storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

military support to the RSK. Specifi cally, he mentioned the considerable armaments of
the “RSK” army - weapons inherited from the JNA and acquired later, and noted: “It is
known that the RSK Army had an air force at Udbina, that it had rocket systems, that it
had quite a few tanks, anti-aircraft guns, artillery, missiles”. Th is is confi rmed by the fact
that “the Croatian Army captured weapons and ammunitions worth at least 700 million
or up to an estimated one billion Deutschmarks” (“Tko je prevario Miloševića?”/Who
Deceived Milošević?/; Intervju; 368; 8 September 1995; 110-11). Of course, numerous
documents confi rm the help provided by Yugoslavia to the so-called RSK and the SVK.
Th us, the “extraordinary operational report of the SVK General Staff ” sent to “the
President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, the President of RSK Milan
Martić and the Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff Colonel General Momčilo
Perišić” on 11 June 1995 mentions the overall help sent by SR Yugoslavia to the Serbian
Army of Krajina, including primarily the mobilization of combat-capable persons who
had fl ed the area and sending them back to the Krajina”. Th e same document mentions
under point 7 the “reception, currently under way, of the materiel authorized for the
requirements of the Serbian Army of Krajina from the Yugoslav Army” (see Appendix
2, document 26). Actually, because of the numerous documents confi rming this point,
nobody can seriously deny the fact that the JNA, and subsequently the VJ, openly
supported the rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia and the structuring of the SVK - to
the extent that they may have been considered to be one and the same army. Th is was
generally known, especially to the offi cials of the so-called RSK, as borne out by the
statement of the “Deputy RSK Prime Minister” Stojan Španović at the “joint session of
the Goverment of Republika Srpska and the RSK Government” held on 19 July 1993
in Knin: In terms of offi cial SRJ documents the SVK is part of the Yugoslav Army (see
Appendix 1, document 10).
Milošević seems to have understood that he could not achieve the planned targets
by military means, and tried instead to keep what he had already realized, or actually
conquered, by a “policy of agreement” which he believed, together with the “Krajina
Prime Minister” Borislav Mikelić, to be the most favourable for the Serbs in Croatia.
However, the “Krajina” leadership turned to Pale claiming that Mikelić was a traitor
and opposing his policy. At the session of the “Krajina Assembly” held in Knin on 29
May 1995, Borislav Mikelić was relieved, and the Assembly expressed agreement with
the “decision on the state unifi cation of the RSK and Republika Srpska”. Because of this,
in an interview given on 9 June 1995, Mikelić censured Milan Martić and Milan Babić
for openly obstructing any attempt to come to an agreement with Croatia. In explaining
the reasons why he opposed “any fast, hasty and ill-considered unifi cation” he actually
highlighted Milošević’s plan focused on lift ing the sanctions against Yugoslavia and
achieving the ultimate goal of Serbian policy - the unifi cation of Serbian lands in one state:
I have fi rst of all in mind the lift ing of sanctions against SR Yugoslavia and the acceptance of
the Contact Group Plan by the leadership in Pale. In that case SR Yugoslavia could enter a
confederation or establish a federal relation with Republika Srpska, and RS Krajina would
then rely on such an arrangement (“Jesam Miloševićev čovjek” /I Am Milošević’s Man/;
25