storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

Even Tuđman fi nds it hard to conceal it. With great pomp and at the request of the
international community Tuđman might withdraw his demand on UNPROFOR leaving
Croatia, and that possibility is not to be excluded. Of course, that could only occur with
certain concessions at the expense of the RSK and the SRJ. Croatia will not and may not
wage war against all Serbs, and that is a realistic option if UNPROFOR leaves.
In case of Croatia’s aggression on the RSK, we must be prepared to wage war, for a shorter
or longer time, without the direct help of the VJ and the VRS. Th is is why we must be
prepared to the utmost. Th is is also important because it makes Croatia’s position easier
with respect to the RSK. Should the situation require it, all the Serbian people will defend
Krajina. We are brothers, and mutual help in the life-and-death struggle will be up to the
task of our time. Food, ammunition and manpower are guaranteed as help for the SVK.
Help will be provided without the SRJ being directly involved in the war.
Independently of the help and involvement of the SRJ and the RS, we must be totally
prepared for opposing Croatian aggression. We must be able to wage war independently
for a longer period. Th e degree of our readiness must allow us to deter Croatia from
aggression on our own, or, should aggression take place, to break it down even in its
worst variant even without any help... (...)
We must make use of all the information gained from knowledge on the combat action of
the 5 th Corps [of the ARBiH] and the Croatian army, and particularly on the commitment
of HV forces in the Livno - Grahovo theatre. We can expect a tough and a long battle. We
must meet the start of aggression with an organized defence and fi re system for breaking
down the attack and survival, and protection from murderous artillery fi re. Blocking and
fortifi cation must be completely coordinated with the defence and fi re system plans. Th e
defence areas of lower echelon units must allow every soldier and squad to oppose the
enemy with at least three lines of defence. Along every line the soldier must have a full
profi le shelter, reserve positions for all weapons, observation posts etc. In places where
the terrain does not allow for concealing troop or weapons movement, communication
trenches must be provided between the defence lines. It would be unrealistic to expect
successful defence if it is based on a single line, however well-prepared it may be. A
combat ready corps must have a reserve, however small it may be. An available reserve
allows a fast response to sudden changes of the situation.
Command practices must avoid repeating the mistakes of 1993. Maslenica, the Medak
pocket, Divoselo must not happen again. Th e loss of these points is the result of singleline
defence and lack of proper action. We cannot give combat only at points of ustashi
assault. In addition to defending the area in which we are attacked, we must turn to
assault in places where the enemy is the weakest and where he does not expect our
counter-attack. We must be ready for attack. We must attack with our reserves, and carry
our determined strikes with new forces (volunteers etc.). We must not attack at points
where the ustashi outnumber us, but there where they are “the thinnest”.
Our combat actions must not be reduced merely to restoring what the Croatian army
has captured. Th at would be a utopia which would not have a favourable impact on the
ultimate outcome of the war. We must resort to defence in order to stop Croatian forces
at the points of their attack, and attack ourselves where the ustashi are the weakest. We
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