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Th e commitment of SVK forces under the proposed Plan depends essentially on the provision of ammunition and fuel. According to the plan, the fi rst stage would last 15- 20 days and the second 10-15 days. Th erefore, war with the HV could last 25-35 days. Calculations have turned up the following basic load requirements for a 30-day war: a) Armoured-mechanized units: basic combat load (b/l) 4.5; available 2.5 b/l; shortage 2 b/l. Fuel requirement: 8 full charges (f/c); available 0.2 f/c; shortage 7.8 f/c or 2,400 tons of fuel. b) Artillery: the situation for artillery ammunition varies depending on the type of the weapon. Availability is the best for B-176 mm fi eld guns (7.05 b/l), 152 mm fi eld guns (8.73 b/l), D-20 122 mm howitzers (4.05 b/l) and 130 mm fi eld guns (5.32 b/l). Supply is the lowest in the company and battalion fi re groups, brigade artillery groups and the corps artillery group (128 mm Oganj). Reserves for a 30-day war call for the following supplies: 82 mm mortars, 3 b/l; 120 mm mortars, 2.88 b/l: 128 mm Oganj, 2.13 b/l; 105 mm howitzers, 1.16 b/l; 9M 14 antitank guided missiles, 0.74 b/l. Th e calculations are based on target estimates and actual available ammunition supplies. c) Infantry weapons: with respect to issue requirements (4.5 b/l), the shortages are the following: automatic rifl e, 3.336 b/l; semiautomatic rifl e, 2.95 b/l; M-84 machine gun, 3.82 b/l; 7.9 mm machine gun, 3.75 b/l; sniper rifl e, 2.27 b/l; 12.7 mm Browning machine gun, 2.59 b/l; hand grenades, 2.20 b/l. Conclusion: In case of aggression aft er the possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and in conditions where the RSK would only be defended by the SVK without the help of the VJ and VRS, success is possible only with a total involvement of all state resources and readiness to accept a high casualty toll and accommodation to the most rigorous conditions of a struggle for survival. Moreover, due attention should be paid to the fact that the SVK cannot deal on its own with problems such as the readiness of the troops and offi cers to withstand all the hardships imposed by the war, and the provision of required materiel, primarily ammunition, weapons, equipment etc. Th e current military and political situation and the actions of the Croatian army require a high degree of combat readiness, and that in its turn implies the recruitment of a high number of conscripts for SVK units. On the other hand, this does not match the requirements of the economy and its eff orts to revive production. Th is contradiction must be resolved jointly in a way which will not disrupt SVK combat readiness. 214 3. VJ INVOLVEMENT Th e third variant of the Plan considers defence by the SVK with some commitment of the Army of Yugoslavia, primarily in Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem. It has been developed in a special Appendix which will be fi led along with the Plan of SVK Commitment.
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 1. At present and in the immediate future there are no imperative conditions allowing for a major involvement of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) in this area in case of an aggression of the Croatian Army (HV) on the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). 2. Th e current situation calls for a commitment plan according to which the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK) will only defend the RSK without direct help from the VJ and the SVK 25 . Because of this, preparations for defence need to be focused primarily on enhancing SVK capability and on preparing the state and its bodies for total war. 3. Urgent resupply of key materiel, weapons and ammunition should be requested from the VJ. Th e situation must be considered jointly with the VRS, and cooperation and possible joint action agreed. MISSION PROPOSAL 1. Proceed immediately to the draft ing of the RSK Defence Plan and its harmonization with the requirements of the SVK Commitment Plan. 2. Rely on our own potential in resisting HV aggression and preparing for the successful waging of war for a minimum period of 30 days. 3. Start recruiting and training volunteers immediately in accordance with the mission laid down in the SVK Commitment Directive. * * * 2. OUR FORCES Th e actions and activities of the advocates of the war option in dealing with the problems arising from the collapse of the former SFRY both in the territory of the former B&H and in the relations between the RSK and the RH demand the maximum readiness of all state bodies and organizations, and particularly of the Serbian Army of Krajina, in countering any threat to the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Bearing this in mind, the mission of the Serbian Army of Krajina is the following: Carry out grouping along the main defence axes and structures in the territory of the RSK in order to prevent sudden aggression, thwart by determined defence the seizure of vital installations, prevent deeper penetration along the lines of attack of the Croatian army, and be prepared, by vigorous counterattacks along specifi c lines, to free occupied territory and capture, as much as possible, Croatian territories with a Serbian population. Defence actions and counterattacks will include the involvement of VJ and VRS elements, and volunteer units. 25 What is probably meant is the VRS, the Army of Republika Srpska. 215
- Page 164 and 165: 164 To Croatian citizens of Serbian
- Page 166 and 167: 166 CONCLUSION There have been quit
- Page 168 and 169: 168 REFERENCES Balkan Battlegrounds
- Page 170 and 171: 170 Books: AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY Dav
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- Page 174 and 175: 174
- Page 176 and 177: Th e documents in the second chapte
- Page 178 and 179: 178 CONTENTS APPENDIX 1 - PLANS OF
- Page 180 and 181: 9 1994, 20 November: Regular combat
- Page 182 and 183: 7 1994, 1 February: Report of the O
- Page 184 and 185: 184
- Page 186 and 187: Article 2 As of the date of entry i
- Page 188 and 189: 188 3 1991, 16 May Knin Decision of
- Page 190 and 191: a single political and territorial
- Page 192 and 193: VI Th erefore, aft er the failed at
- Page 194 and 195: should not give cause to confl icts
- Page 196 and 197: VIII Cooperation in health and welf
- Page 198 and 199: Such an act violates the basic inte
- Page 200 and 201: 200 ____________________ Offi cial
- Page 202 and 203: 10. Agreement on the realization of
- Page 204 and 205: the Gornji Vakuf - Konjic axis, and
- Page 206 and 207: est from our brothers and not what
- Page 208 and 209: 208 17 1994, 18 August Proposal of
- Page 210 and 211: 210 1. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE EXIST
- Page 212 and 213: Th is will create favourable condit
- Page 216 and 217: Operational implementation of the m
- Page 218 and 219: idgehead created earlier to off ens
- Page 220 and 221: (3) 105 th air brigade: Collect by
- Page 222 and 223: [...] To put it simply, the peaceke
- Page 224 and 225: (...) Th e SVK is expected to inspi
- Page 226 and 227: shall operate throughout Croatia. W
- Page 228 and 229: Th e proposal according to which th
- Page 230 and 231: 230 23 1995, 18 May Borovo Selo Par
- Page 232 and 233: Th erefore, territorial integrity,
- Page 234 and 235: No. 01-02-41/1-95 President of the
- Page 236 and 237: 236 30 1995, 30 July Knin From the
- Page 238 and 239: Chief of the HV General Staff Gener
- Page 240 and 241: tarian aid for the survivors. Th ro
- Page 242 and 243: UNPROFOR units on the ground, and h
- Page 244 and 245: efugees to the fact that rebel Serb
- Page 246 and 247: Th at was certainly one of the most
- Page 248 and 249: lockade of Bihać over several mont
- Page 250 and 251: However, we fi nd it diffi cult to
- Page 252 and 253: 252 7 1994, 20 November Report of t
- Page 254 and 255: 254 11 1994, 27 November Oštrelj -
- Page 256 and 257: - 60,000 rounds for AA weapons; - 5
- Page 258 and 259: 1995, 17 February Oštrelj - Petrov
- Page 260 and 261: 1. Hostile forces Th e Croatian Arm
- Page 262 and 263: Black market trade with the (Army o
Th e commitment of SVK forces under the proposed Plan depends essentially on the<br />
provision of ammunition and fuel. According to the plan, the fi rst stage would last 15-<br />
20 days and the second 10-15 days. Th erefore, war with the HV could last 25-35 days.<br />
Calculations have turned up the following basic load requirements for a 30-day war:<br />
a) Armoured-mechanized units: basic combat load (b/l) 4.5; available 2.5 b/l; shortage 2<br />
b/l. Fuel requirement: 8 full charges (f/c); available 0.2 f/c; shortage 7.8 f/c or 2,400 tons<br />
of fuel.<br />
b) Artillery: the situation for artillery ammunition varies depending on the type of the<br />
weapon. Availability is the best for B-176 mm fi eld guns (7.05 b/l), 152 mm fi eld guns<br />
(8.73 b/l), D-20 122 mm howitzers (4.05 b/l) and 130 mm fi eld guns (5.32 b/l). Supply<br />
is the lowest in the company and battalion fi re groups, brigade artillery groups and the<br />
corps artillery group (128 mm Oganj).<br />
Reserves for a 30-day war call for the following supplies: 82 mm mortars, 3 b/l; 120<br />
mm mortars, 2.88 b/l: 128 mm Oganj, 2.13 b/l; 105 mm howitzers, 1.16 b/l; 9M 14 antitank<br />
guided missiles, 0.74 b/l. Th e calculations are based on target estimates and actual<br />
available ammunition supplies.<br />
c) Infantry weapons: with respect to issue requirements (4.5 b/l), the shortages are the<br />
following: automatic rifl e, 3.336 b/l; semiautomatic rifl e, 2.95 b/l; M-84 machine gun,<br />
3.82 b/l; 7.9 mm machine gun, 3.75 b/l; sniper rifl e, 2.27 b/l; 12.7 mm Browning machine<br />
gun, 2.59 b/l; hand grenades, 2.20 b/l.<br />
Conclusion:<br />
In case of aggression aft er the possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and in conditions<br />
where the RSK would only be defended by the SVK without the help of the VJ and VRS,<br />
success is possible only with a total involvement of all state resources and readiness to<br />
accept a high casualty toll and accommodation to the most rigorous conditions of a<br />
struggle for survival. Moreover, due attention should be paid to the fact that the SVK<br />
cannot deal on its own with problems such as the readiness of the troops and offi cers to<br />
withstand all the hardships imposed by the war, and the provision of required materiel,<br />
primarily ammunition, weapons, equipment etc. Th e current military and political<br />
situation and the actions of the Croatian army require a high degree of combat readiness,<br />
and that in its turn implies the recruitment of a high number of conscripts for SVK units.<br />
On the other hand, this does not match the requirements of the economy and its eff orts<br />
to revive production. Th is contradiction must be resolved jointly in a way which will not<br />
disrupt SVK combat readiness.<br />
214<br />
3. VJ INVOLVEMENT<br />
Th e third variant of the Plan considers defence by the SVK with some commitment of<br />
the Army of Yugoslavia, primarily in Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem. It has<br />
been developed in a special Appendix which will be fi led along with the Plan of SVK<br />
Commitment.