storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ... storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
Operational implementation of the mission: a) in case of limited aggression: Decisive defence of all points and installations by SVK forces along the lines of enemy assault; attack along selected lines with main forces and seize areas and installations of particular importance for the enemy in order to capture as much space as possible and recover territories seized earlier. CP in the Knin area ACP in the Petrova Gora area b) in case of radical aggression: Th e Serbian Army of Krajina, with the maximum involvement of all the resources of the state and by persistent defence along with active operations, in cooperation with VRS and VJ elements, must prevent the occupation of territory and defend the integrity of the RSK. Prepare and execute active operations in central Dalmatia, in the area between the rivers Kupa and Mrežnica, and eastern Slavonia. Focus on severing communications in Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia. CP in the area of Petrova Gora ACP in the Knin area 3. In case of a general attack of the Croatian army on the RSK, the VJ will discharge its obligations under the Vance Plan by engaging units and recruiting volunteers from the SRY. Th e main reception centre (Bubanj Potok) in Belgrade (Serbia) will be the responsibility of the First Army, and all liaison shall be eff ected through it. Th e VRS will engage in defence and active action with respect to the Corridor, 26 the Cazin Krajina and Livanjsko Polje, and thereby tie up elements of the HVO 27 and the Muslim army and prevent their engagement against the RSK. 4. I HAVE DECIDED, in coordination with offi cial authorities and organizations, and in cooperation with MUP RSK units and elements of the VRS and the VJ, to prevent by decisive defence and resorting to various forms of armed combat the routing of the SVK, the carving up or occupation of RSK territory, in order to preserve territorial integrity. a) in case of limited aggression: In case of HV aggression against the RSK, resort to determined defence along the lines of enemy assault and, through active operations along other lines, with focus on Eastern Slavonia, Kordun and Dalmatia, restore the territory lost earlier, prevent the cutoff of smaller parts of the RSK, infl ict losses, spread hostile forces and, through artillery and rocket strikes on selected targets in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, deter 26 A thin line of territory in Bosnian Posavina which connected the occupied parts of Bosnia&Herzegovina (western area) and of Croatia (the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina) with Serbia. 27 Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (Croatian Defence Council) - armed forces of the Croats in Bosnia&Herzegovina. 216
adical RH aggression, thus preserving the territorial integrity of the state and creating conditions for continued negotiation in terms of RSK recognition. b) in case of radical aggression: During initial operations prevent by decisive defence deeper enemy penetrations in the lines of attack and the carving up of RSK territory and, with the concurrent VJ commitment in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem, infl ict appreciable losses, break down the assault and create conditions for off ensive action. Aft er taking over the initiative, turn to off ensive action in Eastern Slavonia, Kordun and central Dalmatia, cut off parts of RH territory in Eastern Slavonia, Gorski Kotar and central Dalmatia and thereby link up SVK and RS forces, prevent communications with the central part of RH and the regular supply of Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia, and thus disrupt the planned commitment and deployment of Croatian armed forces. Mount active defence operations in other areas. Th is will create favourable conditions for the continued and defi nitive solution of the position of the Serbian people. In case of extremely unfavourable developments on the battlefi eld, sustain operations and turn to specifi c forms of armed struggle and resistance. Carry out the operation in two stages: Stage one: maintain by determined defence the territorial integrity of the RSK, prevent surprise actions and cutting off of parts of RSK territory, spread out enemy forces, infl ict losses and create conditions for off ensive action. Duration 15-20 days. Stage two: aft er taking the initiative, rout by off ensive action and in cooperation with VJ and VRS forces the ustashi forces along the lines of attack in Eastern Slavonia, Dalmatia and Gorski Kotar, and create conditions for continued off ensive action in order to establish control and prevent communications and the supply of RH armed forces and the population in Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia. Duration 10-15 days. Readiness for the fi rst stage immediately, and for the second one aft er the detection of certain indications for a radical HV aggression against the RSK. (...) Main CP in the Knin area ACP in the area of Petrova Gora UNIT MISSION 1) 11 th Corps: in limited aggression and in the fi rst stage of the operation prevent by decisive defence the breakthrough of ustashi forces in Baranja; in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem turn to off ensive action, block Osijek and Vinkovci and create towards Mirkovci-Županja a bridgehead at Andrijaševci - Pritoka - Otoka. In the second stage of the operation, together with Operational Group 2 (18 th and 138 th motorized brigades, 453 rd and 1 st armoured battalions, 51 st mechanized brigade, 16 th motorized artillery brigade, 12 th composite anti-armoured artillery battalion, 1/240 th self-propelled PVO rocket regiment and 155 th light infantry brigade), turn from the 217
- Page 166 and 167: 166 CONCLUSION There have been quit
- Page 168 and 169: 168 REFERENCES Balkan Battlegrounds
- Page 170 and 171: 170 Books: AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY Dav
- Page 172 and 173: 172
- Page 174 and 175: 174
- Page 176 and 177: Th e documents in the second chapte
- Page 178 and 179: 178 CONTENTS APPENDIX 1 - PLANS OF
- Page 180 and 181: 9 1994, 20 November: Regular combat
- Page 182 and 183: 7 1994, 1 February: Report of the O
- Page 184 and 185: 184
- Page 186 and 187: Article 2 As of the date of entry i
- Page 188 and 189: 188 3 1991, 16 May Knin Decision of
- Page 190 and 191: a single political and territorial
- Page 192 and 193: VI Th erefore, aft er the failed at
- Page 194 and 195: should not give cause to confl icts
- Page 196 and 197: VIII Cooperation in health and welf
- Page 198 and 199: Such an act violates the basic inte
- Page 200 and 201: 200 ____________________ Offi cial
- Page 202 and 203: 10. Agreement on the realization of
- Page 204 and 205: the Gornji Vakuf - Konjic axis, and
- Page 206 and 207: est from our brothers and not what
- Page 208 and 209: 208 17 1994, 18 August Proposal of
- Page 210 and 211: 210 1. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE EXIST
- Page 212 and 213: Th is will create favourable condit
- Page 214 and 215: Th e commitment of SVK forces under
- Page 218 and 219: idgehead created earlier to off ens
- Page 220 and 221: (3) 105 th air brigade: Collect by
- Page 222 and 223: [...] To put it simply, the peaceke
- Page 224 and 225: (...) Th e SVK is expected to inspi
- Page 226 and 227: shall operate throughout Croatia. W
- Page 228 and 229: Th e proposal according to which th
- Page 230 and 231: 230 23 1995, 18 May Borovo Selo Par
- Page 232 and 233: Th erefore, territorial integrity,
- Page 234 and 235: No. 01-02-41/1-95 President of the
- Page 236 and 237: 236 30 1995, 30 July Knin From the
- Page 238 and 239: Chief of the HV General Staff Gener
- Page 240 and 241: tarian aid for the survivors. Th ro
- Page 242 and 243: UNPROFOR units on the ground, and h
- Page 244 and 245: efugees to the fact that rebel Serb
- Page 246 and 247: Th at was certainly one of the most
- Page 248 and 249: lockade of Bihać over several mont
- Page 250 and 251: However, we fi nd it diffi cult to
- Page 252 and 253: 252 7 1994, 20 November Report of t
- Page 254 and 255: 254 11 1994, 27 November Oštrelj -
- Page 256 and 257: - 60,000 rounds for AA weapons; - 5
- Page 258 and 259: 1995, 17 February Oštrelj - Petrov
- Page 260 and 261: 1. Hostile forces Th e Croatian Arm
- Page 262 and 263: Black market trade with the (Army o
- Page 264 and 265: 264 26 1995, 11 June Knin Extraordi
Operational implementation of the mission:<br />
a) in case of limited aggression:<br />
Decisive defence of all points and installations by SVK forces along the lines of enemy<br />
assault; attack along selected lines with main forces and seize areas and installations of<br />
particular importance for the enemy in order to capture as much space as possible and<br />
recover territories seized earlier.<br />
CP in the Knin area<br />
ACP in the Petrova Gora area<br />
b) in case of radical aggression:<br />
Th e Serbian Army of Krajina, with the maximum involvement of all the resources of the<br />
state and by persistent defence along with active operations, in cooperation with VRS<br />
and VJ elements, must prevent the occupation of territory and defend the integrity of<br />
the RSK.<br />
Prepare and execute active operations in central Dalmatia, in the area between the<br />
rivers Kupa and Mrežnica, and eastern Slavonia. Focus on severing communications in<br />
Gorski Kotar and Dalmatia.<br />
CP in the area of Petrova Gora<br />
ACP in the Knin area<br />
3. In case of a general attack of the Croatian army on the RSK, the VJ will discharge<br />
its obligations under the Vance Plan by engaging units and recruiting volunteers from<br />
the SRY. Th e main reception centre (Bubanj Potok) in Belgrade (Serbia) will be the<br />
responsibility of the First Army, and all liaison shall be eff ected through it.<br />
Th e VRS will engage in defence and active action with respect to the Corridor, 26 the<br />
Cazin Krajina and Livanjsko Polje, and thereby tie up elements of the HVO 27 and the<br />
Muslim army and prevent their engagement against the RSK.<br />
4. I HAVE DECIDED, in coordination with offi cial authorities and organizations, and<br />
in cooperation with MUP RSK units and elements of the VRS and the VJ, to prevent by<br />
decisive defence and resorting to various forms of armed combat the routing of the SVK,<br />
the carving up or occupation of RSK territory, in order to preserve territorial integrity.<br />
a) in case of limited aggression:<br />
In case of HV aggression against the RSK, resort to determined defence along the lines<br />
of enemy assault and, through active operations along other lines, with focus on Eastern<br />
Slavonia, Kordun and Dalmatia, restore the territory lost earlier, prevent the cutoff<br />
of smaller parts of the RSK, infl ict losses, spread hostile forces and, through artillery<br />
and rocket strikes on selected targets in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, deter<br />
26 A thin line of territory in Bosnian Posavina which connected the occupied parts of Bosnia&Herzegovina<br />
(western area) and of Croatia (the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina) with Serbia.<br />
27 Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (Croatian Defence Council) - armed forces of the Croats in Bosnia&Herzegovina.<br />
216