storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Martić, General Čeleketić etc.”, highlighted
the problems on Mount Dinara, in Livanjsko Polje, on Mount PLješivica, the
danger of ustashi linkup with the ARBiH 5 th Corps, and the lack of materiel, fuel and
manpower. Karadžić stressed in particular: Personally I think the Serbian Army of Krajina
is in a knockdown, while at the same time the Muslims are redeploying al their forces
towards Izačić. If the ustashi attack in order to link up with the 5 th Corps, they [Krajina]
will have a lot of problems and will not be able to defend themselves. (See Republika Srpska/Army
of Republika Srpska/Command of the 2 nd Krajina Corps/Str. Conf. No. 66-62/5
May 1995; to the General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska).
In spite of all that, Karadžić and Mladić again arrogantly boasted about the imminent
victory of the Serbian army while in Geneva in the summer of 1995. Unfortunately, the
tragedy prevented for the fi rst time in Bihać by operation Winter ’94 occurred several
months later in Srebrenica. A similar tragedy in Bihać was prevented for the second time
on 4 August 1995 with the start of operation Storm.
1
1994, 27 October
Th e General Staff of the «Army of Republika Srpska» requests from the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces of the «Republic of Serbian Krajina» help in the western
Bosnian theatre - the Drvar area - and against the ARBiH 5th Corps
___________________
(...) Th e northwestern theatre of Republika Srpska (zone of responsibility of the 2 nd
Krajina Corps) is seriously threatened from the Cazin area in the northwest and on the
Kupres plateau in the southeast. It is the intention of our common enemy to split by
coordinated action from the southeast and northwest the zone of responsibility of the
2 nd Krajina Corps and thereby physically separate the Republic of Serbian Krajina from
Republika Srpska.
You need to understand that these are in this war the most critical moments for the
Serbs west of the Drina. Minor eff orts of the Serbian Army of Krajina and the Army of
Republika Srpska are required to eliminate the danger. For that purpose the following
steps are indispensable:
1. Th e Army of Republika Srpska needs to stop further hostile penetrations from the
northwest and southeast. In the southeast (Kupres plateu) we have already been successful
and mounted off ensive action along the Zlosela - Kupreška Vrata - Bugojno axis, and we
are prepared for the defence of the Kupres plateau from the attack of Croatian forces
from Livno, Šujica, Tomislavgrad, Prozor and Gornji Vakuf.
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