storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ... storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
States, and that he absolutely had to stop it. I said that in a normal democratic country, the Minister of the Interior would have been sacked or resigned in light of this. Tuđman got quite angry, and so I decided that I needed to follow through on my threat to join the convoy. Prosecutor Nice: And I think you went down in an armoured vehicle but... Galbraith: I went down in an armoured vehicle to Petrinja, where, basically, there were no Croatian civilians, it was a military zone. And the convoy was along the highway, and it was stopped, and I so I walked along the convoy. My plan was to put my armoured car into the convoy and drive along with the American fl ag fl ying, but I ran into a garbage collector who was originally from Karlovac but had moved across the line into the Serbian side. He was quite friendly, recognised me from television, and he invited me to join him on his tractor with his wife and two small children, and so I decided to do that. And I drove with him on the tractor through Sisak. Th ere was a crowd along, jeering, shouting insults, but the Croatian government had policemen every 10 metres and there were no incidents. Prosecutor Nice: One other detail from this period. You were, as you’ve indicated, on television from time to time. You once gave an interview, I think where you made a comment about ethnic cleansing which needs interpretation. Galbraith: Yes. Th is was for British television. I think it was the BBC. I said that the Croatians had not engaged in ethnic cleansing in Krajina, although they had engaged in serious human rights abuses. And my point was that ethnic cleansing was where the forces had come into a town, paramilitaries backed by the military, terrorised the population, engaged in killings, rapes, and forced the population to leave. In this case, the population had left before the Croatians arrived, probably rightly fearing what the Croatians might do but nonetheless they were not there when the Croatians actually arrived. And so therefore it wasn’t ethnic cleansing. Th e analogy that I would use is that you might enter a room with intent to commit murder but if the individual whom you intended to kill wasn’t in the room and had departed the scene, your bad intent probably isn’t a crime. Prosecutor Nice: Before we move on to Dayton, from the things that you had to deal with him over, your assessment of Tuđman as a leader or strategist or tactician at the time? Galbraith: I thought Tuđman was an eff ective leader in the sense that he knew where he wanted to take Croatia. He surrounded himself with some capable subordinates, such as the Foreign Minister Granić and the Defence Minister Šušak. He was able to delegate to them and they were able to negotiate on his behalf, and yet he remained in command. To say that he was an eff ective leader is not to say that his motives were good. He was a nationalist, he had a vision of Croatia that oft en struck me as being out of the nineteenth century, and he had very little respect for fundamental human rights. 370
4 2002, 21 November Testimony of Milan Babić on the Serbian rejection of “Plan Z-4” at the trial of Slobodan Milošević at Th e Hague PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You mentioned the Z-4 plan. What were the main points of the Z-4 plan? BABIĆ: Th e main point, or the gist of the plan, was that the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which had earlier been known as the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and which was then known as Sector North and Sector South under the protection of the United Nations, should be given political, territorial autonomy within the Republic of Croatia. It would have a parliament, a government, institutions, a currency that would be special in appearance but it would be printed by the National Bank of Croatia, competence over the regional police and the courts, which would imply a high level of autonomy. PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Who made this suggestion of the Z-4 plan? Was it an international proposal? BABIĆ: Th e Z-4 was given that name because it was proposed by four ambassadors in Zagreb, that is, by the international community. PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In the transcript earlier on, it was said that ... it is actually on page 61 of the transcript, line 14, it says that Ambassador Albright... that she accepted the Z-4 plan. Is that correct? BABIĆ: Ambassador Galbraith, the Ambassador of the United States to Croatia, Peter Galbraith. He was the main creator and proponent of that plan. PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Th is plan, did that actually mean the reintegration of the three regions of the RSK, that is, Krajina, Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia, into the Croatian Republic? BABIĆ: Th at’s right. Only Western Slavonia would be settled immediately, whereas Eastern Slavonia within a period of fi ve years, and the territory of SAO Krajina would have a high degree of political and territorial autonomy in Croatia. PROSECUTOR UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Were the politicians of the Krajina, you in the RSK... in a position ... did they accept this Z-4 plan? BABIĆ: At the beginning of March/end of February, the politicians in Krajina rejected the plan. Th e plan was accepted only by the last Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in August 1995. 371
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States, and that he absolutely had to stop it. I said that in a normal democratic country,<br />
the Minister of the Interior would have been sacked or resigned in light of this. Tuđman<br />
got quite angry, and so I decided that I needed to follow through on my threat to join<br />
the convoy.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: And I think you went down in an armoured vehicle but...<br />
Galbraith: I went down in an armoured vehicle to Petrinja, where, basically, there were<br />
no Croatian civilians, it was a military zone. And the convoy was along the highway, and<br />
it was stopped, and I so I walked along the convoy. My plan was to put my armoured car<br />
into the convoy and drive along with the American fl ag fl ying, but I ran into a garbage<br />
collector who was originally from Karlovac but had moved across the line into the<br />
Serbian side. He was quite friendly, recognised me from television, and he invited me to<br />
join him on his tractor with his wife and two small children, and so I decided to do that.<br />
And I drove with him on the tractor through Sisak. Th ere was a crowd along, jeering,<br />
shouting insults, but the Croatian government had policemen every 10 metres and there<br />
were no incidents.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: One other detail from this period. You were, as you’ve indicated, on<br />
television from time to time. You once gave an interview, I think where you made a<br />
comment about ethnic cleansing which needs interpretation.<br />
Galbraith: Yes. Th is was for British television. I think it was the BBC. I said that the<br />
Croatians had not engaged in ethnic cleansing in Krajina, although they had engaged<br />
in serious human rights abuses. And my point was that ethnic cleansing was where<br />
the forces had come into a town, paramilitaries backed by the military, terrorised the<br />
population, engaged in killings, rapes, and forced the population to leave. In this case,<br />
the population had left before the Croatians arrived, probably rightly fearing what the<br />
Croatians might do but nonetheless they were not there when the Croatians actually<br />
arrived. And so therefore it wasn’t ethnic cleansing. Th e analogy that I would use is that<br />
you might enter a room with intent to commit murder but if the individual whom you<br />
intended to kill wasn’t in the room and had departed the scene, your bad intent probably<br />
isn’t a crime.<br />
Prosecutor Nice: Before we move on to Dayton, from the things that you had to deal<br />
with him over, your assessment of Tuđman as a leader or strategist or tactician at the<br />
time?<br />
Galbraith: I thought Tuđman was an eff ective leader in the sense that he knew where he<br />
wanted to take Croatia. He surrounded himself with some capable subordinates, such as<br />
the Foreign Minister Granić and the Defence Minister Šušak. He was able to delegate to<br />
them and they were able to negotiate on his behalf, and yet he remained in command.<br />
To say that he was an eff ective leader is not to say that his motives were good. He was a<br />
nationalist, he had a vision of Croatia that oft en struck me as being out of the nineteenth<br />
century, and he had very little respect for fundamental human rights.<br />
370