storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

the liberation of Knin, all that remained was the liberation of the entire occupied area
of the Republic of Croatia. Some of the corps districts accomplished this goal already
on 7 August by gaining control of the state border, while others followed suit within a
few days. But those were tactical developments which had no bearing on the strategic
mission. 513
Th e many problems associated with the execution of Storm were superseded by its
success. In practice successful operations are analyzed in a diff erent way as compared
with failures, although that is not correct. Th e major undeniable problem was the
undisciplined conduct of some troops, which aff ected unit combat readiness and tarnished
the overall success of the operation. Th is was most conspicuous in the reserve units.
Th us, according to reports, discipline in some units was mediocre and more diffi cult to
enforce with respect to troops who had taken part in the war in 1991 and claimed greater
rights than just mobilized troops; 514 some were also occasionally found to be drunk, and
posed diffi culties when they had to be prevented from abusing discovered weapons and
wasting ammunition in great quantities. 515 Reports also noted the “selective torching and
devastation of buildings” even aft er combat, with the questionable conclusion that it had
been done by “local inhabitants who had fl ed into the woods” and deliberately “set fi re to
farm buildings in order to discredit the HV” or by “HV troops who had fl ed the chetnik
terror in 1991 and sought revenge”. 516 Furthermore, reports recorded “an invasion of
late liberators” with comments that “plundering and torching had been prevented to a
considerable extent”, at least in part of the liberated area. 517
Th e most serious forms of undisciplined conduct involved incidents, which obviously
could not be avoided in spite of all the emphasis placed on the respect of the Geneva
Conventions, occasioned largely by revenge because of the conduct of the rebel Serbs
and the Serbian paramilitary units in Croatia since early 1990, but also by gain. Th us,
unfortunately, some Croatian soldiers or civilians murdered part of the remaining
Serbs, and torched and destroyed part of the property of Serbs who had fl ed Croatia. 518
513 CIA analysis: the Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak pronounced the operation complete as of 1800
on 7 August. Th ere remained, however, a few pockets of resistance for the HV to stamp out on the next day.
In the south the Gospić and Split Corps Districts, the MUP Special Police and the 1st HGZ coordinated a
drive against the last major SVK pocket of resistance around Donji Lapac - Srb. Th e action was complete by
2000 hours. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Confl ict, 1900-1995, 374.
514 MORH, GSHV: APO 1106, cl. 8/95-10/10, reg. no. 1106-140.dp-1/95/137/1 of 12 August 1995; Report.
515 MORH, GSHV: APO 2121, cl. 81/95-01/01, REF. NO. 2121-92/2-95-28 of 5 September 1995; Analysis.
516 MORH, GSHV: ZZP Zagreb, IZpM-1 Sisak, cl. 8/95-01/10, reg. no. 1075-IZpM-1/95-96 of 8 August 1995;
Report.
517 SVA MORH, ZZPS: 6th Home Guard Reg., IZM Gorje, cl. 8/95-01-88, reg. no. 8311.01-01/95-1170 of 12
August 1995; Report.
518 N. Barić, “Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1900-1995.” (Serbian Rebellion in Croatia 1900-1995), 559. Cf.
“Izvještaj vojna operacija “Oluja” i poslije, I. dio: bivši sektor Jug” (Report: Th e Military Operation ‘Storm’
and Its Aft ermath; Part I. Former Sector South); Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Zagreb,
1999.
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