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forces in Livanjsko Polje and on Mount Dinara. Aft er the success of Operation ”Cincar”
and the liberation of Kupres in early November 1994, the Croatian forces carried out on
Mount Dinara a serious of actions and operations which began to erode the strong VRS
positions (“Zima ‘94”, “Skok 1” and “Skok 2”); aft er Operation “Ljeto ‘95” they entered
Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč, and opened the route for Knin (Balkan Battlegrounds,
Chapter 77, pp. 364-365). In the meantime, Operation Flash (“Bljesak”) also liberated
Western Slavonija. Th e SVK was unable to help their fellow fi ghters, and neither was the
VRS; they retaliated instead by cowardly and terrorist attacks on Croatian cities with
“Orkan” rockets fi tted with cluster munitions, to which Croatia did not respond (Balkan
Battlegrounds, Chapter 77, pp. 296-298). 6
Th erefore, being overstretched and overloaded, VRS forces could not provide
signifi cant help to the SVK even during Operation Flash. Following that, failure in the
retaliatory VRS off ensive (“Plamen ‘95”; the Croats called it “Revenge”) against Orašje
(5 May to 10 June 1995), defended by HVO forces, vividly confi rmed the declining VRS
capacity as compared with the fi rst war years. Although the attack was spearheaded by
armoured and elite infantry units, of course with very strong fi re support, the Serbian
army failed to achieve the planned targets because, unlike the case in 1992 and 1993, it
was now attacking a well-organized enemy backed by considerably better fi re support as
compared with previous years (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 77, pp. 298-299).
However, aft er Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Mrkšić was appointed on 16 May
1995 to command the SVK and run its reorganization, including the creation of the SVK
Special Units Corps, the fall of Bihać into Serbian hands seemed to be inevitable in July
1995; that was the starting date of the fateful Serbian off ensive against Bihać - Operation
“Sword ‘95”. 7 Aft er a strategic dilemma - crush fi rst the ARBiH 5 th Corps or the Croatian
forces on Mount Dinara, on 19 July 1995 the Serbian forces attacked the Bihać enclave
and, in the battle for Cazin on 19-26 July 1995, brought the ARBiH 5 th Corps to the
brink of defeat. Th e commander of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, General Atif Dudaković, later
described this VSK off ensive as his most diffi cult experience of the war. Any objective
analysis can easily confi rm the dramatic situation in which, in the event of Bihać falling
into the hands of the Serbs, they would enjoy an extraordinary strategic advantage over
the HV and cause a new, vast humanitarian disaster. 8
6 Th e author of the comment in the CIA analysis notes that “President Tuđman showed unusual restraint
when he refrained from ordering retaliatory strikes against the Serbs” (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 77,
p. 298).
7 Th e CIA analysis stresses in particular that the Yugoslav Army had also sent «to Krajina a number of veterans,
former JNA offi cers (at the time offi cers of the Yugoslav Army), in order to help with the implementation
of changes, in the analysis of the SVK strategic and tactical-operational situation, and reinforce defence,
because they also brought along additional equipment for the SVK new mobile reserve forces” (Balkan
Battlegrounds, Chapter 88. p. 363).
8 According to the CIA analysis, involved in the SVK off ensive were also an estimated 500 special operations
troops of the Yugoslav Army, the Serbian State Security Service and Arkan’s Serbian Volunteer Guard,
with additional reinforcements - troops from the VJ Special Units Corps - intended to provide shock troops
and combat leaders during the attack of the VSK Special Units Corps (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 88,
p. 363).
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