storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Intervju; 362, 9 June 1995, 15). Later on, the Belgrade daily Večernje novosti carried an
article which criticized the policy of the “Krajina leadership” because of its drift ing apart
from Belgrade and collusion with the Bosnian Serbs, and presented - as evidence that the
Bosnian and Croatian Serbs pursued the policy of immediate mutual unifi cation - the
Decision on the State Unifi cation of the RSK and the RS, the document prepared for the
announced session of the assemblies of the RSK and the RS, never held because of Storm
(“Tvrdoglavost i naiva”/Stubbornness and Naiveté/; Večernje novosti; 22 August 1995).
Milošević and Mikelić must have been angry when their idea was not accepted (or
understood?) by the leading politicians of the so-called RSK, who probably thought
that the realization of such a plan would be too slow. Th is is why Mikelić accused the
RSK leaders of thwarting every peace initiative and, in particular, found fault with the
“rightist extremism” of Milan Martić and Milan Babić and with their political links with
the “capital” of the Bosnian Serbs, Pale, and Radovan Karadžić. Mikelić reviewed the
events on 29 March 1994 and the Zagreb Ceasefi re Agreement, and pointed out that it
was concluded on the initiative of Belgrade with the objective to place “Krajina” under
international protection aft er the unfavourable developments - the loss of Maslenica,
the Miljevac Plateau, Zemunik, Peruča and the Medak pocket. Th e establishment of
peace, continued Mikelić, was to be followed by economic negotiations, the opening
of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway link and the opening of the oil pipeline. In Mikelić’s
words, “such a development favoured the Krajina because it implied the extension of the
agreement with the peacekeeping forces”. He also mentioned the negotiations in Erdut
with the participation of the Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev who guaranteed
the RSK, if it accepted the plan, the status of a “state within a state”, and added that
the opposition of Babić and Martić, and their insistence on unifi cation with Republic
Srpska, led to the interruption of peace negotiations and to confl ict between them and
him - and thereby to confl ict with Belgrade. Th us, in Mikelić’s interpretation, Martić’s
order to pull back the army in Storm and put up no resistance was in accordance with
Karadžić’s slogan: If Petrinja and Knin fall, Belgrade will fall! (Ko je prevario Miloševića/
Who Deceived Milošević/; Intervju; 368, 8 Sept. 1995, 10-11).
Just as the accusations about “ethnic cleansing”, equally unfounded are the accusations
about the Croatian excessive shelling of Knin, which some try to push by incorrectly
referring only to statements supporting such claims. An example is the statement that
“the Croats knew they were shelling civilian facilities, and out of the 3000 shells fi red on
Knin only 250 hit military targets”, given according to Th e New York Times to the ICTY
investigators by General Alain Forand, commander of UN forces in Sector South (HHO,
Th e military operation ‘Storm” and Its Aft ermath, p. 28). However, all those who visited
Knin immediately aft er Storm know how convincing is the claim, or actually accusation,
about the excessive and uncontrolled shelling of civilian targets in Knin. Especially
when they remember the JNA attacks on Croatian towns and villages in 1991... SVK
commanding offi cers also know it because their reports on the start of the operation
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