storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Grahovo - Livanjsko Polje. Specifi c tasks were agreed, but we do not know when they
will be accomplished because the impression is that in the western part the RS has hardly
any forces capable of off ensive action. Th e VRS is concealing this fact. At the meeting
of the chief of the SVK General Staff at the forward command post of the VRS General
Staff the SVK was requested to carry out air raids on Split as a reprisal for the shelling if
Drvar.
During the meeting the SVK was also blamed for the fall of Grahovo and Glamoč.
1. Foreign factor
Th e analysis of information obtained from diff erent sources on HV aggression on the
SVK warrants the following conclusions.
Th e Croatian Intelligence Service or Western intelligence services (certainly within the
scope of their global policy towards Krajina) have been spreading, several times a day
and from diff erent sources, misinformation about the unconditional HV aggression on
the RSK.
As established, more than 80% of misinformation has been spread through UNPROFOR,
in most cases through liaison offi cers or friends, always taking into account that such
misinformation should reach the highest levels (brigade and corps commanders, and
senior offi cers in the SVK General Staff ). False and misinforming written material was
given to persons believed that they would pass it on to such offi cers.
Th e second category of sources used by foreign intelligence services to launch
misinformation were telephone communications between intelligence agencies and the
republican state security offi cers abroad.
Th e third channel used by the Croatian Intelligence Service were radio communications
intercepted and recorded by the radio tapping service.
Th e fourth group of misinformation - or half-truths - includes data obtained from sources
sent by diff erent services to the Republic of Croatia or the 5 th Corps, not qualifi ed for
proper appraisal of what they saw or heard.
Finally, intelligence services in the units do not function at all, and our units do not have
any tactical depth information about hostile forces and do not monitor the situation.
Th e foregoing considerations obviously show how realistic and timely are the decisions
made from the highest down to the lowest echelon.
Yesterday (2 August) the European Community RC and teams in the RSK were ordered
by the UN High Command in Zagreb to establish the following:
- Air raids on Mount Dinara and facilities in the Grahovo area: did the planes take off
from the Udbina airstrip or from Mahovljani near Banja Luka? If from Udbina, are the
planes and pilots from the air force of Republika Srpska?
- Number of SVK troops killed and wounded? On which sites and where are they taken
care of? Can the ICRC visit them and talk to them?
- Artillery and rocket positions? Did the VRS take part in artillery support?
- Response of the military and state leadership to the negotiations in Geneva? What is
the response of the citizens?
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