storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Ministry of Defence cannot provide the money for the payroll and for the supply of the
SVK with fuel and other materiel.
Resolution 981 of the Security Council has largely provoked a negative response,
particularly the part according to which international forces are to be deployed along
the borders between the RSK and the RS, and the border between these two republics
and Serbia. (...)
Between 1 January and 10 April 1995 the SVK casualty toll included 41 killed, 39
wounded and 28 missing in action. Most of these relate to units committed to operation
Spider. (...)
Personnel issues:
(...) (b) Transfer of offi cers (from the Army of Yugoslavia) for temporary duty in the
SVK
In early March 1995 the 40 th Personnel Centre of the General Staff of the Army of
Yugoslavia called in offi cers born in the territory of the former SR of Croatia in order to
interview them about their voluntary transfer to temporary duty in the SVK.
Out of the total 600 offi cers interviewed, 112 offi cers expressed their wish to be transferred
to the SVK. Aft er additional processing and preparations for departure 66 offi cers agreed
to leave. On the date of departure by bus, aft er further hesitation and withdrawal, only
15 offi cers and 15 non-commissioned offi cers left for the SVK. Such an attitude by some
of the offi cers left a negative impression on those present.
We believe that a professional analysis should determine the true reason underlying the
poor offi cer response. Was it fear from military confl ict in the RSK, uncertain return,
personal problems or something else? Information gained in this way would benefi t
both the Army of Yugoslavia and the SVK in their future work with human resources
and personnel analyses.
2.4 Security in the units and in the territory
1) Counterintelligence support
Security conditions in the RSK are still very complex, aff ected largely by foreign
intelligence services and their intelligence, psychological-propaganda and criminal
actions. (...)
Aft er the change of the UNPROFOR mandate they are engaged in psychological
propaganda actions along the following lines: Krajina will be an integral part of Croatia;
the Croats do not need war, and economic measures and the closing of the RSK border
to the RS and the SRJ will force the Krajina leadership to accept the solution off ered by
the West. (...)
2) Crime, black-marketeering and robbery
Problems giving cause for particular concern include crime of all kinds, arrogant
and violent behaviour, and attacks on security offi cers. Fuel, lubricants, batteries,
communications equipment, munitions and mines and explosive devices are mainly
being stolen in the units, and that reduces combat readiness, while combat vehicles
cannot be used.
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