storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ... storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...
160 “ETHNIC CLEANSING” OR SELF-WILLED DEPARTURE The most intriguing part of Operation Storm and one that still causes most controversies is the following question: did the rebel Serbs abandon the occupied area of the Republic of Croatia (UNPA Sectors North and South) of their own free will or were they expelled, i.e., did Croatia carry out ethnic cleansing of the rebel Serbs with its Operation Storm? Some people blame Croatia on the basis of the “Brijuni transcript”, which is interpreted in diff erent ways. Some interpretations are so radical that they actually demonstrate total ignorance of the issue; thus, some individuals lay stress on the “conspiracy theory” and experience war as a deal between Croatia’s and Serbia’s leaders. 528 Actually, the issue cannot be reduced to the year 1995, but regarded instead in the context of the historical process since the start of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia up to the end of the war. Th e very fi rst statements of the rebel Serbs’ representatives clearly expressed their position and refusal to recognize the lawfully elected Croatian authorities, which soon spilled over into the position that coexistence with the Croats would be impossible. Th e claim that life with the Croats was impossible dominated, fi ve years aft er the breakout of the rebellion, in the RSK and in the public appearances of its inhabitants, known and unknown alike. 529 Considering their mass turnout at the plebiscite on the “autonomy of the Krajina” and their mass participation in the armed rebellion, the massive departure of ethnic Serbs from Croatia was logical. Th e departure of the Serbs from Croatia in large numbers was announced in the early and in the fi nal phase of the war. Th us, in late September 1991 the JNA 169 th Motorized Brigade from Loznica was transferred to Kordun within the scope of the off ensive of the main body of the SFRY armed forces against Croatia. Th e brigade soon fell apart, and it was decided to pull it back to Serbia. Th e decision provoked the response of the local rebel Serb leadership: Th e news that you are withdrawing the 169 th Motorized Brigade from the Karlovac position has spread across Kordun like wildfi re. People have started to evacuate spontaneously, and there was anxiety, confusion and desertion among the troops. If you let the 169 th mtbr leave its position before being replaced by another JNA unit, you will be responsible for the disastrous consequences. Because of this, before you pull back the 528 Th us, the ease with which journalist A. Dragojević identifi es the Brijuni meeting with the Nazi plan for the extermination of Jews in the Second World War demonstrates her total ignorance of the issue and concepts at stake. Andrea Dragojević, “Brijunski protokol” (Th e Brijuni Protocol), Zarez, Zagreb 21, Oct. 204, 9. 529 For more see Nikica Barić, “Je li 1995. godine Hrvatska počinila ‘etničko čišćenje’ Srba?” (Did Croatia Carry out ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of the Serbs in 1995?), Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 36/2, 2004, 441-446.
169 th mtbr we are again asking you to bring in another unit which will protect this people together with our TO units. 530 Th ere was no justifi cation for such a view, because Croatian forces were on the defensive and the JNA in one of the better phases of its war against Croatia. Similarly, the combat readiness report of the Knin Corps Command of January 1992 stated that the people of the Krajina were absolutely against the JNA leaving the area: Th e Serbian people would leave together with the Corps units because they did not trust the UN peacekeeping force without the JNA in Krajina. 531 A similar case refers to the response of the RSK population and political parties aft er Operation Flash, as reported by the Security Department of the General Staff of the Serb Krajina Army to the SVK commander: Th e view prevails among the people that Western Slavonia was sold out by Serbia and Slobodan Milošević, and that the consequence of this new situation is a more intensive exodus of the population of this part of Krajina mainly to the SRJ, that is, Serbia. 532 Aft er that the president of the Krajina Serbs wrote, in his letter to the President of the Republic of Serbia: Mr. President, the tragedy which struck the Serbian people by the latest Croatian aggression against Western Slavonia has grave and incalculable consequences for the solution of the overall Serbian issue. Not only has territory been lost, not only have hundreds of civilians come to grief; what enhances anxiety even more in this terrible moment is the widespread popular belief that the Serbian issue has been betrayed by the very Serbs. Rumours about its surrender are spreading across the Krajina; people claim in disbelief that we have been forgotten both by Serbia and by Republika Srpska. In many villages and towns people are packing and preparing to leave. 533 At the time Milošević was requested to send, on a temporary basis, about two thousand troops of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Ministry of the Interior to garrisons in the Krajina in order to restore the psychological stability of the population with their presence and give the rebel Serbs in the RSK time to improve and stabilize the situation. 534 Because of Operation Flash the RSK Republican Civil Defence Staff ordered the mobilization of all regional and municipal civil defence units with the following tasks: continuous duty service; “organized and preparatory measures and actions for the implementation of all protection and rescue steps with particular focus on securing shelter, evacuation and relief of the population”; determination of the condition and capability of enterprises and organizations of interest for protection and rescue. 535 530 VSA MORH: OpŠTO Vojnić, 11 Oct. 1991; Request. 531 HDA, RSK: 9th Corps Command, str. conf. no. 23-34 of 22 Jan. 11992; Report on the Corps’ combat readiness for 1991. 532 POA: SVK General Staff , Security Dept., str. conf. 33-136 of 5 May 1995; Reactions of the population and of the political parties to the loss of Western Slavonia. 533 POA: RSK, President of the Republic, 6 April 1995; Request. Th e context obviously demonstrates that the date is wrong. A letter with the identical contents was also delivered to the SRJ President Zoran Lilić. 534 Ibid. 535 POA: RSK, Republican Civil Defence Staff , no. str. conf. 01-44/95 of 1 May 1995; Order. 161
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- Page 168 and 169: 168 REFERENCES Balkan Battlegrounds
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- Page 194 and 195: should not give cause to confl icts
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- Page 200 and 201: 200 ____________________ Offi cial
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169 th mtbr we are again asking you to bring in another unit which will protect this people<br />
together with our TO units. 530 Th ere was no justifi cation for such a view, because Croatian<br />
forces were on the defensive and the JNA in one of the better phases of its war against<br />
Croatia.<br />
Similarly, the combat readiness report of the Knin Corps Command of January 1992<br />
stated that the people of the Krajina were absolutely against the JNA leaving the area: Th e<br />
Serbian people would leave together with the Corps units because they did not trust the UN<br />
peacekeeping force without the JNA in Krajina. 531<br />
A similar case refers to the response of the RSK population and political parties aft er<br />
Operation Flash, as reported by the Security Department of the General Staff of the<br />
Serb Krajina Army to the SVK commander: Th e view prevails among the people that<br />
Western Slavonia was sold out by Serbia and Slobodan Milošević, and that the consequence<br />
of this new situation is a more intensive exodus of the population of this part of Krajina<br />
mainly to the SRJ, that is, Serbia. 532 Aft er that the president of the Krajina Serbs wrote,<br />
in his letter to the President of the Republic of Serbia: Mr. President, the tragedy which<br />
struck the Serbian people by the latest Croatian aggression against Western Slavonia has<br />
grave and incalculable consequences for the solution of the overall Serbian issue. Not only<br />
has territory been lost, not only have hundreds of civilians come to grief; what enhances<br />
anxiety even more in this terrible moment is the widespread popular belief that the Serbian<br />
issue has been betrayed by the very Serbs. Rumours about its surrender are spreading<br />
across the Krajina; people claim in disbelief that we have been forgotten both by Serbia<br />
and by Republika Srpska. In many villages and towns people are packing and preparing to<br />
leave. 533<br />
At the time Milošević was requested to send, on a temporary basis, about two thousand<br />
troops of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Ministry of the Interior to garrisons in the<br />
Krajina in order to restore the psychological stability of the population with their presence<br />
and give the rebel Serbs in the RSK time to improve and stabilize the situation. 534 Because<br />
of Operation Flash the RSK Republican Civil Defence Staff ordered the mobilization of<br />
all regional and municipal civil defence units with the following tasks: continuous duty<br />
service; “organized and preparatory measures and actions for the implementation of all<br />
protection and rescue steps with particular focus on securing shelter, evacuation and<br />
relief of the population”; determination of the condition and capability of enterprises<br />
and organizations of interest for protection and rescue. 535<br />
530 VSA MORH: OpŠTO Vojnić, 11 Oct. 1991; Request.<br />
531 HDA, RSK: 9th Corps Command, str. conf. no. 23-34 of 22 Jan. 11992; Report on the Corps’ combat<br />
readiness for 1991.<br />
532 POA: SVK General Staff , Security Dept., str. conf. 33-136 of 5 May 1995; Reactions of the population and<br />
of the political parties to the loss of Western Slavonia.<br />
533 POA: RSK, President of the Republic, 6 April 1995; Request. Th e context obviously demonstrates that the<br />
date is wrong. A letter with the identical contents was also delivered to the SRJ President Zoran Lilić.<br />
534 Ibid.<br />
535 POA: RSK, Republican Civil Defence Staff , no. str. conf. 01-44/95 of 1 May 1995; Order.<br />
161