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- the population was signifi cantly committed to defensive tasks, and the ratio of the
active to the reserve component was defi nitively in favour of the former; thus, out of
50,000 troops, as many as 38,000 were on the active list; 3
- confl icts in the state leadership and frequent relief of command and corps offi cers, with
no eff ect in terms of improved defence;
- markedly negative impact of diff erent lines of command, primarily of special units of
the ministry of the interior which oft en “exceeded authority, controlled the army and
harassed offi cers”;
- undisciplined volunteer paramilitary units with “self-styled voivode”, unwilling to
accept subordination to the joint command.
In remarking that his [Mrkšić’s] job was made even more diffi cult because “he got
back fi ft een thousand mobilized refugees”, the generals noted that no major progress
in the organization of the army was made either by Mile Mrkšić, “offi cer of an elite
Yugoslav Army unit”, who was expected to organize rapid intervention units capable
of deep strikes and “splitting Croatian territory”. Th e conclusion was that “in terms of
personnel and equipment the SVK was inferior to the aggressor”; however, it also referred
to exaggerated data about HV’s strength fl oated around in the public, which created
panic in the population along with rumours such as “the ustashi (ustaše) are coming
and slaughtering people” etc. Attention was also drawn to the “mistaken conviction”
that Knin was being defended in Belgrade (Radovan Pavlović, “Uzroci vojnog poraza
Krajine. Serija propusta u organizaciji vojske RSK”/Causes of the Military Defeat of the
Krajina - A Series of Omissions in the Organization of the RSK army”/; Politika, 27 August
1995).
Th e causes of defeat were also commented on in an interview by Dragan Vasiljković
- “Captain Dragan”. Disappointed by the outcome of the situation, he expressed a
pronouncedly negative view about the “constantly” poor eff ect of Serbian myths
because of which “since the Kosovo battle the Serbians have not admitted defeat and
keep looking all the time for a new Vuk Branković”. According to his opinion, based on
experience acquired over four years of combat action and training, the defeat was caused
by lack of concern for the army, military and government disorganization, and neglect
of basic military requirements such as food and equipment, resulting ultimately in a
poorly prepared army. According to Vasiljković, “Krajina was in total disarray from the
beginning to the very end”. When explaining the reason why he left the so-called RSK,
he said that on the eve of the attack he met in Knin with Patriarch Pavle, Milan Martić,
Mile Mrkšić and Ratko Mladić - who then claimed then that “his army would defend
every inch of the RSK”. Since the fall of Bosansko Grahovo opened to the Croatian forces
the route to Knin, Vasiljković claims that he suggested counter-strikes towards Šibenik
and Zadar, but his proposals were pessimistically opposed by General Dušan Lončar.
3 When considering the number of SVK troops, it is interesting to note that the proposal of «SVK commitment
plan», prepared in early 1995, mentions 69,000 possible SVK members according to the «variant
where SVK engages in defence without major reliance on the Yugoslav Army and the Army of the Republika
Srpska». See Appendix 1, document 18.
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