storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Quite clearly, this turn in the national goal has a direct bearing on the effi cient functioning
of government in Republika Srpska and the RSK, making it less free to meet all the
challenges with which it is faced. Th e transfer of the national goal from the constitutive to
the democratic sphere results in a planned destruction of attempts to develop an effi cient
government machinery. Th at is, the Serbian cause regarded as a democratic issue does
not seek its own state subjectivity, it opposes it. Th e so-called democratic solution sees
the Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th is is why its champions swoop down
on both Serbian states and try to make them ineffi cient and incapable of responding to
the requirements of the time.
One of the by-products of such a policy is the forced division, i.e., trialism of power in
the RSK. (...)
However, let me stress once again that the confl ict of concepts is the fundamental
current confl ict in Serbian lands, one that deliberately brings about the destruction of
the state apparatus and is the true culprit for the fall of Western Slavonia. A strong state
is an obstacle to the realization of the concept of coexistence between the Serbs and the
Croats. Moreover, the weakening and the mutilation of the Krajina state have become
the goals of some former Serbian nationalists. Th e destruction is to be wrought from
within, by creating the illusion of an insatiable struggle for leadership and power which
destroys everything around it; a struggle which is an end in itself.
Distinguished assemblymen,
Th is Assembly must once again clearly and publicly state which concept of solution of
the issue it accepts: the so-called democratic or the constitutive one. On that basis, it
should once again determine its position with respect to both Serbia (Yugoslavia) and
Republika Srpska, but also with respect to war and peace, and the concept of its position
in negotiations with Croatia and the international community. As far as I am concerned,
I have declared by choice a long time ago, and I only accept the constitutive solution
which is also the highest degree of achievement of the democratic right of the Serbian
people. Anything else should proceed without me.
On Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Republika Srpska
Distinguished assemblymen, (...)
Hence, I have never faced the dilemma of Belgrade vs. Pale. I have always chosen both
Belgrade and Pale. I have never made any essential diff erences between the two, and do
not intend to make any in the future either. Krajina cannot survive without Belgrade,
but it cannot survive without Pale either. Let us start, for example, with geostrategic
considerations. Any lay person knows that Eastern Slavonia and Baranja cannot survive,
in military terms, without Yugoslavia, just as the western parts of Krajina cannot
survive without Republika Srpska, with which they make up an integral strategic whole.
Insisting on the censure of Pale within the scope of the internal Serbian squabble means
at the same time condemning Krajina to military defeat and disappearance. I think that
Western Slavonia could have been saved if Republika Srpska and the RSK had united
before the aggression, as precursors of overall Serbian unifi cation.
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