storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Prosecutor Nice: Did you respond to that? And if so, when?
Galbraith: I responded that ... we delivered several démarches to the Croatian
government in this period. Th e Croatians were concerned that if they took military
action, that they would face sanctions from the UN Security Council for having a wider
war. We responded by expressing understanding for the situation in which they found
themselves and understanding for the fact that they were prepared to expend blood and
treasure to save Bihać. We were deeply concerned that Bihać would fall, that it would
become another Srebrenica. It was four times as populous as Srebrenica, so we were
concerned that we could see 30 to 40 thousand people being massacred if Mladić and
the Bosnian Serbs did the same thing there. We did not approve any kind of military
action, and we pointed out that military action would have serious ... that it was always
a risky proposition, that if Croatia got into any diffi culty, it certainly couldn’t expect any
help from the United States. And I warned Tuđman in the strongest possible terms that
should there be any kind of military action, that we would hold him accountable and
Croatia accountable for protecting the civilian population, Serb civilians, as well as for
making sure that UN peacekeepers in the area were not hurt.
Prosecutor Nice: Th ough you didn’t support, did you expressly oppose, or did you leave
that neutral?
Galbraith: We neither supported nor opposed.
Prosecutor Nice: Despite what must have seemed -- was to turn out to be an inevitable
war, did you make one last eff ort yourself to avert that consequence?
Galbraith: Yes. Our position on this, the US government position, was as I said - and
I just want to emphasize it - very much aff ected by what was happening in Bihać. We
recognised that a war was going to have terrible humanitarian consequences but that it
was a lesser evil than what we thought was the likely massacre of 40,000 people in Bihać
if the Serbs applied Srebrenica rules there. Nonetheless, we wanted to do everything
possible to try and fi nd a peaceful settlement, and so when I spoke to President Tuđman
on the 1st of August in Brioni, on instructions from the State Department, I raised
with him the possibility of meeting Babić in Belgrade later that week. I should preface
this by saying that the previous weekend I had been in touch with Babić through the
United Nations and had proposed a meeting to try and see if we could head off the war.
He had said, “You’re not welcome to come to Knin, but I’d be prepared to meet you in
Belgrade.”
Prosecutor Nice: “Who had made you ... who had made you unwelcome in Knin?”
Galbraith: Martić.
Prosecutor Nice: But Babić was prepared to meet you in Belgrade?
Galbraith: Babić said I wouldn’t be welcome in Knin, but he wanted to meet me in
Belgrade. Tuđman initially said this would be an interesting idea but don’t wait until
the end of the week; do it right away. Incidentally, a few hours later he had his press
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