storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

lockade of Bihać over several months, continuous artillery shelling and air raids would
have brought about the fall of Bihać and a humanitarian tragedy in the UN safe area
equal to the one at Srebrenica. Had the ARBiH 5 th Corps been annihilated at the time,
that would have marked the end of the war from the military bus also from the political
aspect considering the positions of the international community and, in particular, of its
chief negotiator Lord Owen. Th e Croatian Army would objectively fi nd itself in a very
diffi cult situation, and its main logistic routes, especially via Karlovac and Maslenica,
would be totally jeopardized. Let me stress once again: from the military standpoint, in
late 1994 Bihać was the key of the war crisis in the former state. Aft er the fall of Bihać
Croatia would have found it extremely diffi cult to establish a serious but also a political
balance, and would simply be forced to accept almost every term tabled by Martić,
Karadžić and Mladić. All these points must be highlighted because of the present and future
generations. During the Homeland War the political position of the Croatian people
was exclusively and solely dependent upon and proportional to the military strength of
the Croatian Army. In the early nineteen-nineties we were reminded periodically of that
fact by Lord Owen himself and his cynical remarks such as What is lost militarily, is also
lost politically! Th at was Croatian reality during the Homeland War.
If the Croatian forces had not mounted operation Winter ’94, there would have been
no Flash or Storm. Without any exaggeration, the operation changed the course of the
war. Th e delusions of the international community about the Serbian strength and power
came to an end. Operation Storm would not have been so successful without the major
eff orts in operation Winter ’94 and subsequent operations. It created almost all the necessary
preconditions for the success of the military operations in the spring and summer
of 1995 - from Flash through Summer ’95 to Storm.
Soon aft er the start of operation Winter ’94 chaos and disorder swept the Serbian
ranks, as demonstrated by the records of the Army of Republika Srpska. Th is is also illustrated
by the transcripts of Karadžić’s talks with the mayors of many municipalities (Grahovo,
Glamoč, Drvar, Prijedor, Šipovo, Ključ, Kupres...), mentioning “misinformation
and rumours, and denouncing of authorities... the lack of fuel, ammunition, clothing,
footwear”. Reference was made to rumours that “General Milovanović was paid millions
of Deutschmarks not to seize Bihać; that military and state security was not functioning,
that some persons were deliberately and systematically spreading misinformation
among the people and the troops with terrible consequences; that the authorities and the
SDS were being undermined; that court-martials were being set up; that there were enemies
in the Serbian ranks”. “Ustashi forces and the ARBiH 5 th Corps were being accused
of coordinated activities”, and stress was laid on the “necessity to suppress rumours and
misinformation because of their destructive eff ect on troops morale”. Records also emphasized
the high number of wounded and sick persons, the high casualty rate of 20%,
missions mounted with only a half of required forces, the lack of fuel for the medical
corps let alone tanks, etc. (See Command of the 2 nd Krajina Corps/Str. Conf. No. 3-36/16
Feb. 1995).
Th e meeting held in the Command of the 2 nd Krajina Corps with the presence of “the
President of Republika Srpska Karadžić, President Krajišnik and General Ninković, and
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