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the ground, meaning, as they emphasized, the actual balance of the military forces of the
warring sides. Due account needs to be taken of the fact that at the time under consideration
the rebel Serbs still controlled about 25% of territory of the Republic of Croatia and
almost 70% of the territory of Bosnia&Herzegovina. In such circumstances no realistic
or objective international politician believed in political solutions acceptable to both
belligerent sides. We knew that Karadžić, Mladić and Martić would never agree to political
concessions found satisfactory by the Croats and Bosniaks until forced to do it by
military force. Th erefore, everything was clear! Only a new balance of military forces on
the ground could lead to new, acceptable political solutions. In this context the Serbian
positions were stated most clearly by Lord Owen, Chairman of the Contact Group, who
oft en pointed out: Don’t hope that you’ll get at the green table what you have not been able
to win by military means. However, Lord Owen forgot that the Serbs, initially with the
help of the JNA, had disarmed already in 1990 all the other republics and peoples in the
former common states, and only then, together with the JNA, waged war on Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina in order to demonstrate their military power and “gallantry”.
Unfortunately, just as Lord Owen did, the international community forgot all
that. Th is applies in particular to the Contact Group, which was very inclined to accept
the right of the stronger party to impose political solutions. And everything was clear! In
the war-time conditions of the early nineteen-nineties, that was the will of the international
community, and the political position of the warring sides was proportional only
and exclusively to their military might and convincing performance on the ground. In
keeping with this, having inherited from the JNA all the occupied parts of the Republic
of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina, Martić and Karadžić held - very long and too long
- a highly important role in all negotiations with the international community, and particularly
during the negotiations in Geneva. Th is lasted until their brutality, arrogance
and intolerance was reduced to the proper political scale and position by the operations
of the Croatian Army and the BiH Army in 1994 and 1995.
Aware of such rules of the game, Karadžić, Mladić and Martić did their best to obtain
fresh forces for the fi nal assault on Bihać through follow-on mobilization of rebel Serbs.
Tension and danger of escalation and spreading of the confl ict - not only at Bihać but
also along almost every front line - grew daily and hourly.
Th e gravity of the situation was also confi rmed by the report of the US Ambassador
in the UN, Mrs. Madeleine Albright, presented to the Security Council on 29 November
1994 at the height of the fi rst Bihać crisis: Th e Bosnian Serbs started the war, and they
are the only ones to reject the Contact Group Plan on the cessation of hostilities. Karadžić’s
and Mladić’s aggression on the UN safe area at Bihać is also supported by the Serbs from
the so-called Krajina, who freely attack the sovereign territory of Bosnia&Herzegovina
ignoring the internationally recognized border bwtween the Republic of Croatia and
Bosnia&Herzegovina. Such conduct, focused on linking and uniting the areas held by the
Serbs from the so-called Krajina with the areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs could also
ignite a broader Balkan war. In the same report, Mrs. Albright stressed in particular: It is
a fact that the attacks on the UN safe area at Bihać originate from the Udbina air base in
Croatia controlled by the rebel Croatian Serbs. All this poses a great security threat to the
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