storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

people responsible for the defence of the so-called RSK. Specifi cally, already in early
1995 the draft of the new “RSK Defence Plan” indicated “that at present it would not
be realistically possible to plan the commitment, in the case of an attack on the RSK,
of either VJ or VRS units” (see Appendix 1, document 18). Similarly, the Serbian press
reported already in July 1995 that SR Yugoslavia, under the pressure of international
economic sanctions, was not longer capable of helping the Serbs across the Drina either
economically or militarily, and that precisely international sanctions had forced Slobodan
Milošević to try to change his past policies by off ering his good services as a peace broker
in the Balkans. Th us, in his interview to Th e Times Milošević claimed that Yugoslavia,
if the sanctions were abolished, would bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table
and added that “he would bring reasonable peace to that part of the country within six
months” (“Poruka iz Srbije”/Message from Serbia/; Nin; 2327, 14 July 1995, pp. 13-14).
Th erefore, it seems that open intervention in Croatia was not acceptable for Milošević
because it would have directly jeopardized his negotiating status and possible lift ing
of sanctions against Yugoslavia. In spite of that, however, Yugoslavia seems to have
promised military help and diplomatic pressure on Croatia to the Krajina leadership.
Specifi cally, Momir Bulatović, then member of the Yugoslav Supreme Defence Council,
claimed that the Supreme Council had sent a telegram - from its extraordinary session
held on 4 August 1995 in the command post at Dobanovci near Belgrade - to General
Mrkšić encouraging him to keep organizing stiff resistance for at least another two days,
aft er which Yugoslavia would be capable of helping him with all available resources (M.
Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja: istiniti politički triler sa poznatim završetkom/Th e Silence
Rules: A True Political Th riller with a Known Ending/; Belgrade, 2004, pp. 181-182; “Rat u
Hrvatskoj 1991-1995”/War in Croatia 1991-1995/; www.centerforhistory.net). Mention
is also made of Milošević’s telephone message to Martić, on the fi rst day of Storm,
“to hold out for fi ve to six days, in order to leave Belgrade scope for action” (Milisav
Sekulić, Knin je pao u Beogradu/Knin Fell in Belgrade/; Bad Vilbel, 2001; 178). Th is is
also supported by the statement of Goran Hadžić, former “RSK” prime minister, aft er
Storm; along with his faith in the survival of the “RSK” in Slavonia and Srijem and the
message that he would never accept the fact that “Krajina” was gone, he answered to the
question on a possible attack of the Croatian Army: I am certain that Serbia will help
this part of Krajina and I have sure indications for that, but I cannot disclose them to the
press at present. I am sure it would have helped that part of Krajina as well if it had put
up at least some resistance(“Srbija će pomoći”/Serbia Will Help/; Nin; 2329, 18 August
1995; pp. 17-19). Milan Milanović, “assistant RSK defence minister”, also spoke about
the organizational capacity and readiness of the remaining “RSK” army to defend itself,
noted that it would expect help from Yugoslavia if it were attacked by a bigger force, and
added that no plans or actions were done without the agreement of Belgrade (“Svi se
boje Srbije”/Everybody is Afraid of Serbia/; Intervju; 22 September 1995; pp. 6-7).
Denying the allegations in the Serbian press about the poor military preparation and
lack of fi nancial support to the SVK, Borislav Mikelić indirectly confi rmed Yugoslavia’s
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