storm - Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog ...

capable of longer resistance. Th e Serbs did not expect a radical HV attack, and that was
the problem. Th ey expected an HV attempt to cut across the Krajina and link up with
the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Two days before the start of Storm the Intelligence Department of
the SVK General Staff anticipated that the HV would attempt to attack towards Sunja-
Kostajnica - Dvor na Uni - valley of the river Una, and to break through from Ogulin
via Slunj to Cazinska Krajina. It was believed that the HV objective was intersecting the
Krajina and lift ing the blockade of the ARBiH 5 th Corps, thereby creating a new situation
“which they would off er to the international community as a matter of fact and propose
a decision on its acceptance”. 511
Aft er the decision to “reduce” the front the SVK began to fall apart. Th e process spread
from Dalmatia through Lika to Kordun and Banovina. At the end of the second day of
the operation the Intelligence Directorate of the HV General Staff rightly assessed that
all the planned objectives in the area of Dalmatia and Lika had been accomplished: the
North Dalmatian and Lika Corps were crushed, the liberation of Knin totally disoriented
the “state” and “military” structure, and led to a substantial decline of morale in the
population and military units, the corridor towards Western Bosnia was opened and
the blockade of the ARBiH 5 th Corps lift ed. Th e fi nal conclusion was that the command
system was broken up and that the SVK no longer existed as an organized opponent.
It was acknowledged that during the fi rst two days of the operation no SVK brigade in
Banovina and Kordun was routed, although the defence line was penetrated at several
points. 512
Aft er that the situation in the theatre depended entirely on HV actions. In the second
stage of the operation attack momentum was lost along some lines. Th e already mentioned
halt of the Split Corps District allowed Serbian forces to withdraw from Northern
Dalmatia and Lika, but this helped to avoid civilian casualties because HV units would
have pressed against them along the Knin - Gračac - Srb line. Th e second important
delay occurred in Banovina where the 2 nd Guards Brigade could not be exploited for
breaking through from Petrinja to Dvor na Uni. Because of this the brunt of the fi ghting
for Dvor na Uni was borne by less prepared reserve units. In this way the main body of
the SVK Banija Corps and part of the Kordun Corps managed to pull out.
By eff ecting the linkup of the HV with the ARBiH in Lika on 6 August Storm
accomplished one of its strategic objectives - the lift ing of the blockade of Gospić and
of the ARBiH 5 th Corps. Since the rebel government had already been brought down by
511 VSA MORH: SVK General Staff , Intelligence Dept., str. conf. no. 2/307-4 of 2 August 1995; Intelligence
information. CIA analysis: Operation Storm started at 0500 with immediate eff ect throughout the Krajina.
One of the HV’s key undertakings was a program of coordinated airstrikes and sabotage missions by ground
forces against the SVK’s command and control facilities across the RSK. It was a stunning success, disrupting
the ability of the SVK General Staff to coordinate the overall defence of the RSK and interfering with
operational communications down to the brigade level. Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the
Yugoslav Confl ict, 1990-1995, 370.
512 SVA MORH, ZZPS: Intelligence Directorate, cl. 804-0895-172/02, reg. no. 512-06-06/1-95-1953 of 5 August
1995; Intelligence information.
155