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From the interview with Leonid Kerestedjiants, fi rst Russian Ambassador to the
Republic of Croatia, on the Serbian refusal of “Plan Z-4”
In early 1995 you led the negotiations for Plan Z-4?
Yes, together with US Ambassador Peter Galbraith. We really sincerely wanted to put an
end to bloodshed and believed in Z-4 as a document preserving the territorial integrity
of Croatia and incorporating the “breakaway” regions, but also resolving on a long-term
basis the Serbian issue in Croatia. We tackled the task seriously. Of course, from this
perspective this looks more like a formality than it really was.
You think, therefore, that Z-4 was a very serious plan?
Of course, because we believed that it would also provide the basis for dealing with
all the other problems in the region. Minister Kozyrev told me that the international
community was taking Z-4 very seriously because it was actually drawn up as a kind
of an introduction for a similar plan in Kosovo. It is precisely this fact, which obviously
reached Milošević, 92 that determined such an outcome of the war in Croatia.
How did the negotiations proceed?
Plan Z-4 was devised by the international representatives. When we received the plan,
Peter Galbraith and me had to present it to the Croatian and to the Serbian side. We were
in charge of the operational aspect and then went to present the plan to Tuđman 93 . We
had agreed that Galbraith would present the plan to the Croats and show by doing so
that Washington was behind it, while I would present it in Knin to let them know that
Russia agreed to the plan. When we came to Pantovčak, I remember, the top Croatian
leadership with Tuđman at their head were already sitting at the table. While Peter
talked, the room was uncomfortably silent, as during a funeral. One could feel that the
Croats resisted the plan, but everyone waited for Tuđman’s response. He was thoughtful
and worried. Th en he started to talk, very nervously. He briefl y said that he was not
enthusiastic and that for the Croats it was not a stimulating plan, but that he understood
that the plan was just the beginning of the search for a fi nal resolution of the crisis, and
that the only positive thing about the document was the fact that it proceeded from “the
territorial integrity of Croatia”. However, he also said that the price of the plan was out
of proportion with what had happened in Croatia. He thought the plan was too pro-
Serbian. Aft er we left , Peter and I felt as if a weight was off our mind. We believed that the
hardest part of the job had been done and that the Serbs in Knin would accept the plan
without hesitation or discussion because we had “dented” the Croats. We talked how we
would start working, aft er the Serbian agreement, on “taking some things from the Serbs
and giving them to the Croats”.
92 Slobodan, President of the Republic of Serbia
93 Franjo, President of the Republic of Croatia
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