storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

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Th e commitment of SVK forces under the proposed Plan depends essentially on the provision of ammunition and fuel. According to the plan, the fi rst stage would last 15- 20 days and the second 10-15 days. Th erefore, war with the HV could last 25-35 days. Calculations have turned up the following basic load requirements for a 30-day war: a) Armoured-mechanized units: basic combat load (b/l) 4.5; available 2.5 b/l; shortage 2 b/l. Fuel requirement: 8 full charges (f/c); available 0.2 f/c; shortage 7.8 f/c or 2,400 tons of fuel. b) Artillery: the situation for artillery ammunition varies depending on the type of the weapon. Availability is the best for B-176 mm fi eld guns (7.05 b/l), 152 mm fi eld guns (8.73 b/l), D-20 122 mm howitzers (4.05 b/l) and 130 mm fi eld guns (5.32 b/l). Supply is the lowest in the company and battalion fi re groups, brigade artillery groups and the corps artillery group (128 mm Oganj). Reserves for a 30-day war call for the following supplies: 82 mm mortars, 3 b/l; 120 mm mortars, 2.88 b/l: 128 mm Oganj, 2.13 b/l; 105 mm howitzers, 1.16 b/l; 9M 14 antitank guided missiles, 0.74 b/l. Th e calculations are based on target estimates and actual available ammunition supplies. c) Infantry weapons: with respect to issue requirements (4.5 b/l), the shortages are the following: automatic rifl e, 3.336 b/l; semiautomatic rifl e, 2.95 b/l; M-84 machine gun, 3.82 b/l; 7.9 mm machine gun, 3.75 b/l; sniper rifl e, 2.27 b/l; 12.7 mm Browning machine gun, 2.59 b/l; hand grenades, 2.20 b/l. Conclusion: In case of aggression aft er the possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and in conditions where the RSK would only be defended by the SVK without the help of the VJ and VRS, success is possible only with a total involvement of all state resources and readiness to accept a high casualty toll and accommodation to the most rigorous conditions of a struggle for survival. Moreover, due attention should be paid to the fact that the SVK cannot deal on its own with problems such as the readiness of the troops and offi cers to withstand all the hardships imposed by the war, and the provision of required materiel, primarily ammunition, weapons, equipment etc. Th e current military and political situation and the actions of the Croatian army require a high degree of combat readiness, and that in its turn implies the recruitment of a high number of conscripts for SVK units. On the other hand, this does not match the requirements of the economy and its eff orts to revive production. Th is contradiction must be resolved jointly in a way which will not disrupt SVK combat readiness. 214 3. VJ INVOLVEMENT Th e third variant of the Plan considers defence by the SVK with some commitment of the Army of Yugoslavia, primarily in Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem. It has been developed in a special Appendix which will be fi led along with the Plan of SVK Commitment.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 1. At present and in the immediate future there are no imperative conditions allowing for a major involvement of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) in this area in case of an aggression of the Croatian Army (HV) on the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). 2. Th e current situation calls for a commitment plan according to which the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK) will only defend the RSK without direct help from the VJ and the SVK 25 . Because of this, preparations for defence need to be focused primarily on enhancing SVK capability and on preparing the state and its bodies for total war. 3. Urgent resupply of key materiel, weapons and ammunition should be requested from the VJ. Th e situation must be considered jointly with the VRS, and cooperation and possible joint action agreed. MISSION PROPOSAL 1. Proceed immediately to the draft ing of the RSK Defence Plan and its harmonization with the requirements of the SVK Commitment Plan. 2. Rely on our own potential in resisting HV aggression and preparing for the successful waging of war for a minimum period of 30 days. 3. Start recruiting and training volunteers immediately in accordance with the mission laid down in the SVK Commitment Directive. * * * 2. OUR FORCES Th e actions and activities of the advocates of the war option in dealing with the problems arising from the collapse of the former SFRY both in the territory of the former B&H and in the relations between the RSK and the RH demand the maximum readiness of all state bodies and organizations, and particularly of the Serbian Army of Krajina, in countering any threat to the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Bearing this in mind, the mission of the Serbian Army of Krajina is the following: Carry out grouping along the main defence axes and structures in the territory of the RSK in order to prevent sudden aggression, thwart by determined defence the seizure of vital installations, prevent deeper penetration along the lines of attack of the Croatian army, and be prepared, by vigorous counterattacks along specifi c lines, to free occupied territory and capture, as much as possible, Croatian territories with a Serbian population. Defence actions and counterattacks will include the involvement of VJ and VRS elements, and volunteer units. 25 What is probably meant is the VRS, the Army of Republika Srpska. 215

Th e commitment of SVK forces under the proposed Plan depends essentially on the<br />

provision of ammunition and fuel. According to the plan, the fi rst stage would last 15-<br />

20 days and the second 10-15 days. Th erefore, war with the HV could last 25-35 days.<br />

Calculations have turned up the following basic load requirements for a 30-day war:<br />

a) Armoured-mechanized units: basic combat load (b/l) 4.5; available 2.5 b/l; shortage 2<br />

b/l. Fuel requirement: 8 full charges (f/c); available 0.2 f/c; shortage 7.8 f/c or 2,400 tons<br />

of fuel.<br />

b) Artillery: the situation for artillery ammunition varies depending on the type of the<br />

weapon. Availability is the best for B-176 mm fi eld guns (7.05 b/l), 152 mm fi eld guns<br />

(8.73 b/l), D-20 122 mm howitzers (4.05 b/l) and 130 mm fi eld guns (5.32 b/l). Supply<br />

is the lowest in the company and battalion fi re groups, brigade artillery groups and the<br />

corps artillery group (128 mm Oganj).<br />

Reserves for a 30-day war call for the following supplies: 82 mm mortars, 3 b/l; 120<br />

mm mortars, 2.88 b/l: 128 mm Oganj, 2.13 b/l; 105 mm howitzers, 1.16 b/l; 9M 14 antitank<br />

guided missiles, 0.74 b/l. Th e calculations are based on target estimates and actual<br />

available ammunition supplies.<br />

c) Infantry weapons: with respect to issue requirements (4.5 b/l), the shortages are the<br />

following: automatic rifl e, 3.336 b/l; semiautomatic rifl e, 2.95 b/l; M-84 machine gun,<br />

3.82 b/l; 7.9 mm machine gun, 3.75 b/l; sniper rifl e, 2.27 b/l; 12.7 mm Browning machine<br />

gun, 2.59 b/l; hand grenades, 2.20 b/l.<br />

Conclusion:<br />

In case of aggression aft er the possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and in conditions<br />

where the RSK would only be defended by the SVK without the help of the VJ and VRS,<br />

success is possible only with a total involvement of all state resources and readiness to<br />

accept a high casualty toll and accommodation to the most rigorous conditions of a<br />

struggle for survival. Moreover, due attention should be paid to the fact that the SVK<br />

cannot deal on its own with problems such as the readiness of the troops and offi cers to<br />

withstand all the hardships imposed by the war, and the provision of required materiel,<br />

primarily ammunition, weapons, equipment etc. Th e current military and political<br />

situation and the actions of the Croatian army require a high degree of combat readiness,<br />

and that in its turn implies the recruitment of a high number of conscripts for SVK units.<br />

On the other hand, this does not match the requirements of the economy and its eff orts<br />

to revive production. Th is contradiction must be resolved jointly in a way which will not<br />

disrupt SVK combat readiness.<br />

214<br />

3. VJ INVOLVEMENT<br />

Th e third variant of the Plan considers defence by the SVK with some commitment of<br />

the Army of Yugoslavia, primarily in Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem. It has<br />

been developed in a special Appendix which will be fi led along with the Plan of SVK<br />

Commitment.

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