is was for British television. I think it was the BBC. I said that the Croatians had not engaged in ethnic cleansing in Krajina, although they had engaged in serious human rights abuses. And my point was that ethnic cleansing was where the forces had come into a town, paramilitaries backed by the military, terrorised the population, engaged in killings, rapes, and forced the population to leave. In this case, the population had left before the Croatians arrived, probably rightly fearing what the Croatians might do but nonetheless they were not there when the Croatians actually arrived. And so therefore it wasn’t ethnic cleansing. Th e analogy that I would use is that you might enter a room with intent to commit murder but if the individual whom you intended to kill wasn’t in the room and had departed the scene, your bad intent probably isn’t a crime. Prosecutor Nice: Before we move on to Dayton, from the things that you had to deal with him over, your assessment of Tuđman as a leader or strategist or tactician at the time? Galbraith: I thought Tuđman was an eff ective leader in the sense that he knew where he wanted to take Croatia. He surrounded himself with some capable subordinates, such as the Foreign Minister Granić and the Defence Minister Šušak. He was able to delegate to them and they were able to negotiate on his behalf, and yet he remained in command. To say that he was an eff ective leader is not to say that his motives were good. He was a nationalist, he had a vision of Croatia that oft en struck me as being out of the nineteenth century, and he had very little respect for fundamental human rights. 370
4 2002, 21 November Testimony of Milan Babić on the Serbian rejection of “Plan Z-4” at the trial of Slobodan Milošević at Th e Hague PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You mentioned the Z-4 plan. What were the main points of the Z-4 plan? BABIĆ: Th e main point, or the gist of the plan, was that the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which had earlier been known as the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and which was then known as Sector North and Sector South under the protection of the United Nations, should be given political, territorial autonomy within the Republic of Croatia. It would have a parliament, a government, institutions, a currency that would be special in appearance but it would be printed by the National Bank of Croatia, competence over the regional police and the courts, which would imply a high level of autonomy. PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Who made this suggestion of the Z-4 plan? Was it an international proposal? BABIĆ: Th e Z-4 was given that name because it was proposed by four ambassadors in Zagreb, that is, by the international community. PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In the transcript earlier on, it was said that ... it is actually on page 61 of the transcript, line 14, it says that Ambassador Albright... that she accepted the Z-4 plan. Is that correct? BABIĆ: Ambassador Galbraith, the Ambassador of the United States to Croatia, Peter Galbraith. He was the main creator and proponent of that plan. PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Th is plan, did that actually mean the reintegration of the three regions of the RSK, that is, Krajina, Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia, into the Croatian Republic? BABIĆ: Th at’s right. Only Western Slavonia would be settled immediately, whereas Eastern Slavonia within a period of fi ve years, and the territory of SAO Krajina would have a high degree of political and territorial autonomy in Croatia. PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Were the politicians of the Krajina, you in the RSK... in a position ... did they accept this Z-4 plan? BABIĆ: At the beginning of March/end of February, the politicians in Krajina rejected the plan. Th e plan was accepted only by the last Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in August 1995. 371
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Davor Marijan S T O R M 1
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Davor Marijan S T O R M Zagreb, Aug
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Editor’s introd
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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION EDITOR’S
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why something was done in a specifi
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material, the reminiscences of Gene
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logical and that is was organized b
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ordered the Flight/; Večernje novo
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In addition to the comment that “
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- the population was signifi cantly
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General Staff had traditionally cou
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However, aft er the Split Agreement
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military support to the RSK. Specif
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warrant the conclusion that Croatia
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war. But, it is certain that they c
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Of course, this does not disprove t
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Croatian soldiers (guardsmen) 34
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36 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .
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(Croatian soldiers, 6 August 1995 (
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y infl uential Croatian politicians
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42 THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE BELLIGER
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Th e Croatian Air Force and Air Def
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46 THE SERBIAN REBELLION IN CROATIA
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helmets”. 35 Th ey brought relati
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standstill the Croatian Army was se
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attacks against the RSK. Th e Lika
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54 CROATIAN FORCE OPERATIONS IN LIV
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Th is was quite true, because the m
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Croatian guardsmen between Mali Ša
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of UNPROFOR. In his letter to Boutr
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62 THE SECOND BIHAĆ CRISIS On 11 J
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64 THE CROATIAN RESPONSE TO THE SEC
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to 8 days; guarantee of civil safet
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July noted that on the previous eve
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70 WAR PLANS (DEFENCE PLANS AND PLA
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Under the pressure of Croatian atta
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Croatian Navy units received orders
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Knin (the fortress), 5 August 1995
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HVO 3 rd Guards Brigade with the Se
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1 st and 4 th Light Brigades, the 2
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of access to Benkovac. 177 Along th
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Bribirske Mostine line on the way t
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88 Conclusion Th e Split Corps Dist
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90 SPECIAL MUP RH UNITS IN OPERATIO
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Medak at about 2000 hours and then,
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Special Police units of the Croatia
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96 THE GOSPIĆ CORPS DISTRICT The m
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98 Execution of the Operation Th e
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day they reached the planned line:
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Th e 138 th Home Guard Regiment pus
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Croatian soldiers (Guardsmen) 104 C
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106 KARLOVAC CORPS DISTRICT Accordi
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and prevent deeper penetration on t
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104 th Brigade, the Serbs committed
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decided to engage units of the 110
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order from Pašin Potok to the vill
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116 Conclusion Th e mission of the
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Pontoon Battalion and the 1 st Sisa
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Before the start of the operation,
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order of the President of the Repub
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Bačuga. On the Petrinja - Jabukova
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advance the fl anks and the rear of
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Petrova Gora, swept by the MUP RH S
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in the night of 6/7 August and orde
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Colonel Čedo Bulat, commander of t
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134 BJELOVAR CORPS DISTRICT Aft er
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the 125 th Home Guard Regiment capt
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138 Conclusion Th e Bjelovar Corps
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Batnoga - Cetingrad road and hit th
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142 ARBiH FIFTH CORPS IN STORM With
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Th e Joint Staff of the Army of the
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146 Southern Th eatre During Storm
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148 RESPONSE OF THE SVK SLAVONIA-BA
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150 UNCRO, UN AND INTERNATIONAL REA
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152 OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATION A pro
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On 10 August the Chief of the HV Ge
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the liberation of Knin, all that re
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order of the Republic of Croatia th
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160 “ETHNIC CLEANSING” OR SELF-
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On the fi rst day of Storm the deci
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164 To Croatian citizens of Serbian
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166 CONCLUSION There have been quit
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168 REFERENCES Balkan Battlegrounds
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170 Books: AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY Dav
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172
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174
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Th e documents in the second chapte
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178 CONTENTS APPENDIX 1 - PLANS OF
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9 1994, 20 November: Regular combat
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7 1994, 1 February: Report of the O
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184
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Article 2 As of the date of entry i
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188 3 1991, 16 May Knin Decision of
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a single political and territorial
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VI Th erefore, aft er the failed at
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should not give cause to confl icts
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VIII Cooperation in health and welf
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Such an act violates the basic inte
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200 ____________________ Offi cial
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10. Agreement on the realization of
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the Gornji Vakuf - Konjic axis, and
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est from our brothers and not what
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208 17 1994, 18 August Proposal of
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210 1. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE EXIST
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Th is will create favourable condit
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Th e commitment of SVK forces under
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Operational implementation of the m
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idgehead created earlier to off ens
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(3) 105 th air brigade: Collect by
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[...] To put it simply, the peaceke
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(...) Th e SVK is expected to inspi
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shall operate throughout Croatia. W
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Th e proposal according to which th
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230 23 1995, 18 May Borovo Selo Par
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Th erefore, territorial integrity,
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No. 01-02-41/1-95 President of the
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236 30 1995, 30 July Knin From the
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Chief of the HV General Staff Gener
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tarian aid for the survivors. Th ro
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UNPROFOR units on the ground, and h
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efugees to the fact that rebel Serb
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Th at was certainly one of the most
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lockade of Bihać over several mont
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However, we fi nd it diffi cult to
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252 7 1994, 20 November Report of t
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254 11 1994, 27 November Oštrelj -
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- 60,000 rounds for AA weapons; - 5
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1995, 17 February Oštrelj - Petrov
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1. Hostile forces Th e Croatian Arm
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Black market trade with the (Army o
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264 26 1995, 11 June Knin Extraordi
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(...) 6. PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION
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Original, typewritten, Cyrillic scr
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3. Other issues: 1) Uncontrolled us
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272 35 1995, 26 July Report of the
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other. Th erefore, the total value
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276 36 1995, 26 July Communication
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the line Brkića Koplje - Visoka Gl
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280 41 1995, 31 July Vrhovine Th e
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282 43 1995, 3 August Report of the
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Dmitar Obradović, former security
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286
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fi ghting tank and the combi-van ha
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290 5 [Okučani, July] Letter of th
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1. Inform all authorized persons ab
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Th e population eligible for evacua
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296 A S S E S S M E N T OF THREAT A
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- Pakrac - Okučani, the most likel
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- inadequate preparation and equipp
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- 120,000 places in basic protectio
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specifi c services and employees in
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municipality. In other municipaliti
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308 11 1995, 11 May Knin Report of
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1995, 30 May Knin 310 12 Order of S
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Original, typewritten, Cyrillic scr
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2. Municipal civil defence staff s
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Original, typewritten, Latin script
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5. Surveillance and reporting servi
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Page 330 and 331: VI Police Forces in Krajina 330 VI.
Page 332 and 333: 332 DRAFT AGREEMENT ON KRAJINA, SLA
Page 334 and 335: 334 (b) Th e defence of the Republi
Page 336 and 337: to mitigate the evasion of taxes an
Page 338 and 339: 338 Chapter IV Participation of Kra
Page 340 and 341: 340 PART TWO: ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNI
Page 342 and 343: 342 PART THREE: COMMON PROVISIONS C
Page 344 and 345: 2. All governmental organs and admi
Page 346 and 347: 346 Chapter XIII Special Constituti
Page 348 and 349: 2. Th e amendments and legislation
Page 350 and 351: 350 A N N E X B LIST OF HUMAN RIGHT
Page 352 and 353: 352 Article 4 Competence Th e compe
Page 354 and 355: 354 II. THE COMPETENCE AND THE POWE
Page 356 and 357: 7. In accordance with the provision
Page 358 and 359: And you went to Knin? Yes, we came
Page 360 and 361: Prosecutor Nice: You then met him o
Page 362 and 363: Prosecutor Nice: What about the acc
Page 364 and 365: Prosecutor Nice: Did you respond to
Page 366 and 367: Prosecutor Nice: Let’s pause ther
Page 368 and 369: I briefed my diplomatic colleagues
Page 372 and 373: PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And when
Page 374 and 375: PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You have
Page 376 and 377: PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Who
Page 378 and 379: PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you
Page 380 and 381: PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: “Us”
Page 382 and 383: BABIĆ: Th ey were integrated into
Page 384 and 385: Croatian Memorial- Documentation Ce
Page 386 and 387: PoD pozadinski odred logistics squa
Page 388 and 389: ZZPO Zapovjedništvo Zbornog podru
Page 390 and 391: Đ Đerić Branko, 194, 196, Đinđ
Page 392 and 393: Stoltenberg Th orvald, 359 Stupar M
Page 394 and 395: Čista Mala, 212 Čista Velika, 83
Page 396 and 397: Ogulin, 40, 41, 73, 97, 106-108, 11
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