storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Galbraith: Yes, there was. If I could just add one other thing to Babić’s reaction. In fact,
at one stage in that meeting, on the 23rd of January, he was concerned that the plan had
actually off ered too much autonomy, had been too generous, because he was concerned
that it might make the Krajina Serb autonomous entity responsible for pensions and
other things, which he had hoped would be picked up by the central government in
Zagreb. I said of course that would not be a problem to have less autonomy. I was due
to meet Milan Martić in the aft ernoon, and Martić cancelled that appointment. He said
it was inappropriate for the ambassador ... and a breach of protocol for the ambassador
to have met the foreign minister ... the so-called foreign minister before meeting the
president.
Prosecutor Nice: We’ll move on in the meetings before we come back to the general
character assessment. On the 30th of January, did you and other sponsors of the plan
meet with Martić, Babić, and Mikelić?
Galbraith: We did.
Prosecutor Nice: Tell us about that in a sentence or so.
Galbraith: We had presented the plan as a basis for negotiation, not as a fi nal document
... as a take-it-or-leave-it document to President Tuđman in the morning, and in
the aft ernoon we fl ew to Knin, where we met in the castle with the top Krajina Serb
leadership, including Martić, Babić, and Mikelić. We attempted to hand over the plan,
and Martić would not take it. He wouldn’t touch it.
Prosecutor Nice: How did the meeting end?
Galbraith: Well, of course we were somewhat shocked that he would actually not even
physically receive the plan, much less that he would ... that they would refuse to negotiate
on the basis of it. We attempted to persuade them in every possible way that this was not
in their interest, that if they refused to negotiate it would increase greatly the likelihood
that the Croatians would take military action, that it would be much harder for the
international community to prevent a military outcome. But none of these arguments
worked. At the end of the meeting Mikelić, the so-called Prime Minister, said to us,
he said, “You should be professional diplomats. You’re making a great mistake.” And I
replied, “A great mistake has been made, but we will see by whom.”
Prosecutor Nice: And I think you made an observation that relates to Babić and his
approach.
Galbraith: Yes. As we were leaving, Babić came up to me and he said in English, “I’m
sorry.”
Prosecutor Nice: Well, now, you’d seen Tuđman in the morning. Was Tuđman ever
prevailed upon to accept the proposal?
Galbraith: He agreed to negotiate on it but very reluctantly. However, given that the
Serbian side refused even to receive the plan, Croatia’s bona fi des were simply not put
to test.
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