storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

However, aft er the Split Agreement of 22 July 1995 between the Croatian President
Franjo Tuđman and the President of the BiH Presidency Alija Izetbegović, along with
the President of the BiH Federation Krešimir Zubak and the BiH Prime Minister
Haris Silajdžić, the Croatian forces launched Operation “Summer ‘95” and, aft er
liberating Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and mobilizing
and deploying their troops, forced the Serbian army to relegate Bihać to a position of
secondary importance and face the jeopardy of the Croatian strategic attack on the RSK
with its threat of fatal changes in the battlefi eld (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 88, p.
363). Accordingly, the capture of the enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa was actually the
only achieved VRS target among the many planned in March 1995, but even this was
soon neutralized by the loss of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč. It was in such conditions
- torn and overstretched, with a considerably eroded morale - that the VRS was faced
with the Croatian military-police operation Storm, and even this brief overview of the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 shows why the so-called RSK and its army did not
get the anticipated military help from the Bosnian Serbs, i.e., the VRS, during Storm.
According to the CIA comment on the reasons why the Yugoslav Army did not give
direct help and why Serbia allegedly sold the RSK out, “the claims of SVK General
Milisav Sekulić that Milošević intentionally forced decisions that would lead to RSK’a
fall do not hold water, because their were good arguments for most of them”. Th us,
evacuation was ordered only in Knin, and not in Sector North, Moreover, the Yugoslav
Army had already started (actually continued) - with Milošević’s concurrence - to supply
equipment to the SVK and provide offi cers to stiff en its units, as well as some special
operations units. Furthermore, “sending VJ units openly across its borders in support of
the SVK was apparently more than Milošević was willing to do to save the RSK. But even
if he had been willing, the rapidity with which the HV struck and enveloped the RSK left
very little time for the VJ to send adequate forces to the region”. Storm did cause the VJ to
mobilize and deploy large numbers of armour, artillery and infantry to the border with
Eastern Slavonia as a warning to Zagreb, “but it would have taken a major VJ-supported
off ensive out of the RSK enclave to actually deter or slow down the HV off ensive”. In the
view of the CIA analysts, “even if Milošević’s failure to order in the VJ is taken as a sign
of his indiff erence or at least callousness about the RSK’s fate, this does not imply that
Milošević wanted the RSK to fall. He had committed his personal prestige and a lot of
Yugoslav resources to propping up the RSK, and he had been sending VJ offi cers and
equipment to help defend the Krajina Serbs since 1992”. But, as the conclusion goes,
there was a line beyond which he was not willing to go (or could not go?) if by crossing
it Yugoslavia incurred prolonged or increased Western sanctions or high military
costs. With Western governments and their peoples increasingly focused on what was
happening in places like Srebrenica and Bihać, Milošević had fi nally come to that line
(Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 376).
Of course, the lack of direct VJ commitment in the defence of “Krajina” stirred up
quite a reaction in the Serbian public. However, such developments did not surprise the
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