storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Th at was certainly one of the most critical periods throughout the Homeland War. At
the time Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina faced the almost greatest military, but also
political crisis, because of the policy of the Contact Group, Lord Owen in particular. Th e
alarm bells rang. What to do? Th ere where only two options - wait or attack!
Waiting would open to the Serbs the road to Bihać and seizure of the town. Th e fall
of Bihać would defi nitively mean defeat, both militarily and politically. Defeat without a
fi ght was out of the question, in spite of all the opposition of the Contact Group which,
on the one hand, barred to the Croatian leadership all military action and, on the other,
tacitly opened to Karadžić and Mladić the route to Bihać. Th at was unacceptable
for Croatia’s state policy. On the other hand, an assault could very quickly relieve the
siege of Bihać, especially from the Croatian side, because the border of the temporarily
occupied Croatian parts was guarded (in Croatia) by UNPROFOR, while the Serbs
from Croatia attacked Bihać in neighbouring Bosnia&Herzegovina. At the same time
Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, with Milošević’s support, deluded the international community
with their peace off ers. At the Geneva negotiations they demonstrated peacekeeping
and cooperativeness, and at Bihać brutal aggression, shelling of the town and
thousands of civilian casualties. At the time the prudent and determined Croatian state
policy and the strength of the Croatian Army played the key role in the solution of all
these problems. In those moments the Croatian state leadership demonstrated all the
required boldness, courage, determination and wisdom. Of course, all these facts do not
support those people in Croatia who still claim that Croatia waged an aggression against
Bosnia&Herzegovina.
It its offi cial policy the Republic of Croatia refrained from an all-out assault and from
an escalation of the confl ict, but its concentrated attack across Mount Dinara and Livanjsko
Polje on 30 November 1994 provided the conditions for halting the siege of Bihać.
Th e arrogance and brutality of Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, and their unwillingness to
engage in any serious political talks and negotiations could not be tolerated indefi nitely.
Refusal to accept the peaceful reintegration of the temporarily occupied Croatian territories
into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia and the attack of
the rebel Serbs on Bihać from Croatian territory were suffi cient reasons for the Croatian
state leadership to mount Operation Winter ’94. Karadžić, Mladić and Martić soon felt
quite well the impact of the only possible response to the situation.
Th e operation was mounted in the nick of time! A snow storm broke on that day,
30 November 1994 - a mark of the real, well-known harsh winter typical of the area.
Th e opening of the avenue towards Knin across Mount Dinara in the middle of winter
was a goal bordering on insanity. But it was the only way to help Bihać. In a spirited attack
across Mount Dinara and along Livanjsko Polje Croatian forces broke through the
Čelebići - Rujani line. While the Serbs from Knin were attacking Bihać, Croatian forces
opened up the route of advance towards Grahovo and Knin. When the rebel Serbs fi -
nally grasped, several days later, what was going on, it was too late. Croatian troops were
already on top of Mount Dinara, and Knin was also in plain view. Th e rebel Croatian
Serbs had to forget Bihać, and its siege soon came to an end. Bihać was saved. Th at was
a turning point during the war in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e chief commanders of the
operation were the Croatian Generals Ante Gotovina and Tihomir Blaškić.
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