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storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ... storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

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25.04.2013 Views

Th at was certainly one of the most critical periods throughout the Homeland War. At the time Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina faced the almost greatest military, but also political crisis, because of the policy of the Contact Group, Lord Owen in particular. Th e alarm bells rang. What to do? Th ere where only two options - wait or attack! Waiting would open to the Serbs the road to Bihać and seizure of the town. Th e fall of Bihać would defi nitively mean defeat, both militarily and politically. Defeat without a fi ght was out of the question, in spite of all the opposition of the Contact Group which, on the one hand, barred to the Croatian leadership all military action and, on the other, tacitly opened to Karadžić and Mladić the route to Bihać. Th at was unacceptable for Croatia’s state policy. On the other hand, an assault could very quickly relieve the siege of Bihać, especially from the Croatian side, because the border of the temporarily occupied Croatian parts was guarded (in Croatia) by UNPROFOR, while the Serbs from Croatia attacked Bihać in neighbouring Bosnia&Herzegovina. At the same time Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, with Milošević’s support, deluded the international community with their peace off ers. At the Geneva negotiations they demonstrated peacekeeping and cooperativeness, and at Bihać brutal aggression, shelling of the town and thousands of civilian casualties. At the time the prudent and determined Croatian state policy and the strength of the Croatian Army played the key role in the solution of all these problems. In those moments the Croatian state leadership demonstrated all the required boldness, courage, determination and wisdom. Of course, all these facts do not support those people in Croatia who still claim that Croatia waged an aggression against Bosnia&Herzegovina. It its offi cial policy the Republic of Croatia refrained from an all-out assault and from an escalation of the confl ict, but its concentrated attack across Mount Dinara and Livanjsko Polje on 30 November 1994 provided the conditions for halting the siege of Bihać. Th e arrogance and brutality of Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, and their unwillingness to engage in any serious political talks and negotiations could not be tolerated indefi nitely. Refusal to accept the peaceful reintegration of the temporarily occupied Croatian territories into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia and the attack of the rebel Serbs on Bihać from Croatian territory were suffi cient reasons for the Croatian state leadership to mount Operation Winter ’94. Karadžić, Mladić and Martić soon felt quite well the impact of the only possible response to the situation. Th e operation was mounted in the nick of time! A snow storm broke on that day, 30 November 1994 - a mark of the real, well-known harsh winter typical of the area. Th e opening of the avenue towards Knin across Mount Dinara in the middle of winter was a goal bordering on insanity. But it was the only way to help Bihać. In a spirited attack across Mount Dinara and along Livanjsko Polje Croatian forces broke through the Čelebići - Rujani line. While the Serbs from Knin were attacking Bihać, Croatian forces opened up the route of advance towards Grahovo and Knin. When the rebel Serbs fi - nally grasped, several days later, what was going on, it was too late. Croatian troops were already on top of Mount Dinara, and Knin was also in plain view. Th e rebel Croatian Serbs had to forget Bihać, and its siege soon came to an end. Bihać was saved. Th at was a turning point during the war in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e chief commanders of the operation were the Croatian Generals Ante Gotovina and Tihomir Blaškić. 246

HV General Krešimir Ćosić and General Wesley Clark, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) on the JCS staff . Operation Winter ’94 turned out to be a total surprise for Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, and provoked their total mental and military insanity. On Christmas Eve, 24 December 1994, the Chief of the HV General Staff General Bobetko summoned me to his cabinet: Ćosić, we have information that rebel Croatian Serbs are planning an air raid from the Udbina air base on the church in Livno during the Christmas Eve Mass in order to force the Croatian leadership, by causing mass civilian and believer casualties, to withdraw Croatian troops from Mount Dinara and Livanjsko Polje. We took all the necessary steps in order to prevent the insane and brutal bloodshed planned by Karadžić, Mladić and Martić. Th e military leadership of the rebel Croatian Serbs was prepared to commit even such a heinous crime in order to stop operation Winter ’94 and the breakthrough of Croatian forces across Mount Dinara and along Livanjsko Polje via Crni Lug towards Grahovo and Knin. Actually, the Serbian plan came as no surprise considering all their bestial crimes from Vukovar, Škabrnja, Dubrovnik and Ravno to the rocketing of downtown Zagreb with missiles carrying banned cluster bomb warheads, fi red from multiple rocket launchers in 1995. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OPERATION WINTER ‘95 What would have happened if the Croatian forces had not set off ? Th e total exhaustion of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, which had a great number of troops killed and wounded, the 247

HV General Krešimir Ćosić and General Wesley Clark, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) on the JCS<br />

staff .<br />

Operation Winter ’94 turned out to be a total surprise for Karadžić, Mladić and Martić,<br />

and provoked their total mental and military insanity. On Christmas Eve, 24 December<br />

1994, the Chief of the HV General Staff General Bobetko summoned me to his cabinet:<br />

Ćosić, we have information that rebel Croatian Serbs are planning an air raid from the<br />

Udbina air base on the church in Livno during the Christmas Eve Mass in order to force the<br />

Croatian leadership, by causing mass civilian and believer casualties, to withdraw Croatian<br />

troops from Mount Dinara and Livanjsko Polje. We took all the necessary steps in order<br />

to prevent the insane and brutal bloodshed planned by Karadžić, Mladić and Martić.<br />

Th e military leadership of the rebel Croatian Serbs was prepared to commit even such a<br />

heinous crime in order to stop operation Winter ’94 and the breakthrough of Croatian<br />

forces across Mount Dinara and along Livanjsko Polje via Crni Lug towards Grahovo<br />

and Knin. Actually, the Serbian plan came as no surprise considering all their bestial<br />

crimes from Vukovar, Škabrnja, Dubrovnik and Ravno to the rocketing of downtown<br />

Zagreb with missiles carrying banned cluster bomb warheads, fi red from multiple rocket<br />

launchers in 1995.<br />

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OPERATION WINTER ‘95<br />

What would have happened if the Croatian forces had not set off ? Th e total exhaustion<br />

of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, which had a great number of troops killed and wounded, the<br />

247

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