storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

General Staff had traditionally counted on the Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav armies to act
as their strategic reserve, and during Storm these reserves were not available. Th e Army
of Republika Srpska (VRS) was still more than willing to fulfi ll this role, but the VRS
General Staff itself was short of reserve formations it needed to contend with ARBiH
attacks across Bosnia. Th e battlefi eld situation in Bosnia made it impossible for the
Bosnian Serbs to contribute anything more than a few counterattacks around Grahovo
and Bihać (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 376).
An overview of the war in Bosnia shows that such a conclusion is justifi ed. According
to the CIA analysis, on instructions of the military leadership of Republika Srpska of 8
March 1995 the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) planned a number of off ensive actions
(“Sarajevo ‘95”, “Spreča ‘95”, Sadejstvo ‘95”, “Lukavac ‘95”, “Zvijezda ‘95”), intended to
seize a large portion of ARBiH-held territory north of Tuzla, the areas of Mounts Igman
and Bjelašnica, expand the Posavina corridor and remove the threat facing Doboj,
strangle the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica and capture them if their UN protectors
withdrew, and reduce the enclave of Goražde to a 3 km radius around the town itself.
Plans had to include two additional operations to cut routes through the Neretva valley
to the sea near Dubrovnik (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 73, pp. 289-290). Th ese very
ambitious plans for the VRS show that that the Serbs wanted to use military actions
in order to force the Muslim and Croatian leadership, and thereby the international
community as well, to acknowledge the facts on the ground, which were abundantly to
the favour of the “Serbian cause”.
However, these plans were largely beyond the momentary capacity of the VRS because
the changes in the balance of forces between the ARBiH and VRS, which fi rst became
apparent in 1994, were very obvious by 1995 (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 78, pp. 300-
303). Th us, instead of capturing territory the VRS had to defend itself from the reorganized
Army of BiH. 5 Moreover, the VRS also had to defend itself from the attack of Croatian
5 Th us, on 20 March 1995 the ARBiH launched spring off ensives, the targets being the Serbian-held radio
transmitters atop Mount Vlašić near Travnik (Operation «Domet») and Stolice on Mount Majevica east of
Tuzla. Th ere was also fi erce fi ghting on Mount Treskavica. Th e ARBiH was very successful in the fi rst attack,
while in the second it suff ered a major defeat. However, in spite of its substantial losses in both operations,
UN military observers reported obvious improvements in terms of equipment, planning, organization and
execution of attacks; Bosnian soldiers now had adequate small arms and ammunition, fl ak jackets, helmets
and radios. Similarly, the failure of the Serbian operation «Sadejstvo ‘95» in April 1995, intended to expand
the corridor at Boderište 8 km south of Brčko, defended by ARBiH forces and the Croatian Defence Council
(HVO) 108th brigade shows that the VRS - in spite of its superiority in armour, artillery and other heavy
weapons - was unable to break through ARBiH defences (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 78, pp. 300-303).
Of course, the VRS also had to prepare for defence from the long announced ARBiH off ensive intended to
relieve Sarajevo, which started in mid-June 1995; although it failed and even if ARBiH had extremely high
losses, the off ensive tied down considerable VRS forces which could not be committed elsewhere. Th e VRS
also suff ered considerable losses (Chapter 80, pp. 307-314). Aft er January 1995 the fi ghting was particularly
intensive in the Bihać enclave where the ARBiH 5th Corps assisted by the HVO 101st regiment and logistic
support from Croatia put up a tough and active defence against the superior forces of Bosnian and Croatian
Serbs, and special force units from Serbia. Th is is supported by the operations «Una ‘95» and «Zora ‘95» of
the ARBiH 5th Corps in May 1995, and operations «Trokut 1» in June 1995 (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapters
74, 75, 79).
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