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Free forces would become available by regrouping existing forces and their in-depth
deployment; this would also deal with the problem of hostile air-borne assault and
infi ltrated reconnaissance-sabotage groups, and allow active operations at General Staff ,
corps and brigade levels.
Th e proposed Decision calls for the defence of towns and larger settlements. Th e
brigades will start preparing for defence immediately and, aft er fortifi cation and
obstruction, designate the forces for the defence of settlements.
Th is Decision envisions the training of forces for rapid intervention and prevention
of desertion. Th is is a must particularly in view of the 1994 experience. Initial grouping
must provide the basis for off ensive action. Major redeployment from one area to
another at the start of aggression has proved to be a poor solution. Any plan involving
the redeployment of major forces from the 11 th Corps area to the areas of other SVK
corps would pose particularly great diffi culties.
Th e directive for SVK commitment specifi cally regulates the assembly, preparation
and engagement of volunteers and volunteer units in the fi ght against the Croatian
armed forces. Volunteer preparation needs to be dealt with before aggression. Th e
Yugoslav Army has designated a reception centre for volunteers from the SRJ (Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia); in the RSK Erdut and Bruška have been designated as points
for the reception of volunteers and their preparation for integration in the SVK system.
According to our estimate, in the fi rst ten days of the war we could accept and train for
combat a number of volunteers equivalent to 3 or 4 brigades.
Let me draw attention to the main features of the force ratio for the variant according
to which SVK would engage in defence without substantial reliance on the Army of
Yugoslavia and the Army of Republika Srpska.
Th e total manpower ratio would be 1.4 to 1 to the advantage of the HV (100,000 to
69,000). Th e tank ratio also amounts to 1.4 to 1 (425 to 301), the ratio for armoured
personnel carriers 2 to 1 (223 to 111), while the 60 to 120 mm mortar ratio is to our
advantage, 1 to 0.3. Th e HV enjoys the greatest advantage in antiaircraft rockets, 6.5 to 1,
and 155 mm howitzers, 5.5 to 1. Th e HV also enjoys a signifi cant advantage in multiple
rocket launchers and 130 mm fi eld guns, 2.6 to 1.
In terms of these ratios, the proposed Decision can be realized provided we have the
required ammunition.
Th e commitment plan according to the variant involving RSK defence by reliance on
our own forces implies struggle for survival and the highest casualty toll.
Success calls for the preparation of all other forces of the state and society for war. And
that cannot be achieved if the Plan of RSK Defence is not prepared immediately. Th e
commitment plan is a part of that plan.
Th e defence plan must provide for the changeover of all state organizations and
businesses to a wartime regime.
Th e RSK defence plan must regulate the obligations of all persons responsible for
specifi c missions and specify their mandatory preparations for defence mission
accomplishment. Immediate steps are required in order to improve the conscripts’
attitude towards their military obligations.
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