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Prosecutor Nice: And, of course, the chargé d’aff aires was the principal, the senior<br />

diplomat at the time, there being no ambassador in that post.<br />

Galbraith: Th at is correct.<br />

Prosecutor Nice: Very well. Babić made his public statement;<br />

Galbraith: He did.<br />

Prosecutor Nice: Did that attract any or any signifi cant support?<br />

Galbraith: He made a statement, and there was a meeting in Geneva on the 3rd of<br />

August between the Croatian government delegation and a Krajina Serb delegation. Th e<br />

idea was that the Krajina Serb delegation would be instructed to accept the full package<br />

that Babić had accepted. Th ey were certainly ambiguous in their statement. It was not<br />

the clear-cut acceptance that was required, and again I think the reason they didn’t make<br />

any clear-cut acceptance is that Babić alone - by this point, incidentally, he was the Prime<br />

Minister of the RSK - didn’t have suffi cient authority to command the delegation in<br />

Geneva. Milošević, of course, was silent. I fl ew back to Zagreb, where I saw Tuđman. At<br />

the meeting with Tuđman - this was at now 5. 45 on the 3rd of August - I urged him to<br />

hold off on military action. I said that we would know within a matter of days whether<br />

the Krajina Serbs were serious, because there were concrete steps that they had to take,<br />

very quickly, and that it was important to give them a chance to see if they were serious,<br />

because the alternative, war, would be so disastrous, particularly for the population of<br />

the Krajina region. Tuđman didn’t believe that Babić had the clout to deliver the Krajina<br />

Serbs, and so he listened, but basically he went ahead with his decision for war.<br />

Prosecutor Nice: Can you look briefl y at an existing exhibit, 352, tab 104, a British<br />

code cable of August 1995 dealing with these matters. You’ve seen it before or had the<br />

opportunity to see it before. I hope the Chamber has got it before. Have you reviewed<br />

this code cable from your British counterpart?<br />

Galbraith: I have reviewed it.<br />

Prosecutor Nice: Is it accurate, subject to what must be said in paragraph 8?<br />

Galbraith: It is accurate. He was a very skilled diplomat.<br />

Prosecutor Nice: And at paragraph 8 he says this: “Commenting on his discussions,<br />

Galbraith recognised that Babić might not have authority to conclude a deal on these<br />

lines. He might be disowned by his RSK colleagues in Knin and by the Assembly, but<br />

it was a last chance for peace. He, Galbraith, would be seeing Tuđman tonight at 5.45<br />

local time to report the outcome of his talks with Babić in Belgrade. Milošević was being<br />

briefed by the American Embassy in Belgrade. Comment?”<br />

Galbraith: At the time, of course I had hoped that our chargé would be able to see<br />

Milošević. I expected, given the imminence of war, given that the scale of the military<br />

action which was going to be the largest military action in the confl ict since 1992, that of<br />

course Milošević would see the American representative, and I didn’t know at the time<br />

367

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