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Lieutenant General Krešimir Ćosić<br />

HOW WE CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE WAR<br />

Operation WINTER ‘94<br />

(memoir notes on the fi rst Bihać crisis - memories of a participant)<br />

The historical events linked with the so-called First Bihać Crisis and its connection<br />

with Operation Winter ’94 of the Croatian Army are almost totally unknown to the<br />

Croatian public. However, it can be claimed without any exaggeration that it was<br />

precisely the Croatian Army and its operation that indirectly prevented the fall of Bihać<br />

and a tragedy of the civil population comparable to the Srebrenica tragedy already in the<br />

winter of 1994, and the probable end of the war in neighbouring Bosnia&Herzegovina,<br />

in which the war criminals Karadžić and Mladić could have become victors. Memories,<br />

facts and original documents bear witness to the fact that the Croatian Army, as far<br />

back as late 1994, while defending Croatia successfully defended Bosnia&Herzegovina<br />

in cooperation with the Fift h Corps of the BiH Army. Th e Serbs knew that the conquest<br />

of Bihać would leave Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina in an almost hopeless military<br />

and political situation. At the time they did everything they could in order to achieve<br />

that goal. At the time many people in the international community thought that the fall<br />

of Bihać was only a matter of days. However, Operation Winter ’94 reversed the course<br />

of the war both in Croatia and in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e Croatian Army was not<br />

impressed or confused by the deceits and threats about the might of the Serbian army<br />

palmed off by Karadžić, Mladić and Martić, with which they had too long deluded the<br />

international community, in particular the Contact Group led by Lord Owen. Operation<br />

Winter ’94 waged by the Croatian Army opened up the way, through Crni Lug, to Grahovo<br />

and Knin, and Bihać was saved. Th e events that followed in the summer of 1995<br />

were almost identical to those in late 1994, because the Second Bihać Crisis in the summer<br />

of 1995 was also linked with Croatian operations Summer 95 and Storm.<br />

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BIHAĆ IN NOVEMBER 1994<br />

FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR IN THE<br />

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA<br />

In late 1994 the war crisis in Bosnia&Herzegovina reached its climax. Th e organized<br />

and coordinated siege of Bihać by Serbian forces from Bosnia&Herzegovina and the<br />

temporarily occupied parts of Croatia, with the logistic support of the Yugoslav Army,<br />

was focused on the fi nal conquest of Bihać, followed by the establishment of total control<br />

over almost the entire territory of Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th e Serbian attacks on Bihać - a<br />

UN safe area - reached their peak on 29 November 1994. Th e fall of the town seemed to<br />

be imminent; it had been totally surrounded for months, with many people killed and<br />

wounded, weary and exhausted defenders and citizens. Th e eff orts of the international<br />

community were largely limited to providing emergency relief for refugees and humani-<br />

239

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