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230 23 1995, 18 May Borovo Selo Part of the speech of the RSK President Milan Martić on the state of the crisis aft er the Croatian Army liberated Western Slavonia, and on plans of unifi cation with Republika Srpska as the fi rst step towards the unifi cation of all Serbian lands ___________________ TAPE RECORDING OF THE THIRD MEETING OF THE REGULAR SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA, HELD IN BOROVO SELO ON 18 MAY 1995 [...] Distinguished assemblymen, I shall obviously have to present once again the causes and the scope of the crisis which has befallen us, and to off er ways and means to overcome it. Before I speak up directly and concretely about certain segments of the events in and around Western Slavonia, I must briefl y review the following problems and dilemmas, and raise the following question: what is the Serbian national goal, and has it changed? What is our position with respect to war and peace, to Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Republika Srpska? How do authorities function in Krajina? What is our position with respect to UN and Croatia? Let me reiterate once again: Western Slavonia fell because of inadequate responses to all these questions, and military defeat is the logical aft ermath. On the national goal and its implications for the state crisis (...) Tragically enough it [the creation of a single common state of Serbs in the area of the former Yugoslavia] has not happened yet. Western Slavonia would not have fallen, probably, had there been a single state. However, to make misery and tragedy even worse, unifi cation has not been accomplished owing primarily to internal Serbian quarrels and lack of understanding. Without entering into the underlying reasons of the diff erences, their dual consequences are noticeable: fi rst, the national cause is being treated as a partial issue - separately for Serbia, separately for Republika Srpska, separately for the RSK; second, correlated with the fi rst, is the transfer of the Serbian national cause from the constitutive to the democratic sphere. Both have had a dramatic and lethal eff ect on the overall national interest, and have clearly shown that some of the subjects involved have amended the goals of their struggle. Th ey have uncritically abandoned the programme focused on the creation of a common Serbian state in the belief that it could not be realized at this time. As opposed to this concept, they advocate the solution of the issue through the achievement of democratic rights of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina.

Quite clearly, this turn in the national goal has a direct bearing on the effi cient functioning of government in Republika Srpska and the RSK, making it less free to meet all the challenges with which it is faced. Th e transfer of the national goal from the constitutive to the democratic sphere results in a planned destruction of attempts to develop an effi cient government machinery. Th at is, the Serbian cause regarded as a democratic issue does not seek its own state subjectivity, it opposes it. Th e so-called democratic solution sees the Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia&Herzegovina. Th is is why its champions swoop down on both Serbian states and try to make them ineffi cient and incapable of responding to the requirements of the time. One of the by-products of such a policy is the forced division, i.e., trialism of power in the RSK. (...) However, let me stress once again that the confl ict of concepts is the fundamental current confl ict in Serbian lands, one that deliberately brings about the destruction of the state apparatus and is the true culprit for the fall of Western Slavonia. A strong state is an obstacle to the realization of the concept of coexistence between the Serbs and the Croats. Moreover, the weakening and the mutilation of the Krajina state have become the goals of some former Serbian nationalists. Th e destruction is to be wrought from within, by creating the illusion of an insatiable struggle for leadership and power which destroys everything around it; a struggle which is an end in itself. Distinguished assemblymen, Th is Assembly must once again clearly and publicly state which concept of solution of the issue it accepts: the so-called democratic or the constitutive one. On that basis, it should once again determine its position with respect to both Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Republika Srpska, but also with respect to war and peace, and the concept of its position in negotiations with Croatia and the international community. As far as I am concerned, I have declared by choice a long time ago, and I only accept the constitutive solution which is also the highest degree of achievement of the democratic right of the Serbian people. Anything else should proceed without me. On Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Republika Srpska Distinguished assemblymen, (...) Hence, I have never faced the dilemma of Belgrade vs. Pale. I have always chosen both Belgrade and Pale. I have never made any essential diff erences between the two, and do not intend to make any in the future either. Krajina cannot survive without Belgrade, but it cannot survive without Pale either. Let us start, for example, with geostrategic considerations. Any lay person knows that Eastern Slavonia and Baranja cannot survive, in military terms, without Yugoslavia, just as the western parts of Krajina cannot survive without Republika Srpska, with which they make up an integral strategic whole. Insisting on the censure of Pale within the scope of the internal Serbian squabble means at the same time condemning Krajina to military defeat and disappearance. I think that Western Slavonia could have been saved if Republika Srpska and the RSK had united before the aggression, as precursors of overall Serbian unifi cation. 231

230<br />

23<br />

1995, 18 May<br />

Borovo Selo<br />

Part of the speech of the RSK President Milan Martić on the state of the crisis aft er the<br />

Croatian Army liberated Western Slavonia, and on plans of unifi cation with Republika<br />

Srpska as the fi rst step towards the unifi cation of all Serbian lands<br />

___________________<br />

TAPE RECORDING<br />

OF THE THIRD MEETING OF THE REGULAR SESSION<br />

OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA,<br />

HELD IN BOROVO SELO ON 18 MAY 1995<br />

[...]<br />

Distinguished assemblymen,<br />

I shall obviously have to present once again the causes and the scope of the crisis which<br />

has befallen us, and to off er ways and means to overcome it.<br />

Before I speak up directly and concretely about certain segments of the events in and<br />

around Western Slavonia, I must briefl y review the following problems and dilemmas,<br />

and raise the following question: what is the Serbian national goal, and has it changed?<br />

What is our position with respect to war and peace, to Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Republika<br />

Srpska? How do authorities function in Krajina? What is our position with respect to UN<br />

and Croatia? Let me reiterate once again: Western Slavonia fell because of inadequate<br />

responses to all these questions, and military defeat is the logical aft ermath.<br />

On the national goal and its implications for the state crisis<br />

(...) Tragically enough it [the creation of a single common state of Serbs in the area of<br />

the former Yugoslavia] has not happened yet. Western Slavonia would not have fallen,<br />

probably, had there been a single state. However, to make misery and tragedy even worse,<br />

unifi cation has not been accomplished owing primarily to internal Serbian quarrels and<br />

lack of understanding.<br />

Without entering into the underlying reasons of the diff erences, their dual consequences<br />

are noticeable: fi rst, the national cause is being treated as a partial issue - separately<br />

for Serbia, separately for Republika Srpska, separately for the RSK; second, correlated<br />

with the fi rst, is the transfer of the Serbian national cause from the constitutive to the<br />

democratic sphere. Both have had a dramatic and lethal eff ect on the overall national<br />

interest, and have clearly shown that some of the subjects involved have amended the<br />

goals of their struggle. Th ey have uncritically abandoned the programme focused on<br />

the creation of a common Serbian state in the belief that it could not be realized at this<br />

time. As opposed to this concept, they advocate the solution of the issue through the<br />

achievement of democratic rights of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina.

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