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296 A S S E S S M E N T OF THREAT AND OF PROTECTION AND RESCUE POSSIBILITIES Knin, April 1995 68 Head of the Republican Civil Defence Headquarters Lieut. Colonel Duško Babić 67 I. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT AND EXPOSURE TO COMBAT OPERATIONS 1. Th e Position of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Th e Republic of Serbian Krajina, part of the former SFRY, is a non-compact area comprising, conditionally speaking, two entities. One territorially linked entity is made up of Northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija and, conditionally, Western Slavonia, which can also be treated as a separate territorial entity considering its communications. Th is territorial entity is situated between today’s Republic of Croatia and the Cazin area, while parts of Northern Dalmatia, Bosnia and Western Slavonia are connected with Republika Srpska. Th e second territorial entity comprises Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, bordering in the west on the Republic of Croatia, in the north on Hungary, and linked in the east with the Republic of Serbia (SR Yugoslavia). Th e total length of the border with the Republic of Croatia is 923 km, with the Cazin area 118 km, and with Hungary 79 km. Th e area of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (without parts under UN protection and parts occupied by the Republic of Croatia) is 17,028 sq.km., and its population totals 430,000, out of whom 120,000 are refugees (partly war-stricken people who fl ed from the Republic of Croatia to the Republic of Serbian Krajina). Th e average population density is 25 per sq.km., and it is rather uneven, ranging from 54 per sq.km. in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem to 10 per sq.km. in Lika. Th e form of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is particularly characteristic because of its great length and small depth (width). Th e greatest depth is 63.1 km. (between the villages of Škabrnja and Tiškovac), and the smallest at Jasenovac - 2.5 km., between Vedro Polje/ Sunja and Kostajnica - 12.5 km., and between the village of Čanak and the border on Mount Plješevica - 19.5 km. 67 Ibid. 68 Th e original read: Knin, August 1994. Th e new date was added by hand.
2. Characteristics and degree of threat for specifi c parts and for the entire Republic of Serbian Krajina Th e territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is generally at risk because of its form and position, great length and small depth, and because of the possibility of its being cut up into several parts and of being caught unawares, bearing in mind the very pronounced aggressive intentions and constant threats of the militarily strengthened Republic of Croatia. Because of these features, in addition to possible surprise and bearing in mind the military potential of the enemy, the entire territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina can be threatened at the same time. However, in strategic terms penetrations along given lines are more likely, as well as the cutting-off of parts of the territory of the Republic. An off ensive along the entire front is less probable. In view of the foregoing, the following lines of hostile action are possible: - Possible tactical lines of action in the Northern Dalmatian operational zone: - Zadar- Knin (Zadar - Benkovac - Knin), - Split - Knin (Muć - Drniš - Knin), - Šibenik - Knin (Šibenik - Oklaj- Knin), - Sinj - Knin (Sinj- Vrlika - Knin), with, most probably, a concurrent strike from the slopes of Mount Velebit and Skradin (via Bribirske Mostine) focused on cutting off Benkovac and Obrovac from Knin, with linkup in the Bruška area. Towards Knin the enemy will most probably attempt to advance via Oklaj, followed by Moseć and Petrovo Polje, which would cut off the greater area of Drniš. Th is would allow hostile forces to reach Mala Promina and put Knin at great risk. - Possible tactical lines of action in the Lika operational zone: - Gospić - Gračac - Gospić - Teslingrad - Ljubovo - Udbina - Otočac - Vrhovine - Plitvice - Brinje - Plaški- Plitvice - Tactical lines of action in the Kordun and Banija operational zone: - Ogulin- Slunj - Plitvice - Karlovac - Vojnić - Velika Kladuša- - Sisak -Petrinja - Topusko - Sisak - Kostajnica - Dvor Th e Slunj line is the most sensitive because it could involve splitting the Republic of Serbian Krajina into two parts. - Possible lines of hostile action in Western Slavonia: - Kutina - Novska - Okučani, 297
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2. Characteristics and degree of threat for specifi c parts and for the entire Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina<br />
Th e territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is generally at risk because of its form and<br />
position, great length and small depth, and because of the possibility of its being cut up<br />
into several parts and of being caught unawares, bearing in mind the very pronounced<br />
aggressive intentions and constant threats of the militarily strengthened Republic of<br />
Croatia.<br />
Because of these features, in addition to possible surprise and bearing in mind the<br />
military potential of the enemy, the entire territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina can<br />
be threatened at the same time.<br />
However, in strategic terms penetrations along given lines are more likely, as well as the<br />
cutting-off of parts of the territory of the Republic. An off ensive along the entire front is<br />
less probable.<br />
In view of the foregoing, the following lines of hostile action are possible:<br />
- Possible tactical lines of action in the Northern Dalmatian operational zone:<br />
- Zadar- Knin (Zadar - Benkovac - Knin),<br />
- Split - Knin (Muć - Drniš - Knin),<br />
- Šibenik - Knin (Šibenik - Oklaj- Knin),<br />
- Sinj - Knin (Sinj- Vrlika - Knin),<br />
with, most probably, a concurrent strike from the slopes of Mount Velebit and Skradin<br />
(via Bribirske Mostine) focused on cutting off Benkovac and Obrovac from Knin, with<br />
linkup in the Bruška area.<br />
Towards Knin the enemy will most probably attempt to advance via Oklaj, followed by<br />
Moseć and Petrovo Polje, which would cut off the greater area of Drniš. Th is would allow<br />
hostile forces to reach Mala Promina and put Knin at great risk.<br />
- Possible tactical lines of action in the Lika operational zone:<br />
- Gospić - Gračac<br />
- Gospić - Teslingrad - Ljubovo - Udbina<br />
- Otočac - Vrhovine - Plitvice<br />
- Brinje - Plaški- Plitvice<br />
- Tactical lines of action in the Kordun and Banija operational zone:<br />
- Ogulin- Slunj - Plitvice<br />
- Karlovac - Vojnić - Velika Kladuša-<br />
- Sisak -Petrinja - Topusko<br />
- Sisak - Kostajnica - Dvor<br />
Th e Slunj line is the most sensitive because it could involve splitting the Republic of<br />
Serbian Krajina into two parts.<br />
- Possible lines of hostile action in Western Slavonia:<br />
- Kutina - Novska - Okučani,<br />
297